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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later the 
 would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon.” (Cox 1993: 63) 
 
1.1 Problem outline 
Since the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs)1 positioned themselves as financiers of development 
and turned to sub-Saharan African countries from the early 1970s, they have not limited themselves 
to lending, but instead continuously diversified the range of their activities to eventually include 
policy development. As the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had repeatedly 
been experiencing institutional transitions, their notion and conceptualization of development was 
changing, as were the instruments and policy recommendations provided by them. (cf. Goldman 
2005) 
The relationship between the Northern creditors and the Southern debtors was often conflict-ridden. 
In order to get access to development finance from the Bank and the Fund, countries had to agree to 
comply with BWI headquarters-set conditions and to implement certain macroeconomic policies. 
These compulsory policy reforms have greatly weakened the autonomy of recipient countries. A 
lack of local enthusiasm for what appeared to be BWIs imposed-programs was widely believed to 
be due to limited “country ownership” of these programs, leading to delays and very often to 
failures in implementation. Consequently, the Bank and Fund began to argue the case for greater 
national ownership of development policies. (cf. ODI 2001; Steward and Wang 2003) 
A new policy tool, the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach, was introduced at the end of the 
1990s and replaced its widely criticized predecessor, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). It 
is regarded as the most concrete and widespread manifestation of the BWIs’ efforts to increase 
country ownership of development programs (cf. ibid.: 2).2 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) now form the basis for virtually all multilateral lending to the least developed countries. 
They are policy documents produced by borrower countries outlining their economic, social and 
structural programs to reduce poverty and they are to be implemented over a three-year period. In 
order to access development funds, such as for instance debt relief, the development of a PRSP is 
                                                 
1
 The term Bretton Woods Institutions or the abbreviation BWIs stands for the World Bank Group and the 
International Monetary Fund. The World Bank Group is also referred to as the World Bank (WB) or the Bank. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is also referred to as the Fund.  
2
 The BWI's conceptualizations of development and their development policies (such as Structural Adjustment 
Programs, Poverty Reduction Strategy etc) are discussed in more detail in chapter 2.  
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mandatory for Southern Countries’ governments, although these Poverty Reduction Strategy 
documents should be drawn up in a participative process and be “owned” nationally. As they must 
receive endorsement from the boards of both the Bank and the Fund before becoming effective, the 
actual scope of national ownership of PRSPs is limited. Herein lies a fundamental contradiction – 
PRSP policies adopted need to fit within a strategic framework imposed by the Bank, and should 
simultaneously be freely chosen and “owned” by client governments (cf. Rückert 2006: 62). The 
scope and effect of such Bank and Fund loan conditionalities on development have been widely 
discussed in academia. Conditionalities are a mechanism for ensuring that macroeconomic core 
policies of borrowing countries fit within the Bank’s and Fund’s development agenda, and there is 
not much space for alternatives. Hence true “national ownership” in terms of self-determination is 
hardly possible. Putting it in the Bank's terms the country is now “in the driver's seat”, though the 
driver's route on its development path is already pre-set (cf. Buchardt 2003).  
The PRSP approach assumes that participation of various stakeholders, and most of all Civil Society 
Organizations, will increase national ownership. To what extent it does so must depend on who 
participates, whether participation actually affects the design of the policies or merely provides 
endorsement to externally designed programs, as well as on the scope and coverage of the PRSP 
formulation process. (cf. Steward and Wang 2003: 4) This makes country ownership a rather 
flexible concept.  
 
1.2 Research objective and outline 
This paper will re-examine the Bank's and Fund's roles in development by analyzing their practices 
with respect to ownership in Malawi3. Malawi has had a long and deep, although often problematic, 
relationship with the BWIs and its development strategies were significantly influenced by them. In 
order to get access to debt relief under the multilateral Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative, 
Malawi also developed Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (the first full PRSP was approved in 
2002). In what follows, the PRSP formulation process is to be analyzed, and I am concerned with 
how and why the idea of “ownership” has been actively promoted by the World Bank, as well as 
with the tensions and contradictions that resulted from applying it in development policy.  My 
analysis is guided by three research questions:  
(a) To which extent has the BWIs' development paradigm changed since the introduction of 
                                                 
3
  I chose Malawi for several reasons: it was one of the first sub-Saharan countries to start drawing up a PRSP, it 
qualified for HIPC debt relief and due to its long aid relationship with the Bank and Fund, it seemed to illustrate the 
characteristics of the aid relationship between the Bretton Woods Institutions and Southern Countries well. 
Furthermore, my personal academic interest is focused on development economics and on sub-Saharan Africa and I 
realized that research interest about Malawi is comparatively low in Austria. These factors formed the basis for the 
choice of my research topic.  
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the PRSP approach with respect to ownership and participation? 
(b) What was the aid relationship between the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Government 
of Malawi, Parliament and Civil Society in the first PRSP process and how did it change 
over time?  
(c) Did Malawi “own” its PRSP? 
My hypothesis, which is to be tested by this analysis, is that the introduction of the PRSP approach 
did not lead to any substantial changes in the aid relationship between the BWI and the Malawian 
counterparts, and that country ownership remained very limited. The aid relationship is still 
determined by the BWIs' neoliberal4 development paradigm, and the policy shift towards increased 
ownership was meant to increase local support for neoliberal policies through creating consensus by 
means of participation.  
Through a critical reconstruction of the context of the emergence and implementation of the concept 
of ownership within the scope of the PRSP approach, it is possible to assess its meaning and 
function. My analysis is based on a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework5 (Cox 1983; 2001; 2002; 
Augelli and Murphy 1998; Gill 1993) and the research method applied, Maarten Hajer's 
Argumentative Discourse Analysis (Hajer 1995; 2002; 2006), also draws on Gramsci (Scherrer 
2007: 78). A neo-Gramscian perspective has much to offer for an understanding of world orders, 
questions of development and the role of multilateral institutions in it as it “does not take 
institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning 
itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox 1983: 129). It 
puts emphasis on how existing social or world orders have come into being and how norms, 
institutions or practices emerge (Bieler and Morton 2004: 86). Furthermore, it is accompanied by 
the relativistic assumption that discourse in some sense creates reality, and that “the objective truth 
of the discourse lies within and is produced by the discourse itself rather than ‘the external object’” 
(Ashley 1986: 281 quoted in Femia 2009: 32). Argumentative Discourse Analysis will show how 
ownership was discussed in Malawi, who raised his/her voice on this topic, what was said and how 
different stakeholders made the case for ownership, applying which arguments.  
                                                 
4
  In this study, the terms “neoliberalism” or “neoliberal” refer to a set of economic principles centered on competition, 
deregulation, privatization and financial liberalization (cf. Neunhöffer; Plehwe and Walpen 2006). It has a political 
dimension too as it doesn’t favor state intervention into what is considered to be the market (cf. Ötsch 2009). An 
example for neoliberal reform policy is the Washington Consensus (see chapter 2.2.2). 
5
  The paper at hand is not on (neo-)Gramscian thought, but I use Gramsci's and neo-Gramscian scholars' ideas to help 
understand the BWIs' role in development. I use Gramsci's concepts and analytical tools, isolating them from his 
view of history and leaving aside his political program. However I am aware that this is not possible outright, since I 
believe – as Gramsci also did (Augelli 1988: 5) – that totally detached, impartial social scientific analysis is not 
possible, and neither is separating a theoretical approach from its (initial) purpose. For a further explanation see also 
chapter 3.1. 
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In chapter 2 that follows, I will first give an overview of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, their conceptualization of development and their activities in their roles as 
financiers and policy makers. The third chapter will present the research design, outline the 
theoretical approach and research method. In chapter 4, I will take a closer look at the Bank's and 
the Fund's activities in Malawi during the PRSP process and present my interim findings. The last 
chapter presents a conclusion of my findings. 
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2. THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF 
IDEAS AND POLICIES  
 
2.1 Development: intended social change  
The term “development” is often used without any further explanation, taking its meaning for 
granted. In this short section I will give a brief overview of the history of ideas of development and 
outline how its meaning has changed over time.  
Drawing on Cowen and Shenton (1995), Nustad (2004) starts his discussion of development as a 
concept by outlining a dichotomy, namely the distinction between the immanent and the intentional 
meanings of the word development.  
 
This conceptual pair […] seeks to distinguish between two usages of the word development: as active 
intervention, as in development project (intentional) and as process that unfolds over time, as in 
‘development of capitalism’ (immanent). It was when development in the immanent sense was seen as 
creating problems that could be solved by active intervention, that intentional development was 
created. (Nustad 2004: 14) 
 
 Hence every question concerned with development is a question of planned social change, and 
consequently a political question (Boas and McNeill 2004: 4).  
Since its inception – which is usually associated with US President Harry Truman's 1947 speech 
about foreign aid and burden sharing, also called the “Truman Doctrine” – development has been 
seen as a linear process towards increased prosperity facilitated through improvements in the fields 
of infrastructure, agriculture and industrialization. Western societies and industrial countries, which 
were perceived as “developed” were set as a role model, and resemblance to them was the goal of 
development. This theoretical model created a condition, “underdevelopment”, which it had set out 
to treat (cf. Nustad 2004). The pair of development and underdevelopment is thus mutually 
constitutive. The idea was that underdeveloped, poor countries would catch up if they would 
become nation-states and get capital, technology, democracy, education and the rule of law. (cf. Hart 
2000; Nustad 2004) The absence of these factors was ascribed to internal causes in the country 
concerned and thus technical assistance was regarded as necessary. From its inception, development 
assistance was linked to the agency of elites, as “experts and scientists were given the responsibility 
for guiding the development of peoples seen as lacking it” (ibid.: 17). 
 
Post-war development assistance can be broken down into seven decades and associated with 
different development paradigms: the birth of the Bretton Woods system in the 1940s; the era of the 
Marshall Plan and modernization theory in the 1950s; the heydays of industrialization and 
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dependency theory in the 1960s; the shift towards aid as an answer to poverty in the 1970s; the “lost 
decade” of stabilization and structural adjustment in the 1980s; the emphasis on good governance 
and democracy in the 1990s; and the decade of the Millennium Development Goals (cf. Moyo 
2009: 10). Throughout the past 70 years the idea of intentional development has not been 
overcome.6  
The Truman Doctrine, which set the ground for development aid, formed the basis of U.S. foreign 
policy from World War II until the end of the 1980s. Thus early development aid must be seen a 
product of the Cold War and instrument to advance the interests of the U.S. in Southern Countries. 
Until the 1960s, development assistance was part of the budgetary item “mutual security”. (cf. 
Nuscheler 2004: 78; Ötsch 2009: 90-1) As outlined above, resemblance to the West was seen as the 
ultimate goal of development at this time and modernization theory put forward the idea that 
underdeveloped, poor countries could catch up if they: would become democratic nation-states 
governed by the rule of law, accumulate capital and focus on economic performance, acquire 
technology to enable industrial production, and increase the level of education. Tradition was 
perceived as an obstacle to development. Walt W. Rostow’s Stages of Growth model, which 
postulates that development occurs in five stages, was the most important model in modernization 
theory. “Traditional societies” – characterized as hierarchic, fatalistic, heavily dependent on 
agriculture, and by their low use of technology – will reach the “Age of High Mass Consumption” 
after passing three sequential stages of development. The third stage, “Take-off” is of particular 
importance and occurs when society is driven more by economic processes than tradition what 
manifests in the growth of the rate of productive investment from five percent or less to more than 
10 percent. For modernization theorists historic conditions and international economic structures 
were only of minor importance. (cf. Nuscheler 2004: 78; 214-5; Fischer et al. 2004: 35)  
It was quite the opposite for dependency theorists, mainly scholars from Latin America, who 
                                                 
6
  The idea of development was challenged since the late 1980s by scholars of postdevelopment and postcolonial 
studies which articulated dissatisfaction with the concept and practice of development (Ziai 2007: 3) and 
“deconstructed” (cf. Esteva 1992) it as a myth that was imposed by the West (cf. Fischer et. al. 2004: 41). Gustavo 
Esteva (1992),  Arturo Escobar (1995), Wolfgang Sachs (1992), and others, had become disillusioned with 
development policy and advanced the view that “the industrial model of society could no longer be conceived as 
ahead in the evolutionary scale in the light of ecological predicament, that the project of development, which had 
been an instrument of the Cold War was bound to exhaust itself after 1989, that the development era had not led to 
progress of catching up for most of the ‘developing world’ but to a widening gap between rich and poor countries, 
and finally, that ‘development’ was a ‘misconceived enterprise’ in that it implicitly aimed at eliminating cultural 
diversity through the universalizing of Western institutions” (Ziai 2007: 4). In search for “alternatives to 
development” (Escobar 1995: 215) postdevelopment scholars looked into new social structures in grassroots 
movements, local communities and the informal sector which were characterized by different conceptions of the 
economy, politics, and of knowledge (Ziai 2007: 5). The focus of postcolonial studies is on the relationship between 
local cultures and global forces, the analysis of imperial power and neo-colonialism as economic dominance and 
“epistemic violence”(cf. Spivak 1988), with euro-centrism being a widely discussed issue (cf. do Mar Castro Varela 
and Dhawan 2005; Ashcroft et al. 2000).   
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influenced development thinking in the 1960s and 1970s. They criticized modernization theory for 
focusing on overcoming tradition as a barrier to economic growth, and insisted that external factors, 
such as unequal terms of trade had been the reason behind economic and social misery in Southern 
Countries. The integration of former colonies into the world market, which had been dominated by 
capitalist Europe at this time, led to dependence on foreign trade. (cf. ibid.:  36-38) This “structural 
dependency” (Nuscheler 2004: 216) applied to trade, financial flows and debt, as well as to class 
and power relations. Consequently, dependency theorists such as Henrique Cardoso or Andre 
Gunder Frank, argued in opposition to free market economists that Southern Countries needed to 
de-link from the world market and follow an auto-centric development path in order to overcome 
the disparities in North-South relations. Dependency theory7 became a leading paradigm in 
development thinking in times of world economic and political crisis in the 1970s and can be linked 
to the demand for the New International Economic Order, a set of proposals for promoting the 
interests of Southern Countries in international economic relations. However, in their theories, 
dependency theorists did not transcend the dichotomy of development and underdevelopment, but 
were concerned with finding the real cause for underdevelopment. This shows the extent to which 
(intentional) development had established itself as hegemonic idea by then. (cf. Nustad 2004: 17-
20)  
Current development policies are primarily concerned neither with industrialization, nor with 
radical changes in the terms of trade, but with neoliberal concerns such as stabilizing the world 
market and liberalizing trade and financial flows. Development practice and thinking is currently 
dominated by economists who tend to treat questions of development, like poverty, as purely 
technical, apolitical categories. Most of the policy recommendations of international institutions 
active in development are founded on the functionalist logic that economic questions can be 
separated from politics. (cf. Boas and McNeill 2004) “The space for debate and discussions about 
development and development policy [was] increasingly confined to the ‘operational framework’ of 
the neoliberal political agenda” (Weber 2006: 188). It seems that political debates over development 
have been settled, especially when it comes to the big players such as development banks and 
donors agencies in the development industry.  
 
2.2 The Bretton Woods Institutions and development: means and ends 
For the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, development was, from the outset, 
                                                 
7
  There are several approaches in dependency theory which vary to some extent. Early approaches put forward by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and its first Secretary General, Raúl Prebisch, were 
followed by approaches by Henrique Cardoso and Andre Gunder Frank or the European scholar Dieter Senghaas.  
14 
defined as the promotion of economic growth, though the variables and functions of the Bank's 
growth model have changed over time (cf. Woods 2006: 43). The Bank's ethical and economic 
arguments for development have been varying and “what is so remarkable is the rapidity with which 
the Bank's new political rationalities shift and often contradict one another, yet circulate and become 
legitimate”, as Goldman (2005: 266) highlights in his elaborate study of the World Bank8. 
The World Bank’s and the International Monetary Fund's core business is lending money in order to 
support countries, projects and policies that may be risky, which take a long time and will not 
necessarily attract private sector bankers or investors. This position gives them considerable 
bargaining power in their relations with their clients, borrowing governments. They can lend, 
influence lending and assistance commitments from other donors, or even stop lending. Equally, 
they can define, impose and monitor development paths of countries through conditionality. (cf. 
Gowan 1999; Woods 2006). The Bank's and Funds' influence “in the short term depends on local 
conditions and whether politicians have an interest in using Fund and Bank resources or 
conditionality to bolster a particular position or policy. Longer term influence of the institutions is 
affected by the perceived quality and economic impact of their advice” (ibid.: 8).  
Theoretically, the IMF and World Bank are run and governed by their 187 member countries, but in 
fact most of these countries have little to say, as voting power is proportional to the contributions 
paid to the Bank, resembling a shareholder structure. Due to their weak economic position Southern 
Countries’ influence is very limited.  Also, more than three quarters of the members are not directly 
represented on the Board of Directors and virtually no senior management staff comes from Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs); and many countries have no national working in the Bank. (cf. ibid.: 
190) 
 
2.2.1 The early World Bank and McNamara's presidency 
The World Bank, via its lending arm9, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), started lending after it was founded in 1944, and its activities were focused on the 
reconstruction of war-torn Western Europe and Japan. Goldman (2005) and Gowan (1999) explain 
that the early World Bank, which was heavily influenced by the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. State 
Department and Wall Street acted reluctantly based on conservative banker ethics, and invested in 
                                                 
8
 In his book “Imperial Nature. The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of Globalization”, 
Michael Goldman (2005) gives a very detailed overview on development thinking and the role of ideas in the World 
Bank and much of this chapter is draws on this book.  
9 The World Bank comprises two institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and the International Development Association (IDA). The latter also comprises the International Finance 
Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes. 
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capital intensive projects to rebuild old colonial infrastructure and promote industrialization, except 
when the State Department insisted on lending to Cold War allies. These conflicting rationalities 
made the World Bank ineffectual and it played a minor role in development and political economy. 
(cf. Goldman 2005: 50) Only after its first clients achieved a certain level of income per capita, the 
Bank turned towards new clients: countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America which had been 
termed developing countries after their process of decolonization and independence.  (cf. Boas and 
McNeill 2004: 210; Goldman 2005: 50). At the time of the BWIs' foundation, poverty reduction was 
not on the agenda at that time since development was not understood as a process of “social 
upliftment” (ibid.: 31), and the rural poor for instance were not the target group of the Bank's capital 
investments. (cf. Woods 2006: 39-41.) This changed heavily in the next two decades, under Robert 
McNamara’s presidency.  
Goldman summarizes the causes for the reorientation of the Bank and the redefinition of its mission 
by pointing out that  
 
the idea of fighting poverty with large capital interventions came from the historical conjuncture of a 
number of related events: the bloody and costly U.S. war in Indochina; the crash of the U.S. economy; 
the yearning of capital-flush Western Europe, Japan and OPEC nations to find investment 
opportunities outside the U.S. economy; a revolutionary spirit spreading through the global South; and 
a world crisis in the ‘international food order’ spurred not by food shortages but by a flood of cheap 
U.S. food exports (Goldman 2005:31)  
 
He further explains that this historical conjuncture became a great opportunity for McNamara  “to 
harness the North's capital surpluses and the South's economic woes into a new development regime 
that helped transform the World Bank into a global ‘defender of the world's poor’” (ibid.: 32). 
McNamara voiced criticism about the failure of the Bank's development model which has been 
pursued do far and insisted on lending to the poorest countries and for concerns which had been 
avoided by the Bank's economists before. Development, as it had been conceptualized in the 1970s, 
became the World Bank's central mission and the institution, together with the IMF, would employ a 
wide range of instruments in seeking to accomplish it.  
Upon his initiative, capital was made available for new clients in the form of project lending for 
multi-sector and society-wide interventions, replacing individual loans in specific types of 
infrastructure. “Equity” and “poverty alleviation” became lending objectives and McNamara began 
to stick to the language and political strategy of “development” rather than “investment banking” 
and thereby created a new development discourse. Internally, McNamara faced skepticism and 
opposition as his staff, dominated by economists, doubted that “investing in the poor” would be a 
financially sound, efficient and effective route to productive capital expansion and overall economic 
growth. (cf. Goldman 2005: 72-77; Woods 2006: 43-45) In order to make lending and borrowing 
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large amounts of capital for things other than infrastructure and industrialization possible, the World 
Bank “needed to generate a major shift in perceptions and the institutional means to put theory into 
practice” and “to win support for his interventionist logic and expansive development agenda, 
McNamara needed to sell it as rational, politically and economically necessary, and profitable. The 
effort required a new organizational culture and a much grander development science” (Goldman 
2005: 72, emphasis in original). In order to create that perception and not to lose the confidence of 
the Bank's main constituents through making a discursive shift, the World Bank heavily expanded 
its capacities for research, economic modeling, data collection, report writing, and dissemination of 
information on the so-called less developed world. The research department recruited heavily and 
although vacancies were predominantly filled with economists, some political scientists and 
sociologists were also employed. The trickle-down effect was to be replaced by a new paradigm in 
development thinking: problems needed to be measured, analyzed and overcome. (cf. ibid.: 76-7.) 
With this shift McNamara also introduced rational choice theory into the World Bank and helped it 
to get established as a tool for public policy.10   
Under the presidency of McNamara the World Bank started lending for projects in education in 
order to solve the problem of low literacy rates, nutrition and ill health, population control, rural 
development as well as urban poverty concerns in growing megacities. This focus at first dismayed 
the donors and dominant players in development finance, such as Wall Street and the U.S. Treasury, 
but by the 1980s these types of poverty alleviation investments have become standard for the Bank, 
Northern investors and donors as well as the international development agency network which 
comprises bilateral aid agencies, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and charities. (cf. ibid.: 
71) The larger political-economic context of his era, the battles for the New International Economic 
Order and strong support for Keynesianism, helped McNamara to successfully convince critics that 
this shift in development lending was sound and necessary (cf. Woods 2006: 33-4). Furthermore, 
Northern creditors were no longer presented as beneficiaries of development financing, but were 
replaced by the new target group, the world's poor in Southern Countries. The Bank's annual reports 
became a discursive tool intended to a broader audience and their contents focused on the 
socioeconomic aspects of poverty. Goldman (2005: 83) highlights that these were not mere 
rhetorical changes, rather they were changes with meaningful and material consequences. The 
                                                 
10
  Ötsch (2009) and Amadae (2003) explain how political and economic ideas are presented as scientific results in 
order to get accepted and thus able to influence decision making and public policy. Rational choice theory grew out 
of the efforts of the RAND Corporation – the first U.S. military think thank – to develop a "science" of military and 
policy decisionmaking. The context of the emergence of the theory, the Cold War, shaped the theory and its scope. 
As Secretary of Defense McNamara had links to RAND and by introducing rational choice theory into the World 
Bank and making it a major tool for development policy, he promoted capitalist libertarian ideas which formed the 
basis of rational choice theory. (cf. Amadae 2003; Ötsch 2009) 
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introduction of a new development regime and the broadening of the Bank's lending portfolio 
allowed it to influence domestic policies and decision making in borrowing countries more deeply.  
 
2.2.2 The debt crisis and the Washington Consensus  
However, the Bank's efforts to solve the problems of development and to reduce poverty in the 
1970s were unsuccessful and because of imbalanced terms of trade11, many developing countries 
became highly indebted and net importers of food from the North. Deriving from volatile flows of 
finance capital in and out of the South, poverty and indebteness grew as a result of the Bank's 
development agenda. In the early 1980s, Southern Countries' level of debts became unsustainable12 
and the “debt crisis” started in 1982 with Mexico declaring bankruptcy. Many other Southern 
Countries were heavily indebted and faced a disastrous external position. The debt crisis became a 
threat to the very foundations of global financial stability as the survival of international creditors 
depended on getting paid back for loans. Debt restructuring was seen as the only solution to the 
crisis, and debt relief was not on the agenda, quite the contrary, the World Bank and IMF insisted on 
full repayment of debts. It was assumed that most countries were not insolvent, but illiquid, and that 
economic reform measures would answer their problems. (cf. Raffer and Singer 2001: 166). As the 
international private lending market dried up and commercial banks were no longer willing to lend 
to indebted countries, the World Bank and IMF took advantage of the vulnerable position of their 
borrowers and their own unique role as powerful development banks with a global mandate, and 
positioned themselves as managers of debt restructuring.13 Hence the debt crisis was important with 
respect to BWI influence on debtor economies, resulting in a dramatic shift in power and in 
spreading the neoliberal agenda to the global South. (cf. Moyo 2009; Raffer and Singer 2001) 
The BWIs became the lead players in the economic restructuring of so called third world countries, 
and other donors, which tend to stick to BWIs’ accreditation, loans, and programs, followed them. 
The IMF formed the Structural Adjustment Facility and later the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility to lend money to defaulting nations in order to help them repay their debts. From then on, 
                                                 
11
  Income from trade was falling drastically at these times, prices for commodities such as oil and sugar had fallen to 
historically low levels. For example, oil fell from $38 per barrel in 1980 to $15 in 1986 and sugar from 65 cents per 
pound to less than 7 cents per pound in 1978 (Moyo 2009: 19).  
12
 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a level of debt is sustainable if 
it allows a debtor country to meet its current and future debt service obligations in full, without recourse to further 
debt relief or rescheduling, avoiding accumulation of arrears, and if it allows for an acceptable level of economic 
growth. (cf. UNCTAD 2000) 
13
 After the Bretton Woods System had collapsed and the U.S. had ended direct convertibility of the dollar to gold in 
1971, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank underwent an institutional crisis as their mandates had   
been ruptured. Some scholars (Raffer and Singer 2001) doubt if the BWIs' further existence without reform after the 
1970s has been legitimate, and they also highlight that without the debt crisis the BWIs would have lacked a 
mission. The debt crisis gave the BWIs reason for their further existence and an opportunity to reposition 
themselves.  
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any financial support to debtors was contingent on approval by the BWIs which set down the 
conditions debtors needed to meet in order to continue borrowing or get access to debt rescheduling. 
Any Southern Country which wanted to receive funding from the Bank and the Fund had to undergo 
so-called Structural Adjustment Programs. (cf. Raffer and Singer 2001: 158-174. Woods 2006: 146)  
 
In the early 1980s economic neoliberalism was on the rise and there was a growing consensus 
among leading policymakers that there were structural impediments to the smooth functioning of 
economic markets. Government involvement was regarded as an obstacle to growth and it was 
argued that governments should liberalize their economies in favor of the laissez-faire paradigm, 
which highlighted the self-regulation of private markets. While the strongest economies worldwide, 
the U.S. under the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the UK lead by Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, were undergoing economic reforms focusing on deregulation, privatization, cuts in public 
expenditure, and trade liberalization, the World Bank also shifted its orientation in development 
thinking. (cf. ibid.: 47)  
The BWIs started to fund stabilization and so called structural adjustment14. Stabilization comprised 
measures aimed at the reduction of a country’s imbalances, such as the import-export ratio or the 
government’s fiscal position, to reasonable levels. Structural Adjustment focused on trade 
liberalization, reducing prices and structural rigidities. (cf. Moyo 2009: 20-1) The set of free-market 
neoliberal adjustment policies imposed upon developing countries through loan conditionality was 
later commonly called the Washington Consensus15. It comprised the following ten policy 
prescriptions16:  
 (i) Fiscal discipline; 
 (ii) Redirection of public expenditure priorities towards fields with high economic return;  
 (iii) Tax reform, including cutting marginal tax rates; 
 (iv) Financial liberalization; 
 (v) Unified and competitive exchange rates; 
 (vi) Trade liberalization; 
 (vii) Equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors; 
 (viii) Privatization; 
 (ix) Deregulation; 
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 Stabilization and structural adjustment measures were together known as “programme aid”. The most important 
policy tool, Structural Adjustment Programs, is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.3.  
15
 The term “Washington Consensus” goes back to John Williamson who dates its origins to his Congress hearing in 
1989 (cf. Raffer and Singer 2001: 51).  
16
  The summary below draws on Raffer and Singer (2001: 51-4). For a more detailed discussion see also Williamson 
2005.  
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 (x) Secure property rights. 
 
These conditionalities were fully in line with the neoliberal paradigm which was on the rise in 
Europe and the U.S.. Newly elected U.S. president Ronald Reagan had displaced former World 
Bank president McNamara, and his successor, A.W. Clausen, replaced the Bank chief economist and 
significant parts of staff with orthodox economists17. Evidently, neoliberal macroeconomic reforms, 
such as the ones the North was undertaking, became a blueprint for the restructuring of the South. 
(cf. Goldman 2005: 91-3) The neoliberal structural adjustment era  
 
affected relations at the point of social reproduction, reconfiguring the way in which states and 
citizens interact […]. Spearheaded by the Bank, these overlapping regimes of development – poverty 
alleviation and structural adjustment – only deepened and expanded World Bank power in borrowing 
countries (Goldman 2005: 91).  
 
The Bank's neoliberal turn was supported by a network of influential policy elites and lawyers, 
economists, business leaders and technocrats working in a variety of state and non-state institutions 
and pushing the neoliberal agenda on the national level. (cf. Dezalay 2002, Goldman 2005) Critics 
such as Raffer and Singer or Woods highlight that the World Bank and IMF were not always lending 
on technical economic or developmental grounds18 and that provision of their funding occasionally 
had severely negative consequences for their alleged target group, the poor.  
 
By 1989 most new loans granted by the Bank to developing countries were adjustment loans, which 
were accompanied by a package of strict conditionalities, and when Russia and the Newly 
Independent States from the former Soviet Union joined the rank of borrowers, “the Bank's 
adjustment regimes had definitely become global” (ibid.: 90-1). 
 
2.2.3 The Post-Washington Consensus  
“With the debt and structural adjustment crises, the Bank reformulated the […] question of 
democratization and governance, and the […] concern with redistribution and equity, into the 
neoliberal question of the freedom and sovereignty of capital” (ibid.: 91). The BWIs introduced an 
enduring managerial state of mind and by setting the frames for development, they impeded 
alternative development paths. Despite failed projects and the lack of desired development effects, 
the Bank and Fund held to their existing development paradigm. Evaluations of the effects of SAPs 
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 When the older World Bank development economists signed off and nearly 800 neoliberal macroeconomists were 
hired the Bank committed what a Bank official called „economic genocide“ (Goldman 2005: 92; cf. George and 
Sabelli 1994).  
18
 „The extremes cases of this were the support provided to Nicaragua under Somoza, to the Philippines under Marcos, 
and to Zaire under Mobutu” (Woods 2005: 153).  
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in the 1980s showed that the policies did not achieve their objectives; neither stabilization nor 
growth was reached.  Instead, the situation of the population in Southern Countries had severely 
worsened due to cuts in social welfare and due to effects on the income redistribution of the 
implemented policies. In short, the poverty-reduction performance of most poor countries was 
disappointing. Nevertheless, loan requests from countries which did not want to keep to the 
assumption that stabilization and adjustment would lead to poverty alleviation were not approved. 
(cf. Raffer and Singer 2001; Goldman 2005) Moreover, official Bank and Fund publications still 
promulgated the view that adjustment was the key to poverty reduction, although evidence did not 
back up the claims made in the reports. (cf. Woods 2006: 160) 
 
By the end of the neoliberal adjustment decade, Southern Countries debt was at least US$ 1 trillion 
and the cost of repayment “colossal” (Moyo 2009: 22). Debt servicing flows from the South to the 
North lead to net reverse flows from poor countries to rich countries amounting to some US$ 15 
billion per year. “From a development point of view, this was absurd” (ibid.: 22). Eventually, the 
BWIs and Northern creditors understood that the debt problem was not about illiquidity and that 
debt reduction was a necessary precondition for sustainable economic growth and development. In 
1989 the “Brady Plan”, named after the US treasury secretary, was developed: it envisaged a mix of 
debt relief, debt reduction, and new credits for 39 of the most heavily indebted countries. Structural 
adjustment was again compulsory for all countries. The Brady Plan somewhat managed to ease the 
situation for some highly indebted middle-income countries, but in 1994, when Ecuador became 
insolvent, it was evident that partial debt relief for a limited group of countries was not sufficient. 
(cf. Neuwirth 1997: 309) 
With this incident the BWIs acknowledged the failure of their development agenda, including the 
Structural Adjustment Programs. The World Bank “was on trial in the world's court of public 
opinion” (Goldman 2005: 94) and skeptical Civil Society Organizations (CSO), governments, 
academia and the private sector, supported by media, voiced heavy criticism of the Bank. They 
strongly echoed the concerns of debtor governments, which suffered from rigid structural 
adjustment policies. Under such pressure the Bank and Fund had to re-conceptualize their 
understanding of development and revise their aid model, and, as before, the World Bank President 
and Chief Economist were replaced. (cf. Cammack 2004)  
However, the Bank and Fund did not question the fundamentals of their development paradigm and 
policy prescriptions of their adjustment programs, but perceived the implementation and wider 
institutional setting in the borrowing states as wrong. Neoliberalism was still seen as the only way 
forward, and what needed to change in order to make structural adjustment reforms work, was 
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political leadership and the weak institutions in many Southern Countries, especially in Africa. (cf. 
Taylor 2004: 130) “Good governance”, a concept which includes strong and credible institutions, 
transparent rule of law and a legal framework including a set of operating principles for a 
competitive global economy, was seen as a precondition for making neoliberal reforms more 
effective. Corruption, which had often been supported by politically motivated aid flows19, was to 
be eroded with good governance. (cf. Abrahamsen 2000: 2-6) Critics highlight that good governance 
allegedly focuses solely on the economic and in doing so circumvents the political, although it 
actually has significant effects on the role and functioning of the state: “In essence, good 
governance promotion can be seen as an expansion of the IMF's mandate into the realms of 
advocating constitutional and legal safeguards for transnational capital” (Taylor 2004: 136).20   
In this era of reflection and reorientation further development concepts were proposed, the most 
prominent of which was the “redistribution with growth” approach, which recommended targeting 
investment to the poor in order to increase their income through economic growth but did not 
advocate active redistribution, as well as the “basic human needs approach” which focuses on the 
eradication of extreme poverty. The level of success of these approaches was limited and according 
to critics, this was due to the World Bank's commitment to neoclassical theory21, which prevented it 
from developing a conceptual framework which would enable it to understand the potential for 
growth and the dynamics of poverty, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. (cf. Cammack 2004; Sender 
2002: 185) 
 
In the late 1990s a new development agenda, termed the Post Washington Consensus (PWC), was 
introduced by the BWIs. It comprised a “second generation” of reforms, especially legal, tax, social, 
and education policy reforms. (cf. Burchard 2002: 57) Privatization and decentralization were 
supposed to increase efficiency and effectiveness of enterprises, and social welfare was to be 
focused more on the poor in need. World Bank President James Wolfensohn22, who was appointed 
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  As to Uganda’s Idi Amin, Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, Liberia’s Samuel Doe or Malawi’s Hastings Banda. 
20
 George and Sabelli (1994) summarize the rhetoric success of the concept by saying that „being against good 
governance is like being against motherhood and apple-pie“. Criticism of good governance is often indirectly 
prevented as it is mostly presented as an aspect of democracy.  
21
  Neoclassical economics is the dominant approach in microeconomics and focuses on determination of prices, 
income and distribution in market through supply and demand based on the hypotheses of maximization of utility 
and rational choice theory. For a critical discussion of neoclassical economics see Lee, Frederic S. and Keen, Steve 
(2004): The Incoherent Emperor. A Heterodox Critique of Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory. In: Review of 
Social Economy, LXII/ 2, p. 169–199. 
22
 Wolfensohn also highlighted the need for a clearer division of labor between the Bank and the Fund: „Our roles are 
clearly different. The Fund’s mandate covers surveillance, exchange rate matters, balance of payments, growth-
oriented stabilization policies and their related instruments. The Bank has a mandate for the composition and 
appropriateness of development programs and priorities, including structural and sectoral policies – and therefore, 
by building a sound basis for development, a responsibility for crisis prevention“ (Wolfenshohn quoted in Cammack 
22 
in 1995, argued that the Bank should “consider the financial, the institutional and the social 
together” (Wolfensohn 1998: 5). Chief economist Joseph Stiglitz brought the state back in and 
assigned it a control function, governments had to work “as a complement to markets” (Siglitz 1998 
quoted in Führmann 2003: 29).  
The Bank's and Fund's development discourse shifted away from growth-oriented adjustment 
towards emphasizing poverty reduction23 and country ownership24 as operational principles in all 
lending. This commitment would have meant more participatory and less conditional policy 
formulation processes. (cf. ODI 2001: 2)  However, critics highlight that despite these principles, 
Bank and Fund activities did not stray too far from neoliberal principles in the actual development 
practice and that self-determination of national policies and development priorities was still very 
limited25. (cf. Goldman 2005: 245; Rückert 2006: 40-7). Clearly disappointed by World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund policies, Sindzingre (2004: 176) argues that the emphasis on poverty is 
a strategic response, and that speaking of poverty “is to postpone speaking of development, making 
a shift in the temporality – shorter time frames – of ideas as well as policies”.  
 
During James Wolfensohn's presidency, the Bank also opened up toward NGOs and paid more 
attention to their concerns. As most of the powerful and well-organized NGOs were from creditor 
countries, allying with them can be understood as means to satisfying creditors rather than for 
improving the quality of services delivered to the borrowers (cf. Wade 2002). In order to silence 
critics, and to better argue its case for its unpopular policies and to improve its image, the World 
Bank has also strengthened its public relations activities, expenditures for Public Relations 
surpassed its research budget in the new millennium. (cf. Kapur 2002: 349, Goldman 2005: 230) 
 
2.2.4 Institutional features influencing development theory and practice 
The World Bank and IMF are powerful and coercive intermediaries of the international community 
and bastions of a dominant way of thinking about global economic policy – or so they are perceived 
across developing, emerging, and transition economies (Woods 2006: 65).  However, the World 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2003: 10) 
23
 The most prominent policy tool of the Post Washington Consensus' poverty reduction strategy (which again is the 
prescribed route to achieve the Millennium Development Goals) is the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 
(World Bank and IMF 2005: 1). This is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.3. 
24
 The concept of ownership is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.3. 
25
 In his study, Goldman analyzes the case of World Bank loans and policy recommendation in the water and sanitation 
sector. He points out that „in the mountains of policy papers, technical agendas, investment portfolios, and 
legislation [...] that have been produced by them since the mid-1990s, one discovers a remarkable global consensus 
on the options available to countries [...]. In less than a decade, there has been an unequivocal and narrowing set of 
the terms of reference, of economic models, of ethical concerns, and of the roles of actors offered as a synthetic 
global regime of truth, rule and right”. (Goldman 2005: 245) 
23 
Bank and the Fund evidently do not have a very good track record. Their conceptualization of 
development, which the Bank virtually equates with GDP growth per capita, their ineffective policy 
recommendations, and high level of conditionalities are often criticized by NGOs, governments and 
academia. The reasons and causes for their poor performance are complex, and to some extent also 
institutional, as Woods (2006) explains.  
Woods (2006) highlights three institutional features hindering the Bank's move towards a broader 
conception of development: first, expanding the Bank's goals beyond GDP growth was prevented by 
its Article of Agreement which prevented it to take politics into account when making lending 
decisions. It also prohibited direct political interference: such decisions are left squarely in the hands 
of governments. At most it was entitled to aim to enhance the capacity of a government to address 
political, social and welfare objectives which it was not allowed to target explicitly. Thus, even if 
governments agreed to a wider set of policies, the Bank would have not been able to define what 
these were. (cf. Woods 2006: 45) This point is discussed somewhat controversially among 
academics; Raffer for instance claims that the Bank has repeatedly violated its bylaws (Raffer 2008: 
11). The other two problems are more practical in nature.  
Second, the Bank's analysis has always been deeply affected by its internal structure. The Bank is 
organized into technical departments and area departments. While the technical departments 
appraised projects and loans, the area departments examined macroeconomic indicators such as 
growth rates and trade flows. The capacity to systemically trace how development policies and 
processes come together in specific settings was missing and so were analyses which would have 
been important for forging practical cases or models for development strategies. 26 (cf. Woods 2006: 
45)  
Third, the Bank lacked the research, expertise and knowledge to analyze and explain the social and 
political conditions in Southern Countries, as its research department is “small and underfunded” 
(Woods 2006: 45). In virtually all of its thinking, the Bank is dominated by a technocratic and an 
economic perspective. The technocratic nature of the BWIs clearly and directly limits the extent to 
which external ideas can have a real impact on their thinking (cf. McNeill 2004: 120-1).27 Although 
                                                 
26
  An example given by Robert Wade is the World Bank’s approach to environmental issues: “In reviewing the Bank's 
efforts to integrate environmental considerations, one finds that the organization has handled them best when it has 
organized environment as a separate sector, alongside agriculture, energy, forestry, and so on – a sector bounded, 
moreover, by national borders. These are fully consistent with the Bank's long-established mode of organization: 
they can be given to a task manager located in a country department and handled just like any other project.” (Wade 
2004: 90, emphasis in original) 
27
  Ngaire Woods also sheds light on the structural constraints to innovation by examining the incentives World Bank 
staff face to adopt new ideas. “Ideas that open up new lending possibilities will best fit with the ‘disbursement 
culture’ that has long rewarded staff for how much they lend rather than the quality of these loans” (Woods 2006: 
39) 
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the Bank's economic perspective has undergone changes over time, the products of the Bank's 
internal research departments are widely self-referential and tend to confirm results contained in 
reports. Research is strongly influenced by economists: while political scientists and sociologists 
have been hired, their power to influence decision-making is very weak and thus innovative trans-
disciplinary approaches to problems are prevented. Within multilateral institutions, economics as a 
research discipline has a hegemonic position and is presented as an objective approach which 
provides a value-free and correct picture of problems. Through such an approach development is 
presented as a technical question, rather than a political one. (cf. Boas and Mc Neill 2004; 
Sindzingre 2004) 
 
2.3 World Bank policies and policy tools 
 
2.3.1 Comprehensive Development Framework and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
The Comprehensive Development Framework, the World Bank’s new long-term, holistic approach 
to lending practices which claims to place poverty reduction at the fore and to allow recipient 
countries to own and direct their development agendas, was eventually introduced in the late 1990s 
as was mentioned above. Researchers identified three factors, besides the SAPs’ limited impact on 
poverty reduction, which lead to the introduction of the new approach:  first, the growing 
recognition of the importance of the national policy context for aid effectiveness; second, increased 
awareness of the limitations of conventional conditionalities for levering some of the critical 
changes; and third, the search for a new instrument that would be suitable to justify a major debt-
reduction initiative (cf. ODI 2001: 2-3).  
The most prominent tool for implementing the new CDF is the so called Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). They replace the former Policy Framework Papers as the required 
statement of recipient government objectives for the purpose of further adjustment lending28 by the 
Bank and the Fund. A PRSP is supposed to outline a national program for poverty reduction for 
three years. Furthermore, PRSPs were conceptualized as a device to ensure the proper - meaning 
poverty reduction related - use of additional funds from debt relief. Countries seeking to receive 
debt relief under the multilateral Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, which was 
introduced in 1996 in order to write off unsustainable debt of HIPCs29, need to present a PRSP or 
                                                 
28
  Both the World Bank, viz. IDA, and the IMF introduced new lending instruments that are more in line with PRSP 
principles and objectives. The IMF introduced the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Bank 
introduced the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC). (cf. ODI 2001: 1)  
29
  Malawi was one of them. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  
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Interim PRSP (I-PRSP) in order to reach the “decision point” in the debt relief process which 
enables partial debt relief. I-PRSPs were introduced to address the issue of tension faced by many 
HIPCs between qualifying for debt relief and allowing time to develop a good full PRSP. Now the 
process is split up into two stages for all countries. (cf. Bretton Woods Project 2003) 
The national Poverty Reduction Strategy should be based on already existing national development 
plans, which should then be re-presented as a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The core principles 
underlying the CDF and the development and implementation of the PRSP, which are defined in the 
Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction, are outlined below (cf. World Bank 1999; 2002). The poverty 
reduction strategies should be:  
(i) country-driven: involving broad-based participation by civil society and the private 
sector in all operational steps; 
(ii) results-oriented: focusing on outcomes that would benefit the poor; 
(iii) comprehensive: recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty; 
(iv) partnership-oriented: involving coordinated participation of development partners 
(bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental); 
(v) based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction. 
 
Despite the core principles “country driven” and “partnership oriented”, conditionalities continue to 
be attached to loans. Substantive conditionality, which stressed efficiency and results, as it did in 
SAPs, was replaced with process conditionality, which ostensibly puts more emphasis on process 
and national ownership than on expected output indicators (cf. Bwalya et al. 2004: 5) However, the 
BWI did not discount tangible outputs, although they were thought to be more achievable if the 
policies which were supposed to bring them about had been grounded in a thorough and 
participatory process. Or,  
 
[i]n other words, the PRSPs were not all about process at the expense of output. Rather, the process 
approach was not considered more instrumental towards achieving basically the same policy outcomes 
– albeit more broadly and with some modification – that the SAPs had failed to achieve. (Bwalya et al. 
2004: 3).30  
 
Thus content still matters. The PRSP must be presented to the Bank and the Fund before a country 
seeks new funding through loans, and the boards of both institutions must approve a country’s 
                                                 
30
  The Overseas Development Institute comments that “[t]he phrase Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper has a literal 
meaning and an aura of solemnity that are potentially deceptive. Some of the language in which PRSPs are currently 
being discussed is strongly reminiscent of the early days in ‘development planning’ in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
the world seemed a simpler place than it does now. The concept of PRSP might seem to imply that the reduction of 
poverty is more straightforwardly amenable to rational thinking and action than we know to be the case.” (ODI 
2001: 2; emphasis in original) 
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PRSP before a lending program is agreed. In addition to the PRSP, countries also need a Letter of 
Intent and a Country Assistance Strategy, a sort of “business plan” defining their targets and actions. 
The specific program outlined in these documents forms the basis of a policy matrix which is 
negotiated between the Bank and the borrower, but the matrix already pre-sets specific priority 
actions considered crucial to the success of the program by the Bank and Fund. The full PRSP is 
submitted to the Bank and Fund and appraised by officers from both BWIs in so called Joint Staff 
Assessments (JSAs). In order to get approved, a PRSP must present a coherent policy strategy for 
poverty reduction based on “sound policies” which basically must not differ much from the policies 
recommended in the SAPs.31 (cf. Bretton Woods Project 2003: 5-6)  
Referring to the core principles outlined above, the government is responsible for writing the PRSP 
and for managing technical and donor inputs to it, as it is supposed to “own” its PRSP. The World 
Bank has signaled openness towards PRSPs’ contents, but in practice PRSPs of countries whose 
proposals do not follow the economic paradigm and policies favored by the Bank and the Fund are 
mostly not approved in the Joint Staff Assessment (cf. Raffer and Singer 2001). Though a positive 
Joint Staff Assessment “does not signify agreement with all the analysis, targets, or actions included 
in the PRSP or that the PRSP represents the best possible strategy for the country. What it does 
indicate is the staff’s “bottom line” judgments as to whether the PRSP is a “credible” framework 
within which the World Bank and IMF will provide financial and other support” (Bretton Woods 
Project 2003: 5). Without a positive Joint Staff Assessment and acceptance by the boards of both the 
Bank and the Fund, the respective government will not receive funding from the BWIs, and most 
likely not from other donors either since the BWIs act as gatekeepers for development finance. 
These two mechanisms ensure that the BWIs have the final say about the contents of the national 
development programs of Southern Countries, which contradicts the rhetoric of national 
ownership.32  
Civil Society Organizations voice their concerns about this contradiction and say that this will cause 
governments of Southern Countries to opt for programs which they know will be accepted even if 
they conflict with development priorities identified through consultative processes in the given 
country. Paradoxically, in the Joint Staff Assessment mentioned above, the Bank and Fund also 
appraise the extent to which governments have consulted with civil society and how governance 
issues were addressed. The PRSP must be based on an acceptable participatory process, though the 
                                                 
31
  It is noteworthy that after having turned away from the SAP approach, the Bank and Fund renamed their lending 
facilities for poor countries. As mentioned above, the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility is now called 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, although beside the name nothing has changed: interest rates and repayment 
conditions remained the same. (cf.  Bretton Woods Project 2003) 
32
  The concept of national or country ownership is explained in more detail in the next chapter. 
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World Bank has not specified what constitutes such an acceptable participatory process and which 
criteria need to be fulfilled. The Bank argues that the great diversity of country specific contexts and 
capacities makes the application of one standard impossible.  (cf. Steward and Wang 2003)  
 
2.3.2 Country ownership and participation   
The introduction of “country ownership” as a lending principle was a response to the failure of 
BWIs’ development programs. It was eventually recognized that Bank- and Fund-imposed one-size-
fits-all blueprints will not foster economic growth and that development policies have to be adapted 
to each country's institutional context. (cf. Singleton and Weller 2006: 75) In the PRSP approach, 
the notion of country ownership of policies and partnership in development cooperation represent 
an attempt to involve developing countries more directly in the policy-making process. With respect 
to the PRSP approach, the World Bank presents its notion of ownership in the following way: 
“Country ownership is the guiding principle. … the process and content [of PRSPs] must be 
designed nationally to suit local circumstances and capacities, and should be useful to the country, 
not only to external donors” (Klugman 2003 quoted in Steward and Wang 2003: 2, emphasis added 
by Steward and Wang). For the IMF, ownership is a willing assumption of responsibility for an 
agreed program of policies by officials in a borrowing country, based on the understanding that the 
program is achievable and in the country’s own interest (IMF 2001: 6; Cavassini and Entwistle 
2005: 2). Another possible definition proposed by Eberlei (2007) is more focused on the process of 
policy formulation and on participation. According to him, country ownership can be defined as 
“broad-based participation in the designing process and strong domestic accountability during 
implementation” (ibid.: 7).  
The World Bank admits that country ownership is multidimensional, and that it is difficult to arrive 
at a definition of country ownership that is operational and empirically verifiable (Cavassini and 
Entwistle 2005: 2).33 It proposes four criteria to assess ownership: 
(i) The locus of initiative for the policy must be in the government; 
(ii) The key policymakers responsible for implementation must be intellectually 
convinced that the goals to be pursued are the right ones; 
(iii) There must be evidence of public support from the top political and civic leadership; 
and 
                                                 
33
  There are further more detailed operationalizations for assessing country ownership of policies, as e.g. Booth (2003) 
or Bwalya et al. (2004). These are conceptualized to assess the ownership of the policy-making process and 
implementation, viz. the substance of the policy outcomes. As my analysis discusses the participatory aspects of the 
policy-making process which led to the formulation of the Malawian PRSP only, and does not look into the policy 
outcomes in terms of their feasibility and efficacy in implementation or their poverty reduction impacts, I keep to 
Eberlei’s (2007) and the World Bank’s (2005) approach.  
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(iv)  There must be evidence that the government is building support among the affected 
stakeholders and can rely on their cooperation. 
In the SAPs, the role of the state has been very limited and conditional funding often undermined 
national sovereignty. By emphasizing national ownership of policies in the PRSP approach, the 
Bank and Fund brought the state back in and assigned it regulative functions. But it was not only 
the governments which were supposed to have a stronger say in the policy formulation process, 
policy consultations with Civil Society Organizations were also foreseen as the BWIs assumed that 
including civil society in the process is likely to help to increase perceptions of national ownership 
and thus improve implementation.34  
 
Participation has often been used as a proxy for country ownership (Cavassini and Entwistle 2005: 
3). As outlined in the previous chapter, the Bank takes an acceptable participatory process as a basis 
for the endorsement of the PRSP by the Joint Staff Assessment and the Board – without defining 
what “acceptable” participation ought to be. In the Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies the 
World Bank defines participation as “the process by which stakeholders influence and share control 
over priority setting, policymaking, resource allocations, and/or program implementation” (World 
Bank 2002: 237 quoted in Eberlei 2007: 2). The World Bank expects the following groups to 
participate:  
(i) The general public, particularly the poor and vulnerable groups;  
(ii) The government, including parliament, local governments line and central ministries;  
(iii) Civil Society Organizations such as NGOs, community based organizations, trade 
unions and guilds, academic institutions; 
(iv) Private sector actors such as professional associations; 
(v) Donors, both bilateral and multilateral.  
The approach presented above envisages that participation takes place at all stages and is very 
inclusive. Nevertheless, in practice the meaning of participation is not as straightforward as it 
seems.  Critics highlight that the extent to which participation increases ownership depends on who 
participates, whether participation actually affects the design of programs, or whether it merely 
provides endorsement to externally designed programs, as well as on the scope and coverage of the 
PRSP process.35 (cf. Steward and Wang 2003: 4) Participation means involvement and climbing up 
                                                 
34
  At this point it needs to be highlighted that even a PRSP benefiting from a moderately high degree of national 
ownership may not be a very effective instrument for achieving poverty reduction results as it might be too weak 
analytically. This can be the case due to limited capacities of decision makers (ODI 2001: 57) 
35
  The significance of participation in development has been widely discussed by academia and practitioners. Different 
participatory approaches and trends in development policy are discussed in detail in Cornwall, Andrea (2000):  
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the so called “participation ladder” (Eberlei 2007: 13), which may include: information-sharing, 
consultation, joint decision making, initiation of proposals, and control of decision making. All 
these forms of participation open up different possibilities for action and allow for different levels 
of influence, as Eberlei (2007) shows. According to him,  the timing of participation is also highly 
important as getting a stakeholder involved, for instance after most decisions have been taken, will 
also determine his/her influence. A further question concerns who is involved in the participatory 
process. Different stakeholders have diverse interests and focus on particular issues in the topic 
discussed when they are consulted. The extent of national ownership is greatly affected by the 
selection of groups which are meant to participate, the way representatives are chosen and how 
capable they are to fulfill their task. Hence the inclusion and exclusion of certain groups and 
persons can significantly influence the outcome of the process. Another important aspect for 
country ownership is the manner in which participants are involved. This comprises amongst others 
the voting procedures, the place and timing of the meeting or whether information is available 
before the meeting. Further, the involvement of bilateral and multilateral donors in the participatory 
process weakens national ownership if they start to dominate the process, by setting agendas, by 
their capacities and by their role as financiers. The political arena in which the processes of broad-
based participation and domestic accountability unfold in PRSP countries is “strongly dominated by 
the donor community on the one hand and the political elite on the other.” (ibid.: 7)  
 
This chapter gave an overview of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, their 
changing conceptualization of development and their lending activities. The Bank and the Fund 
play an important role as financers of development, and since the 1980s they are having a lead role 
in development policy. By linking concessional lending to the adoption of a set of neoliberal 
policies, known as the Washington Consensus, they directly influence the economic situation in 
Southern Countries. Since this approach proved to be ineffective the BWIs have introduced a new 
development paradigm. The new policy tool, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, is supposed to 
deliver better results as it is country-driven and policies are owned by borrowing countries. Critics 
highlight that this is not the case as the Bank and the Fund didn’t refrain from imposing strict 
conditionalities.  
In the next chapter I will present my research design, outline the theoretical approach and research 
method which form the basis of my analysis of the PRSP approach in Malawi which will follow in 
chapter 4.  
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Theoretical approach 
As outlined in the introduction, Gramsci's social theory of power and its further developments, 
mainly by Robert W. Cox, Stephen Gill, Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, form the theoretical 
basis of my analysis. Their work, and what is often called “Italian School”, “neo-Gramscianisms” 
or “critical theory” is no homogenous theoretical set, rather, it is a theoretical framework which 
shares a common point of departure: Antonio Gramsci's thoughts. Moreover, there is no single 
consensual interpretation of Gramsci's fragmentary and often contradictory thoughts on hegemony 
and world order. This might be due to the variety of academic disciplines which use them for their 
scientific work. Taking this into consideration, I will pay attention to stating whose thoughts I am 
referring to when using the term “neo-Gramscianism” in my analysis.  
Applying a Gramscian framework to the contemporary world36 and using it for the study of 
international organizations has faced some criticism (cf. Paterson 2009). Lifting Gramsci's critical 
analysis from one time and space, and then correctly applying it to another has been deemed 
problematic (cf. Germain and Kenny 1998; Bellamy 1990). It has been widely discussed and 
eventually criteria for its successful application were developed (cf. Morton 2007). However, 
critical theorists regard his work as applicable to the analysis of any ruling or subordinate group in 
society (cf. Augelli 1988). Most of Antonio Gramsci's substantive work – I am referring to the 
theory, or rather fragments of theory, which Gramsci developed in his so called Quaderni del 
Carcere (Prison Notebooks)37  – mainly focused on the analysis of national social formations in 
different historical periods in Italy. His work contains the principles of a sociological theory of 
power (cf. ibid.: 117), and is centered on the distinction between rule by force and rule through 
consensus. Based on this, Gramsci contrasts two ideal types of supremacy: domination, the exercise 
of power without the critical, reflective consent of the governed on the one hand and ethical 
hegemony, i.e. intellectual and moral leadership, on the other hand (cf. Augelli and Murphy 1993: 
127-8). Gramsci intended to elucidate the complex mechanisms of hegemony, and for him, 
hegemony was a “new category for the interpretation of history, the state and the bourgeoisie” 
(Buci-Glucksmann 1981 quoted in Brand 2007: 6). Gramsci's concern when investigating the 
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 Gramsci's writings date back to the 1920s and 1930s.  
37
 Machart (2007) discusses the difficulties of “canonizing” Gramsci’s fragmentary thoughts into a system of 
Gramscianism, especially in the light of the political context and circumstances under which Gramsci developed his 
thoughts. He says that paying tribute to the factors that caused the fragmentary character of Gramsci's work, his 
imprisonment and political oppression in fascist Italy, is important, however it should not stop scholars to develop 
Gramsci's thoughts further and to build new theories upon them (cf. Marchart 2007: 175).  
31 
concept of hegemony was to understand the dynamics of the consolidation of power, including 
those in international relations (cf. Augelli and Murphy 1993: 127). Gramsci's approach was rooted 
in Vladimir Lenin's concept of hegemony on the basis of which he built a broader theory by adding 
elements from theories of Benedetto Corce, Niccolò Machiavelli and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (Augelli 1988: 117).  
 
3.1.1 A Gramscian understanding of world orders 
3.1.1.1 Epistemology and ontology in Gramsci 
A neo-Gramscian approach provides an ontolgical and epistemological foundation for conducting 
non-deterministic yet structurally grounded interpretations of social change or what is called 
“development”. Gramsci's historicist approach is an epistemological and ontological critique of the 
empiricism and positivism which underpin the prevailing theories of international relations. His 
theory can be classified as non-structuralist, or as being opposed to abstract structuralism in so far 
as it has a human aspect: historical change is understood as, to a certain degree, the consequence of 
collective human agency. Hence with respect to agency, it offers a path between the pre-determined 
units in neo-realism (i.e. states) and the neglected domestic foundations of world-systems theory. 
(cf. Boas and McNeill 2004: 218)  
This idea is consistent with that of historical structures, as Gramsci says that they are partly 
constituted by the consciousness and action of individuals and groups (Gill 1993: 22). Thus, in his 
view, history and political economy are not understood as  
 
a sequence or series of discrete events or moments which when aggregated equal a process of change 
with certain governing regularities: for Gramsci, it is the ensemble of social relations configured by 
social structures (“the situation”) which is the basic unit of analysis, rather than individual agents, be 
they consumers, firms, states or interest groups, interacting in a (potentially) rule-governed way in the 
political market-places' at a given moment or conjuncture, as in modern public choice theory (Gill 
1993: 24, emphasis in original).  
 
In contrast to prevailing international relations theories, a Gramscian approach also refrains from 
methodological individualism and methodological reductionism. However, ontology in Gramscian 
approaches is not always straightforward. Mark Rupert points out that in the process of constructing 
a Gramscian critique of capitalist social reality “ontology itself is radicalized; no longer viewed a 
priori, i.e., as prior to and constitutive of the reality which we can know, it becomes instead an 
ongoing social product, historically concrete and contestable” (Rupert 1993: 67). However, as 
Joseph Femia outlines, it is worth noting that Gramsci condemned positivists for adopting “the 
conception of the objective reality of the external world in its most trivial and uncritical sense” 
(Gramsci 1971: 444 quoted in Femia 2009: 38; emphasis by Femia). This shows that for Gramsci, 
there is some acceptable sense of “objective reality”, albeit one which recognizes the contribution 
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of human thought to the way that reality is structured and accessed (ibid: 38). Nevertheless, 
Gramsci disapproved of conventional positivist approaches by saying that  
 
bare 'facts' acquire meaning only when organized in the frame of a theory, which cannot itself be 
derived from the facts to be explained. Knowledge is not like a photographic plate that reproduces the 
picture it receives, for our images of reality are filtered through culturally determined presuppositions. 
(ibid: 38)  
 
Femia concludes his analysis of Gramsci's ontology by saying that Gramsci “was a truly dialectical 
thinker who asserted the interdependence of mind and objective reality, and not the absolute priority 
of either” (ibid: 41). 
 
3.1.1.2 Power and hegemony  
As outlined above, Gramsci's sociology of power is based on the distinction between rule by force 
and rule through consensus. The concept that scholars of international relations most connect with 
Gramsci's name is that of “hegemony”, which was introduced by him in order to analyze the 
relation of forces and power in a given society. What Gramsci calls hegemony is the ability of a 
social group to exercise a function of political and moral direction in society while other groups 
acknowledge that the hegemonic group has this leading role in society, and a wide political 
consensus in support of the hegemon's goals is formed. In order to achieve power and supremacy, a 
social group needs to establish this kind of hegemony among a group of allies. (cf. Augelli and 
Murphy 1993: 130).  
In Gramscian terms, hegemony is “not merely leadership of a revolutionary alliance, but intellectual 
and moral leadership throughout society” (Augelli and Murphy 1988: 122). Thus a hegemonic order 
is present when relations between classes and between the state and civil society are characterized 
by consent rather than coercion. (cf. Gill and Law 1993: 93)  Based on that, one can distinguish 
between two types of supremacy: domination, the exercise of power without critical reflexive 
consent of the governed, and ethical hegemony, i.e. intellectual and moral leadership. When 
hegemony is not ethical, but based on fraud and deception, it is a form of domination. (cf. Augelli 
and Murphy 1993: 127-8) Hence, “hegemonies can be distinguished by the degree to which they 
develop the critical understanding of the ruled, or, contrastingly, the degree to which they exploit 
the ruled's unreflective common sense” (Augelli 1998: 126).  
The quality of rule is analyzed at three levels of society: the “economic structure”, and the two 
super-structural levels, “civil society” and “political society”, as according to Gramsci these are the 
domains in which force and consent operate to consolidate power. Here, civil society is understood 
as  
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the moment of transition from economic structure to political society, the social realm in which mere 
corporate interests (defined by a group's position in the mode of production) can be transformed into 
broader, more universal, political aspirations [...] civil society is a primary political realm, a realm in 
which all of the dynamics in ideology, the activities of intellectuals, and the construction of hegemony 
takes place” (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 129).  
 
Hence, hegemony-building, whether “ethical” or based on fraud, needs to take place in the realm of 
civil society.  
As hegemony requires the consent and participation of the ruled, it contributes to the formation of 
coalitions and compromises designed to integrate diverse social forces into (asymmetric) power 
blocs. Instead of one global homogenous power, there are several distinct hegemonic constellations. 
(cf. Neunhöffer 2006: 3) Therefore an analysis of hegemony has to look into diverse, albeit 
interrelated, social forces and how hegemonic constellations are formed through them. An analysis 
of world politics should thus be looking at how global hegemony is constructed at the local, 
national, regional and international level through a variety of political, social and cultural agents. 
However, the application of Gramsci's complex model poses a challenge to researchers in academia, 
and there is no clear consensus as to which power constellations on the national, international and 
global level can be deemed as hegemonic, and which ones cannot.38 (cf. Scherrer 2007: 71; 
Schwarzmantel 2009a, 2009b) 
 
3.1.1.3 Defining hegemony  
In his writings, Gramsci developed several concepts which allowed him to differentiate various 
types of hegemony. An overview and classification based on Scherrer (2007) is given below:  
Domination – hegemony: in contrast to domination, which refers to a preponderance of 
 material power, hegemony includes leadership and guidance of allied groups and is located 
in civil society.  
 Hegemony – supremacy: supremacy comprises hegemony, but adds governmental coercion 
 to it.  
Furthermore, hegemony can be differentiated based on:  
(a) Its ethical dimension: hegemony is ethical when the ruled groups are guided towards 
 buon senso (common sense). When hegemony is exercised by fraud and deception, it is not 
                                                 
38
 For instance, in view of the tribute payments of allies to the United States during the second Gulf War in 1993, Cox 
observed the end of the hegemonic system which had been prevalent at that time. More than a decade later, Arrighi 
deemed the high trade deficits of the U.S. as signs of an unraveling of hegemony. While, according to Robinson, a 
transnational hegemony exists, Gowan does not regard globalization as the enlargement of a transnational 
managerial class' power. According to him, the U.S. are broadening their power. Wallerstein perceives the 
international financial crises at the end of the 1990s as a sign of the weakness of neoliberal hegemony, whereas 
according to Candeias these crises can lead to the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony. (cf. Merkens 2007) 
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ethical.  
 (b) Nature of consent: consent can be either active or passive39 
 (c) Its development perspective: hegemony can be emerging or declining.  
The term hegemony describes a consolidated form of rule, where use of force and violence is only 
applicable under exceptional circumstances. The more the leading role of the hegemonic group is 
actively supported and not just passively tolerated, the steadier that hegemony will be. The scope of 
support normally depends on whether the ruling group's action and institutions match the other 
subordinate groups' interests. Alignment of interests can be achieved either by taking the other 
groups' interests into account when building institutions, or by influencing the process of interest 
formation of the other classes, so that they conceive the respective institutions as being consistent 
with and part of their interests. Hegemonic rule needs to comprise both functions of interest 
alignment, as merely aligning one’s own interests to the others' would bear the risk of not being able 
to preserve the former and in consequence not being able to exercise rule anymore. (cf. Scherrer 
2007) 
If hegemony is successfully exercised on all three social spheres identified by Gramsci - the 
economic structure, political society and civil society - power is consolidated, and in his terms a 
“historic bloc” is formed. Gramsci's historic bloc refers to a historical congruence between material 
forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces. In the creation of 
an historic bloc, Gramsci distinguished between three levels of consciousness:  
 
the economic-corporative, which is aware of the specific interests of particular groups; the solidarity 
or class consciousness, which extends to a whole social class but remains at a purely economic level; 
and the hegemonic, which brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of 
subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal 
terms (Gramsci 1971: 180-95, quoted in Cox 1993: 57-8) 
 
As outlined above, in order to establish a true “historical economic-political bloc”, a potential 
hegemon must make alliances. In order to link itself to other groups, it must step beyond defending 
its economic-corporate interests40, and be able to place its ideal aspirations above these.  (cf. Augelli 
and Murphy 1988: 123) When successful, institutions and ideologies built by it will be universal in 
form, i.e., they will not appear as those of a particular class, and will give some satisfaction to the 
subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership or vital interests of the hegemonic class 
(cf. Cox 1993: 57-8). According to Gramsci, in order to further reinforce the stability of the 
historical bloc and to go beyond it to extend the hegemony of the leading social group to the 
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  This means rule can either be actively supported or just passively tolerated.  
40
 Or „immediate and narrowly selfish interests of a particular category” in Gramscian terms (Augelli and Murphy 
1988: 123). 
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popular masses, it must provide economic development which satisfies the narrower interests of its 
allies. In his view this is another reason why hegemons can only come from classes which play a 
decisive role in the economy. He highlights that the central role the hegemonic group plays in 
production gives it certain influence over the economy, but that eventually; this potential must be 
made a reality by conscious political action. (cf. Augelli and Murphy 1993: 132) 
Gramsci basically identifies two mechanisms for the alignment of interests and for the 
establishment of a historic bloc, namely “passive revolution” and its feature, “transformismo”, as 
Paterson (2008) points out. The former, passive revolution, explains how antagonistic political elites 
and subaltern groups can be absorbed into a political institution without bringing about a revolution 
in the social conditions or ideology of the masses. A major characteristic of 'passive revolution' is 
the absence of popular participation during such power shifts. In contrast, transformismo is a 
mechanism that deliberately prevents popular participation. Being a strategy of passive revolution, 
it used to distort ideational grievances to foster the alignment of interests and works by co-opting 
potential leaders of subaltern social groups (cf. Paterson 2008: 8). It works through the assimilation 
of potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition, and can 
thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organized opposition to established social and 
political power. Both the concept of passive revolution and that of transfomismo are counterparts to 
that of hegemony as they describe the condition of a non-hegemonic society in which no dominant 
class has (yet) been able to establish its hegemony.  
 
3.1.1.4 The roles of ideas 
The process of interest alignment also takes place on the ideological level, and here the work of 
intellectuals becomes essential: their role in hegemony-building is that they must “supply 
intellectual and moral support for the hegemon's dominant political role to the point that, what is 
'political' to the productive class becomes 'rationality' to the intellectual class as a whole” (Augelli 
and Murphy 1988: 123). Simply put, they must demonstrate in every field of knowledge that the 
aspirations of the group they support coincide with the interests of society as a whole. Ideological 
hegemony is a consensus on the ideology of the ruling class, and therefore intellectuals need to 
“produce a philosophy, political theory, and economics which together constitute a coherent world-
view, the principles of which can be translated from one discipline to another” (Augelli and Murphy 
1993: 131). When the ideology of the class in power sweeps into common sense41, critical reason is 
squelched. In this context Gramsci focuses on what he calls the material structure of ideology, 
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  What Gramsci calls “common sense” is ideology without critical reflection (Augelli and Murphy 1988: 7-8). 
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which is the “complex of institutions and organizations whose task is to influence common sense” 
(Augelli 1988: 24). The process of common sense creation takes place through forms of 
popularization which hide the conceptual debate over the fundamental principles of the dominant 
class' ideology. This means: schools, private media, press offices of governments, and other 
institutions spread simplified versions of the dominant class' ideology which obscure the critical 
philosophical debates in which that ideology originated, making the ideology appear to be just the 
way it is (cf. ibid.: 24).   
 
3.1.2 A neo-Gramscian theory of international relations  
Gramsci's concept of hegemony which was discussed in more detail above is the gist of critical 
theories of international relations. Next to Robert W. Cox, Stephen Gill, Enrico Augelli and Craig 
Murphy are the most prominent neo-Gramscian scholars and have contributed most to developing 
Gramsci's thoughts further and applying them to the present.  
In his article Cox (1983) presented his seminal “historical structures” methodology for studying the 
global political economy. In contrast to realist international relations theory, which limits hegemony 
to the single dimension of dominance based on military and economic capabilities of states, the 
domain of hegemony is broader in Cox' neo-Gramscian theory (cf. Bieler and Morton 2004: 87).  
According to Cox, hegemony is constituted in historical structures by a set of particular 
configurations of forces, namely: ideas, institutions and material capabilities (cf. Berry 2007: 13). 
The concept of “world order” is Robert Cox' most innovative attempt at applying Gramsci to 
international relations and is analog to what Gramsci called historic bloc. World order is defined as 
“the sum of a structure whereby states and production combine to produce a 'configuration of social 
forces' that promote a common set of norms and values” (Worth 2009: 22). World hegemony, 
according to Cox, is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political 
structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three (cf. Cox 1983:171-2). In 
their work, neo-Gramscian theorists look at how dominant states are configured and how they 
transport ideas and construct international structures to complement them. Cox suggested that at the 
international level, norms and values are often embedded through international treaties or 
organizations and that it is through this mechanism that dominant states transport their form of 
hegemonic strategy to the international community. (cf. Cox 1996: 137-40; Schwarzmantel 2009a, 
2009b) He describes this mechanism in the following way:  
 
Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant 
state or states insofar as these ways of doing and thinking have inspired emulation or acquired the 
acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states. These social practices and the ideologies 
that explain and legitimize them constitute the foundation of the hegemonic order. (Cox 1992: 178-9) 
37 
 
3.1.2.1 Epistemology and ontology in neo-Gramscian theory 
“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” according to Cox (Cox 1986: 207) and for 
him, the idea of a pure interest free theory, separated from time and space is delusional. In his view, 
for every analysis and investigation, the question of who benefits from that analysis must be posed.  
In neo-Gramscian thought, “[k]nowledge is not something that is discovered; it is something that is 
'produced', like a work of art or fiction” and “[i]deas, words, languages – these are not 'mirrors' 
which copy the 'real' or 'objective' world. Theoretical preconceptions always determine what we 
take as 'facts'” (Femia 2009: 35). Knowledge production is of interest to critical theorists and a 
familiar term in neo-Gramscian literature (cf. Gill 1993, Femia 2009: 35).   
Based on their respective purposes, Cox distinguishes between problem-solving theory and critical 
theory. Problem solving theories assume that the major components of the system, such as states, 
are not subject to fundamental change, and they are interested in investigating action within the 
limits of the system only. By contrast, “[c]ritical theory steps outside the confines of the existing set 
of relationships to identify the origins and developmental potential of these phenomena” (Cox and 
Sinclair 1996: 5-6) and therefore calls the existing world order into question by examining how it 
came into being and what possibilities for transformation exist42 (cf. Femia 2009: 33). In their 
writings, both Gramsci and Cox put emphasis on the transformative capacity of human beings and 
its potential to avoid the reification of the present world order. Femia summarizes their ontology by 
highlighting that “[c]ivilisations are viewed as realms of intersubjectivity and since social existence 
is a process of self-interpretation and self-definition by human collectivities, nothing is fixed or 
inevitable”.  He further explains that “[o]nce we accept that reality is constituted not by objective 
structures but by human ideas, we can also accept that “the production of knowledge must always 
be considered a social process linking subject and object” (Murphy and Tooze 1991: 14). 
Recognizing the reality of intersubjective meanings in the construction of the global order requires 
us, in this view, “to abandon positivism in the name of a 'reflexive' methodology which 
acknowledges the political and normative content of all analysis” (Femia 2009: 35).  
 
3.1.2.2 Hegemony and world orders 
Robert Cox (1987) suggests that there are different forms of state and world orders, whose 
conditions of existence, constitutive principles and norms vary over time and space (Gill 1993: 29). 
In order to study successive world orders, he developed a structuralist model inspired by Gramsci: 
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  For example, applying a critical approach allows to look into and deconstruct concepts such as national sovereignty 
or the anarchy of international relations which from a realist perspective are given and inherent (cf. Femia 2009: 33). 
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he analyzes power and (the formation of) hegemony in three spheres of social activity and takes 
three interrelated forces into account. Below, a more detailed overview of the fundamentals of Cox' 
model and the concepts developed by him is given, which mainly draws on Cox (1987, 1993, 
1996), Augelli and Murphy (1998), Gill (1993) and Paterson (2008; 2009). According to Cox, 
hegemony is constituted by the interplay of three separate spheres of social activity, namely43:  
 (i) the social relations of production, consisting of the totality of social relations that 
 engender particular social forces through material and ideational forms of social interaction;  
 (ii) different forms of state, encompassing historically contingent and amendable state-
 society complexes; and  
 (iii) world orders, describing how relations in the international system can be organized .  
Within each of the three spheres, the interplay of44:  
 (a) ideas, defined as intersubjective meanings and shared collective images;  
 (b) material capabilities, describing accumulated resources; and  
 (c) institutions, understood as means of stabilization  
leads to the production of a particular social order and historical structures within it.  
Power relations in production are seen as the starting point for understanding people’s everyday life, 
the forms of states they inhabit and the dynamics of world orders. However, as there is no unilinear 
relationship between the spheres of activity in Cox' model, the point of departure to explain the 
historical process may equally be that of forms of state or world order (cf. Bieler and Morton 2004: 
88; Cox 1987: 8). He focuses on the relationship between production and power, i.e. how power in 
social relations of production may give rise to certain social forces, how these social forces may 
become the bases of power in forms of state and how this might shape world order (cf. Bieler and 
Morton 2004: 89). With respect to the social relation of productions, production is to be understood 
in the broadest sense as it also covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the 
social relations, morals and institutions which are prerequisites to the production of physical goods 
in Cox' model (cf. Cox 1989: 39). Just as for the forms of state, the state is not conceived in realist 
terms, instead historical constructions of various forms of state and the social context of political 
struggle are taken into consideration. This understanding of the state is inclusive of the realm of 
civil society and it draws on Gramsci according to whom “the state is the entire complex of 
practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains 
dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci 1971: 
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 See figure 1 in Annex A.  
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 See figure 2 in Annex A.  
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178, 244 quoted in Bieler and Morton 2004: 92).45 With respect to world orders and hegemony, Cox 
theorizes that the construction of a hegemonic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class 
and that is a national phenomenon as various classes and fractions of classes construct, or contest, 
hegemony through national political frameworks (cf. Cox 1983: 168-70). Yet once hegemony has 
been consolidated domestically it may expand to move outward on a world scale and insert itself 
through the world order.  
 
Hegemony at the international level is thus not only an order among states. It is an order within a 
world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into 
other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships which 
connect the social classes of different countries. World hegemony is describable as a social structure, 
an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must 
be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and 
mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society 
that act across national boundaries – rules which support the dominant mode of production. (Cox 
1993: 62) 
 
 
3.1.2.3 International institutions and hegemony  
Cox and other neo-Gramscian theorists such as Gill or Augelli and Murphy attribute an important 
role to international organizations in coordinating the policies of the global economy and in forming 
world hegemony. International organizations are perceived as mechanisms for the expression of 
universal norms, and they function as a process through which the institutions of hegemony and 
their ideology are developed.  
In Cox' approach, “the essential function of international institutions is the justification and defense 
of a particular politico-economic project” and “[i]n acting thus, they promote certain values as 
being comparatively fixed and appearing as natural” (Taylor 2004: 125).46 International 
organizations fulfill these functions through the following mechanisms:  
 (i) they embody rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders;  
 (ii) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order;  
 (iii) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order;  
 (iv) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries; 
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 In his analysis of world orders and hegemony building Brand comments that “international civil society is not an 
intermediate sector, but an international relation of societal forces. It deals with a space of struggle which is decisive 
for the restructuring of socio-economic and political conditions [...] As the terrain where hegemony is disputed, 
international civil society is at the same time “the object and the medium of struggle” (Haug 1985: 174)” (Brand 
2007: 10).  
46
 However, one must not forget that within multilateral institutions there are complex sets of social structures which 
shape the behavior of the various agents (states, civil society) involved in the power games taking place in these 
institutions concerning the use of ideas (cf. Boas and McNeill 2004: 209).  
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 (v) they absorb counterhegemonic ideas; and  
 (vi) provide material incentives47.  
According to Cox “[i]nternational institutions embody rules which facilitate the expansion of the 
dominant economic and social forces but which at the same time permit adjustments to be made by 
subordinated interests with a minimum of pain” (Cox 1993: 62). This assimilation, through co-
optation and absorption, in Gramscian terms takes the form of a passive revolution as particular 
elites can attain power without rupturing the existent social fabric (cf. Taylor 2004: 126). Cox 
continues by saying that rules governing world monetary and trade relations, as well as 
organizations regulating them, are particularly significant (cf. Cox 1993: 62). Thus, as they are 
involved in defining such rules and policy guidelines for states and are in the position to legitimate 
certain practices and institutions at the national level, international institutions are performing an 
ideological role48. Augelli and Murphy highlight that in their roles as facilitators of international 
cooperation, monitoring and regulating bodies and as distributors of development assistance, 
intergovernmental agencies take on certain functions similar to those of the modern welfare state 
(cf. Augelli and Murphy 1988: 180). Analyzing the role of international organizations and dynamics 
of forces behind the formation of the current world order, Cox introduces the concept of 
“nebuleuse”. He wants to show that the dominant world order is not a result of the decisions of a 
single hegemonic state. The nebuleuse is a group of international elites, corporate representatives 
and intellectuals who are forged into a historic bloc working towards the establishment of a 
hegemonic policy consensus (cf. Paterson 2009: 45). 
 
3.1.3 The Bretton Woods Institutions and hegemony 
The disputed question that neo-Gramscians aim at answering is whether and in what ways the 
current world order can be described as a hegemonic one, in the sense of a particular model of state, 
economy and society being diffused on a global scale and imposed by regulatory institutions (cf. 
Schwarzmantel 2009a: 7).  
In order to answer that question, Cox examined global power structures and following his three 
sphere-model which was presented in the previous chapter and finds that “[t]here is something that 
could be called a nascent historic bloc consisting of the most powerful corporate economic forces, 
their allies in government, and the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate 
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 The five functions have been defined by Cox (1981) and the 6th function, which seems to be particularly relevant in 
my analysis, was added by Rückert (2007).  
48
 In doing so, they mostly reflect orientations favorable to the dominant set of social and economic forces (cf. Cox 
1993).  
41 
the ideology of globalization.” (Cox 1999: 12 quoted in Taylor 2004: 126). Looking back at history, 
Rückert recognizes that the post-war “embedded liberal” order was marked by a universal 
consensus and concomitant hegemony (cf. Rückert 2006: 39). The transition from that order - in 
Gill's terms an “international historic bloc” of social forces - towards a “transnational historic bloc” 
started in the 1970s. It was characterized by forging links and a synthesis of interests and identities 
not only beyond national boundaries and classes, but also creating the conditions for the hegemony 
of transnational capital and the growing integration of developing country economies into a truly 
global marketplace (cf. Robinson 2004). The role of the U.S., the IMF and the World Bank in that 
process is particularly significant. Specifics of the neoliberal agenda “were generated through 
political struggles and compromises unfolding though North-South as well as World Bank-borrower 
relations” (Goldman 2005: 92). In order to deepen the structural power of internationally-mobile 
capital, interventions aimed at disciplining Southern Countries were pushed and implemented “with 
varying degrees of effectiveness, through a combination of market power and the surveillance of the 
Bretton Woods international organizations under US leadership” (Gill 1993: 32). With regard to that 
transnational historic bloc, Cox theorizes that  
 
[s]tates now by and large play the role of agencies of the global political economy, with the task of 
adjusting national economic policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of global economic 
liberalism. This structure of power is sustained from outside the state through a global policy 
consensus and the influence of global finance over state policy, and from inside the state from those 
social forces that benefit from globalization” (Cox 1999: 12 quoted in Taylor 2004: 136).  
 
Therefore, according to Cox, economic neoliberalism49 is hegemonic ideologically and in terms of 
policy.  
 
3.1.3.1 Neoliberal hegemony and interventions in Southern Countries 
Although economic neoliberalism is hegemonic ideologically and in terms of policy, from a neo-
Gramscian perspective, the current world order can be deemed as non-hegemonic. This is due to the 
increasing coercion and domination needed and applied in the (re)production of neoliberal norms 
and practices (cf. Rückert 2006; 2007). Gill argues that a historic bloc can be established without 
necessarily enjoying hegemonic rule and points out that the transnational historic bloc is exercising 
supremacy, not hegemony (cf. Gill 1993; 1995). For Gramsci, “supremacy prevails, when a 
situation of hegemony is not apparent and when dominance is exercised through an historical bloc 
over fragmented opposition” (Bieler and Morton 2004: 96-7, emphasis in original). Referring to this 
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  For Cox the “neo-liberal form of state” is rooted in the post World War II “negotiated consensus among the major 
industrial interests, organized labour, and government – the neo-liberal historic bloc” (Cox 1993: 265 quoted in 
Schwarzmantel 2009: 7). For a more comprehensive definition of neo-liberalism and how the term is used in this 
paper, see footnote 4 in chapter 1 and chapter 2.2.2.  
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Rückert highlights that neoliberalism has faced major legitimacy challenges in both the developed 
and the developing world and that in the latter the absence of a hegemonic world order “is 
expressed most palpably by the increasing unwillingness of developing country governments to 
voluntarily implement structural adjustment policies, and the growing popular uprisings against 
neoliberal reforms in many peripheral countries” (Rückert 2006: 39). The implementation of 
neoliberal policies, and the strengthening of neoliberalism in general, was and remains a 
transnational dialectical process, a product of tension, struggle, and negotiated compromise (cf. 
Dezalay 2002).  
Evidently, in neo-Gramscian theory the IMF and the World Bank are defined as leading actors in the 
attempt to create hegemony around the transnational historic bloc (cf. Robinson 2004, Rückert 
2006). In order to promote the neoliberal agenda on a global scale, the BWIs do not only formulate 
and execute certain development policies, but also persuade borrowing countries to implement them 
and in doing so, they organize the interests of the dominant classes and disorganize those of 
antagonistic groups (cf. Brandt 2007: 12 and Woods 2006: 65). Despite their strong bargaining 
power, which is based on to their role in providing funding and coordinating assistance, the World 
Bank and the Fund depend on sympathetic national policymakers to bring about domestic policy 
change in Southern Countries. Their intermediaries need to be interested in pursuing the policies 
prescribed by the Bank and the Fund (cf. ibid.: 149). In Gramsci’s terms, the World Bank and the 
Fund work through ideology, i.e. they function by building consensus, not by using force.  
 
Although the BWIs’ endeavor to restructure the developing world and establish hegemony uses 
numerous mechanisms and avenues of intervention, two key processes are highlighted by Bieler and 
Morton (2004: 96-7): the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism and the concomitant 
spread of market civilization. New constitutionalism is a concept introduced by Gill (1993) which 
describes “a doctrine and associated set of social forces which seek to place restraints on the 
democratic control of public and private economic organization and institutions” in order to 
promote neoliberalism on a legal basis.50 The complementary mean for spreading market 
civilization was the advancement of neoliberal policies through conditional lending and obligatory 
macroeconomic structural adjustment. Eventually, the World Bank successfully transformed a 
“potentially explosive political question about rights, entitlements, how one should live, and who 
                                                 
50 Gill continues that new constitutionalism “can be linked to attempts to embed the hegemony of “disciplinary” 
neoliberalism, of the type associated with the attempts to restructure the post-communist states under IMF and 
Western tutelage.” (Gill 1993: 10) Redefinitions of sovereignty and constitutional reconsideration are now important 
political issues in many Southern Countries – also in Malawi –  and Gill speaks of a “constitutionalization of 
neoliberal principles” (ibid; Gill 2000). New constitutionalism is also closely related to the concept of good 
governance.  
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should decide into technical questions of efficiency and sustainability” (Li 2002:1 quoted in 
Goldman 2005: 224).  
An important feature is that throughout their operations, the IMF and the World Bank were 
concerned with transforming the policy of applying force to the developing world to one of building 
consensus in order to turn supremacy to hegemony (cf. Augelli and Murphy 1993: 133-4). Gill 
highlights the importance of elite interaction and network-building for the establishment of 
consensus (cf. Gill and Law 1993: 108) and Patterson provides a summary of the dynamics of this 
process by drawing on Cox' concept of nebuleuse that was mentioned above:  
 
[A] transnational and international network of state elites, corporate representatives and intellectuals is 
forged into an historic bloc, which is largely responsible for formulating a 'policy consensus for global 
capitalism' […] Those official policies of the nebuleuse emerge not only from the United Nations and 
the 'unholy trinity' of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO […], but also from the 'global private-
level authorities that regulate both states and much of transnational economic and social life' […]. 
These institutions establish a 'new constitutionalism' of legal frameworks to enforce transnational 
interests […], and legitimize the restructuring of people's lives through propagating a neoliberal 
ideology (the language of competition, deregulation, downsizing, efficiency, flexibility, 
modernization, outsourcing, privatization and restructuring). As elites and the demos are bombarded 
with the dictates of this neoliberal ideology a 'common sense' emerges, which naturalizes and 
legitimizes the new mode of production. (Paterson 2009: 45) 
 
 As Paterson and others show, the World Bank and IMF work with projected interventions, 
negotiations, and conditionalities, by providing material incentives, making concessions and with 
consensus-building in order to get sectional interests to be displayed as the common interest (cf. 
Taylor 2004: 127; Rückert 2006: 40).  
Hence, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the recent shift in the Bretton Woods Institutions' 
development approach51 from the clearly neoliberal Washington Consensus52 towards poverty 
reduction and the introduction and revision of the so called Post Washington Consensus can also be 
interpreted as an attempt to facilitate the expansion of a hegemonic neoliberal world order by 
ideologically legitimating the norms of this order (cf. ibid.: 40). This happens through a shift in 
discourse towards emphasizing poverty reduction and country ownership as the operational 
principles lending activities, “without straying too far from neoliberal principles in the actual 
development practice” (ibid.: 40). The PRSP process can thus be seen as an attempt to consolidate a 
unified political project for development worldwide. Academics examining the BWI's development 
policies (Soederberg 2005; Cammack 2004; Weber 2006) point out that the allegedly revised 
development approach's substance “reflects concrete attempts to further entrench the dominant 
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 A detailed discussion of the Bank's and Fund's development approaches and their shifts over time can be found in 
chapter 2.  
52
  From a neo-Gramscian perspective, the Washington Consensus can be seen as a means to protect the international 
financial system and defending Western interests, using international institutions. 
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social power relations as well as accompanying legal frameworks for a form of radical capitalism to 
be consolidated at a global level and on a global scale” (Weber 2006: 189). From a neo-Gramscian 
perspective this undertaking, co-optation of leaders of Southern Countries and alignment of 
interests for the establishment of hegemony, can be seen as an action of passive revolution or 
transformismo.  
 
3.1.3.2 Neoliberal hegemony, PRSPs and country ownership  
As outlined above, from a neo-Gramscian perspective the World Bank’s policy shift towards the 
PRSP approach and the emphasis on country ownership are fully in line with the ambition to push 
the neoliberal economic paradigm and to establish a hegemonic world order because  
 
the commitment to poverty reduction and even the commitment to economic growth is a consistent 
commitment to the systematic transformation of social relations and institutions in the developing 
world, in order to generalize and facilitate capitalist accumulation on a global scale, and build 
specifically capitalist hegemony through the promotion of participation and ownership. (Cammack 
2004) 
 
Raising criticism of their neoliberal policies and the failure to deliver effective projects for poverty 
reduction in Southern Countries led the BWIs to reorient their development approach in the 1990s. 
As the Bank and the Fund believed that delays or failures in the implementation of programs and 
projects were caused by a lack of local ownership viz. local support for them, their new concept, the 
PRSP approach was based on the principles of participation, country ownership53 and poverty 
reduction. Consequently the BWIs announced they would take a “back seat”, get Southern 
Countries to take the “drivers’ seat” and determine their own development path. (cf. Buchardt 2003: 
61; Rückert 2006: 61-2)  
However, scholars highlight that the contrary is what actually happened as the actual scope of 
participation is very limited in practice54. The BWIs believe that ownership on the one hand would 
make development cooperation more effective and efficient, while on the other hand ownership is 
also expected to contribute to a genuine commitment to implementing neoliberal adjustment 
policies. “What is unique about the PRSP approach is the realization on behalf of the [BWIs] that a 
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  It is noteworthy that “[t]he term ‘ownership’ is borrowed from the realm of private property over good or land, 
where it generally has a well-defined legal meaning, but also involves a psychological aspect, a perception of 
possession. When transferred to policy programs, the legal aspect, which underpins the concept in its normal use, 
disappears, and we are left with the psychological aspect. This psychological aspect could be just a matter of 
perceptions, without any change in underlying realities – i.e. that governments/local people are induced to believe 
they have ownership of what are essentially unchanged reality, by reformed process, such as the PRSP might bring 
about. But a genuine change in the underlying reality is likely to be needed to bring about a lasting change in 
perceptions. This would require that the national contribution to the design of policy programs substantially 
increases, even if it does not become exclusive.” (Steward and Wang 2003: 3)  
54
  Cf. chapter 2 and Klugman (2002) 
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strong consensus around [BWI] policies in the developing world will make the implementation of 
adjustment policies less contentious and more probable” according to Rückert (2006: 45). Indeed, 
following the BWI’s own argumentation: 
 
[o]wnership matters because it directly affects program implementation. … When the program is 
owned by the country, decisions on such actions are likely to be made quickly and in support of the 
program, which makes it more likely that the program will succeed. Furthermore, ownership will 
make it easier to generate domestic political support for the program, since it is likely to be seen, at 
least in part, as an indigenous product, rather than a foreign imposition. (IMF 2001: 14 quoted in 
Rückert 2006: 45-6)  
 
The BWI’s limited understanding of ownership and their hegemonic ambition is very clear in this 
statement.  
 
As outlined above, the fundamental contradiction55 is that PRSP policies need to fit within a 
strategic framework imposed by the Bank, and should simultaneously be freely chosen and 
“owned” by client governments. (cf. Rückert 2006: 62) Cammack also shows that country 
ownership and popular participation from the beginning were subordinated to a governing logic laid 
down by the Bank, and that a key phase of the preparations for introduction of the PRSP approach 
was principally concerned with “providing an intellectual justification for it, canvassing support, 
and setting in motion the institutional changes through which it could be advanced” (Cammack 
2004). As the BWIs were aiming to establish hegemony and wanted to work though consensus, they 
had to “persuade the populations that an adjustment package is legitimate” following a World Bank 
official (cf. Taylor 2004: 134). The BWIs were aware that their proposed policy ideas could only be 
successfully translated into local policies “if configurations of power at the domestic level can 
sustain such policies” (Boas and McNeill 2004: 10). In order to create such support for the PRSP 
approach on the governmental level the BWIs acted through training and transnational policy 
networks56. Governments were convinced by the neoliberal economic paradigm through 
dissemination, performance monitoring, seminars, publications and what Woods (2006: 66) calls 
“disciplinary training”. The Bank’s and Fund’s strong leverage is reinforced by the fact that they 
often step into crisis situations in which governments are uncertain while they employ consultants 
with technical knowledge sympathetic to their reform agenda. The BWIs successfully redefined 
state interests by introducing their ideas. (cf. Goldman 2005; Woods 2006: 68) 
Besides analyzing the mechanisms of persuading governments, Rückert also looks into the meaning 
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  Another contradiction highlighted by Rückert is the incompatibility of neoliberal macroeconomic and poverty-
sensitive social policies (cf. Rückert 2006: 62). 
56
  For a detailed discussion of transnational policy networks, their meaning for policy reform in Southern Countries 
and their power to frame development agendas in a neoliberal way see Goldman 2005: 221-272.  
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of including previously excluded people – the poor, marginalized and rural communities – into the 
policy process. The policies proposed and accepted in the PRSP framework are focused on 
integrating the formerly excluded people in the formal economic system. Micro-level incentive 
structures which shape behavior in ways conductive to the promotion of competition and capitalist 
accumulation were created. Rückert cites the example material incentives for the extremely poor 
through subsidization of health care and water in an effort to control subaltern forces and coopt 
them into the neoliberal system. He perceives the inclusion of these social groups as a refinement of 
the neoliberal political project and thus calls it “inclusive neoliberalism”. Overall, then, a neo-
Gramscian reading of the BWIs efforts in Southern Countries suggests that “the ultimate goal of 
inclusive neoliberalism is the combination of broadly macroeconomic neoliberal policies with 
micropolitical rationales and technologies of social inclusion” (Rückert 2006: 41-2).57  
 
It is important to note that the inclusion of previously excluded people also has a counter-
hegemonic potential. It lies primarily in the description of Southern Countries as agents in the new 
development discourse of the World Bank and the Fund. This discursive shift from portraying 
Southern Countries as passive recipients of development aid to partners in development cooperation 
acknowledges the active role of Southern Countries in shaping their own future and development 
agenda, rather than seeing them as objects of external agency. (cf. Abrahamson 2004; Rückert 2006) 
 
3.2 Research method  
In this chapter, I will outline the research methods and materials used in my analysis. With regard to 
the scope of a Master’s thesis, my limited capacities, and the available materials, I choose to limit 
my methodical approach to one qualitative research method. I chose Argumentative Discourse 
Analysis, which is closely related to and draws on a very common research method for policy 
analysis, namely qualitative content analysis58.  
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  Cammack criticizes the concept of „empowerment” and how it is employed by the BWIs in a similar way: 
“Empowerment means enhancing the capacity of poor people to influence the state institutions that affect their lives, 
by strengthening their participation in political processes and local decision-making. And it means removing the 
barriers -- political, legal, and social -- that work against particular groups and building the assets of poor people to 
enable them to engage effectively in markets. Expanding economic opportunities for poor people indeed contributes 
to their empowerment. But efforts are needed to make state and social institutions work in the interests of poor 
people -- to make them pro-poor […]. Once again, the ‘empowerment of the poor’ serves the purposes of the 
neoliberal state” (Cammack 2003: 13) 
58
  Handbooks for qualitative content analysis which were consulted for this study are Lamneck 1993 and Mayring 
1997; 2000.  
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3.2.1 Materials 
I will base my analysis on official documents of the Government of Malawi (GoM) such as the 
interim PRSP, the full PRSP, the PRSP progress reports as well as documents of the BWIs such as 
Joint Staff Advisory Notes and the Country Assistance Strategy. As the final versions of official 
documents often reveal little about the politics of negotiations and (in)formal channels of influence 
which shape decision other documents, such as policy and position papers by NGOs, and relevant 
research papers have also been consulted. 
 
3.2.2 Argumentative Discourse Analysis  
My aim is to answer the second research question by using Argumentative Discourse Analysis:  
 “What was the aid relationship between the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Government of 
Malawi, Parliament and Civil Society in the first PRSP process and how did it change over time?” 
This research question can be divided into two operationalized questions:  
 (i) Who was involved in the PRSP process and what interaction was there between the 
 stakeholders? Which stakeholders directed the formulation of the PRSP?  
 (ii) How was ownership perceived by the different stakeholders involved?  
Argumentative Discourse Analysis can also provide answers for my third research question “Did 
Malawi ‘own’ its PRSP?” However, the World Bank and the IMF have themselves proposed criteria 
to assess ownership (cf. Cavassini and Entwistle 2005a: 2) and I will also apply these, and assess 
the results of both approaches for answering my third research question. I believe an answer based 
on two methods which complement each other in this case will allow for giving a more informed 
answer to my complex third research question.   
 
Argumentative Discourse Analysis was introduced by the public policy analysis scholar Maarten 
Hajer (1995; 2006a; 2006b). In general, discourse analysis is concerned with how ideas are 
assembled and held together by means of framing and promoting certain meanings or sometimes 
disputed “truths”. Hajer’s concept is somewhat broader, since he defines discourse “as an ensemble 
of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical 
phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer 
2006a: 67) it refers to a set of concepts that structures contributions of participants to a discussion 
on a given topic. Discourse should be distinguished conceptually from discussion so as to allow for 
the differentiation of plural discourses, which might exist in the discussion of a single topic issue. 
Based on this definition, discourse analysis is “the examination of argumentative structure in 
documents and other written or spoken statements as well as the practices through which these 
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utterances are made” (Hajer 2006a: 66).  
Hajer’s method is perceived as a discourse analysis influenced by Gramscianism (cf. Scherrer 2007: 
78) as he also addresses concepts like power of ideas, institutional support for certain visions, and 
consensus building. Like Gramscian scholars who say that discourse in some sense creates reality 
(cf. Ashley 1986; Femia 2009), Hajer points out that the basic assumption of discourse analysis is 
that language shapes our view of the world and reality and is not merely a neutral medium 
mirroring it. Establishing a clear connection between ideas and institutionalization, he theorizes that 
language has the capacity to make politics, create signs and symbols which are capable to shift 
power balances and can impact on policy making and institutions. The aim of any Argumentative 
Discourse Analysis thus should be to examine “how the definition of a political problem relates to 
the particular narrative in which it is discussed” (Hajer 2006a: 66), or in other words, to see how 
discourse, cognition, strategic behavior, and institutional patterns interrelate and how change comes 
about. The latter definition also emphasizes the importance of discursive interaction for the creation 
of meanings. Argumentative Discourse Analysis examines the exchange of arguments, i.e. 
contradictory suggestions regarding how to make sense of reality, and how realities are 
(re)produced in specific discursive patterns.  
Hajer highlights that the analysis of discourses is especially fruitful if conducted in the context of 
the study of the socio-historical conditions in which the statements were produced and received.  
 
Discourse analysis then opens up methodologically sound ways to combine the analysis of the 
discursive production of meaning with the analysis of the socio-political practices from which social 
constructs emerge and in which the actors that make the statements engage. (Hajer 2006a: 67) 
 
Hence Argumentative Discourse Analysis is an adequate tool to analyze the aid relationship 
between the BWIs, the Government of Malawi, Parliament and Civil Society in the PRSP process 
and to answer the question whether Malawi “owned” it’s PRSP, viz. who gave direction in the 
formulation process. In order to maximize the explanatory power of my analysis of ownership of 
the PRSP, I also analyze the socio-historical conditions in Malawi and at the Bretton Woods 
Institutions.  
 
Unlike some other approaches in discourse analysis59, Hajer’s method is precisely defined and 
clearly operationalized, although Hajer begins his elaborations by saying that “how you 
operationalize discourse analysis, of course depends very much on the type of questions you have” 
and that “[i]t is, after all, a matter of research design” (ibid.: 68). In Argumentative Discourse 
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  Michel Foucault, for instance, who plays a decisive role for discourse analysis and is treated as the “father” of this 
method, is often criticized for his lack of clear operationalization.  
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Analysis, statements are examined with the help of concepts such as “story lines”, “narratives”, 
“discourse-coalitions” or “practices”. The definitions of these concepts which are given below draw 
on Hajer’s methodological articles (Hajer 2006a; 2006b), and the glossary available on his 
website60.  
 
Story lines 
Hajer defines story lines as follows: statements are often told in the form of a narrative or a story. 
Mostly, people use a given (buzz)word assuming that the hearer will know what he/she means or 
refers to. Story lines are condensed statements summarizing complex narratives, and are used by 
people as “short hand” in discussions. In any field, there are several such stories which are regarded 
as particularly important. It is often assumed that the meaning a receiver seeks in a message is the 
same as the sender intended to put into the message, but for Hajer, this assumption of mutual 
understanding is false. Much communication is in fact based on interpretative readings, and ideas 
are interpreted differently in different institutions, while ideas and interpretations change over time, 
in different ways in different institutions (cf. Boas and McNeill 2004). However, Hajer highlights 
that gradual misunderstandings can be functional for creating a political coalition or consensus.   
Identifying story lines shows that people actually do something with the discussed topic when 
talking about it, they do not merely refer to a problem with a fixed identity, but are continually 
changing the problem definition. (cf. Hajer 2006a; 2006b) 
 
Discourse-coalition 
A discourse-coalition refers to the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors who utter them, and 
the practices through which they are expressed over a particular period of time. Story lines function 
as a medium through which actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain 
social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements. This suggests that 
politics is a process in which different actors form various backgrounds from specific coalitions 
around specific story lines. As it is important to take into account the situation and specific 
circumstances in which story lines are uttered and discourses drawn upon, Hajer introduces the 
concept of practice, which is discussed below. (cf. ibid.) 
 
Practices 
Practices are defined as embedded routines and mutually understood rules and norms which provide 
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  http://www.maartenhajer.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=19 [23.02.2011]  
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coherence to social life.61 Drawing on Wittgenstein, Hajer highlights that linguistic utterances 
cannot usefully be understood outside the practices in which they are uttered. Hence discourse 
should always be conceived of in interrelation with the practices in which it is produced, reproduced 
and transformed. Hajer writes that “if discourse analysis is the analysis of language-in-use then 
practices are the sites where language is used.” (Hajer 2011)  
Discourse coalitions are not primarily connected to a particular person, they are related to practices 
in the context of which actors employ story lines, and (re)produce and transform particular 
discourses. Thus it becomes possible for some people to utter contradictory statements, or even 
reproduce different discourse-coalitions. (cf. Hajer 2006a; 2006b) 
 
Discourse and power 
In order to measure the influence of discourse Hajer proposes a two-step procedure assessing 
whether a discourse coalition is dominant in a given political realm. First, central actors should be 
forced to accept the rhetorical power of a new discourse which is widely used for conceptualizing 
the world. This situation is called “discourse structuration”. Second, if the discourse solidifies into 
the institutions and organizational practices of that given political domain, and the actual policy 
process is conducted according to the ideas of a given discourse, one can speak of “discourse 
institutionalization”. If both criteria are fulfilled, that particular discourse is deemed dominant. (cf. 
ibid.) 
 
3.2.3 Conducting Argumentative Discourse Analysis 
Argumentative Discourse Analysis is an examination “of what is being said to whom, and in what 
context” (Hajer 2006a: 72). With every statement, people react to one another and thus interactively 
produce changing meanings. Hajer acknowledges that the emphasis on the argumentative – 
understood as interplay in the context of practices – puts methodological constraints on the way in 
which data can be accessed, collected and interpreted.  
Hajer defines ten basic steps for an argumentative discourse analysis (cf. Hajer 2006a; 2006b) 
which are listed below:  
1. Desk research: a general survey of the documents and positions in a given field; for example 
newspaper analysis, analysis of news sections in relevant journals in order to make a first 
chronology and arrive at a first reading of events; 
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  On his website, Hajer gives two examples for practices: “we can think of going to church as a practice, or writing 
articles for academic journals as a practice characteristic for the life world of university professors.” Another 
practice could be writing a progress report for a donor, for instance.  
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2.  ‘Helicopter interviews’: interviews with three or four actors chosen because they have an 
overview of the field, albeit from different positions. They might comprise a well-informed 
journalist, a key advisor to the government, or an expert policy-maker; 
3. Document analysis: analyzing documents for structuring concepts, ideas and 
categorizations; use of story lines, metaphors, etc. This should result in a first attempt at 
defining structuring discourses in the discussion. At this stage one gets a basic notion of the 
process of events as well as the sites of discursive production.  
4. Interviews with key players: on the basis of the preceding steps interviews can be conducted 
with central actors in the political process. The interviews can be used to generate more 
information on causal chains (‘which led to what’).  
5. Sites of argumentation:  a search for data should go beyond reconstructing the arguments 
used and also include a reconstruction of argumentative exchange. Examples might include 
parliamentary debates, minutes of inquiries, presentation and interpretation of evidence 
presented to a particular research commission, panel discussions at conferences. 
6.  Analysis of positioning effects: actors can get “caught up” in an interplay. They might force 
others to take up a particular role, but once others are aware of what is happening, they 
might also try to refuse it (indicators: “This is not what I meant”, “That is not what it is 
about at all”). This positioning occurs on the individual level of persons but can of course 
also be found among institutions or even nation-states. 
7. Identification of key incidents: identification of key incidents which are essential to 
understand the discursive dynamics in the chosen case. If possible, these key incidents are 
then transcribed in more detail allowing for more insights into what determined their 
political effects. 
8. Analysis of practices in particular cases of argumentation: rather than assuming coherence 
on the part of particular actors, at this stage one goes back to the data to see if the meaning 
of what is being said can be related to the practices in which it was said. 
9. Interpretation: on this basis one may find a discursive order which governed a particular 
domain at a given time. Ideally, one should come up with an account of the discursive 
structures within a given discussion, as well as an interpretation of the practices, namely the 
sites of production which are of importance in explaining a particular course of events. 
10. Second visit to key actors: is a way of controlling if the analysis. Discourses are inferred 
from reality by the analyst, yet when respondents are confronted with the findings, they 
should at least recognize some of the hidden structures in language.  
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In my analysis, I will omit points 2, 4 and 10 (helicopter interviews, interviews with key players, 
second visit to key actors) and will be using secondary literature in which relevant data have been 
collected through such interviews (Bwalya et al. 2004; Fozzard and Simwaka 2002; Jenkins and 
Tsoka 2003; ODI 2001; VENRO 2008). Drawing on that secondary literature is a necessity for me 
as conducting such interviews by myself would have gone beyond the scope of a Master’s 
dissertation.  
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4. CONTESTED OWNERSHIP: MALWI’S PRSP 
 
4.1 A general overview of Malawi 
Malawi is a landlocked country located in southeastern Africa62 with a population of approximately 
15,7 million. It has a comparatively low urbanization rate of only 17 percent and more than 83 
percent of Malawi’s population live in rural areas. With a very high population density, it is more 
densely populated than neighboring states in the region. It borders Lake Malawi and has no sea 
access, what poses a significant trade barrier.  Malawi is one of the world’s poorest countries in 
terms of GDP per capita and is currently ranked 153rd out of 169 countries on the United Nations 
Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI)63. Life expectancy is rather low (54,6 
years), infant mortality comparatively high (the under five-mortality rate is of 100/1000 live births), 
illiteracy significant and years of schooling low (the school enrollment ratio lies at 61% and the 
mean years of schooling for adults is 4,3). A major problem in Malawi is health care, as there is 
only one medical practitioner per 50.000 inhabitants64. Poor medical care and the high HIV/AIDS 
rate (about 14%) are jointly responsible for the low life expectancy. In the past twenty years 
Malawi’s HDI has increased, though it remains below the regional average.65 (cf. UNDP 2011)  
 
As mentioned above, Malawi is one of the world’s poorest countries in economic terms. Poverty is a 
serious problem with 29% of the population being affected by extreme poverty at the beginning of 
the millennium. Poverty is more prevalent in rural than in urban areas, where approximately 55% of 
the population lives below the national poverty line of MK 16.165 per year, equivalent to about 
USD 115 (cf. IFAD 2009: 4).66 There are also regional differences, with more poor and ultra-poor 
living in the southern and northern regions. Distribution of wealth is not equal: the richest 20% 
consume 46% of the total goods and services, while the poorest 20% consume only 6%. (cf. IFAD 
2009; Kubalasa 2004: 3) 
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  A map of the Republic of Malawi can be found in Annex B.  
63
  The Human Development Index (HDI) was introduced in 1990 as alternative to conventional measures of national 
development, such as the level of income of rate of economic growth (which are used as indicators by the BWIs). 
The HDI measures well-being on the basis of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and 
income. 
64
  Braindrain is a particularly severe in the health sector: allegedly, there are more medical practitioners from Malawi 
working in the United Kingdom than in their home country. (cf. Meinhardt 2010) 
65
  For my analysis it is noteworthy that there seems to have been a period of stagnation between 2000 and 2006, and 
there are no data available for the period between 2001 and 2004 – the years of the first PRSP. (cf. UNDP 2011) 
66
  According to the PRSP definition from 1998, the poor are defined as persons who can only afford to spend USD 
0,10 or MK 10,47 per day on food and non-food needs. (cf. Kubalasa 2004: 3) 
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“Poverty is deep, severe and widespread” (Kubalasa 2004: 3), smallholder farmers, female- and 
child-headed households, estate workers and the disabled are worst affected by poverty. The poverty 
gap index, showing the ratio of the average extra consumption required to bring all poor people up 
to the poverty line indicates that poverty, is deep in Malawi. Estimates show that the poverty gap 
amounted to around 20% of GDP at the end of the 1990s. The principal causes of poverty are the 
limited access to land, low education levels, poor health status and care, limited off-farm 
employment and lack of access to credit. Some of these factors, such as poor education and ill 
health, are simultaneously consequences of poverty. (cf. Bwalya et al. 2004: 7; Fozzard and 
Simwaka 2004: 5)  
 
4.1.1 History and the political system in Malawi 
4.1.1.1 Independence and the Banda Regime 
In the colonial era, Malawi had been a British protectorate since 1891 and became known as 
Nyasaland in 1907. The Republic of Malawi gained its independence in 1964 after a long period of 
comparatively peaceful struggle for autonomy, which was led by Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Banda, a 
medical physician trained in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, returned to Malawi in 1958 after 
having spent more than four decades abroad. He became the political leader of newly independent 
Malawi and subsequently established an autocratic leadership, imposing himself as the undisputed 
leader. (cf. Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 3) 
The first parliamentary elections were held in 1961, and all seats were won by Banda’s Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP). After independence in 1964, Malawi set up a parliamentary system of 
government following the British model, formally a multiparty system. However, the 1964 elections 
were cancelled, what paved the way for Banda’s autocratic regime. When Malawi introduced a new 
constitution in 1966 and formally became a republic, the parliamentary system as well as the 
multiparty system was abolished and the MCP was declared to be the only legal party. All 
constitutional powers were transferred to the president, as a result of which Banda, who was also 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, had almost unlimited powers to rule the country “like a 
private estate” (ibid.: 3) as he would say himself. Besides these formal powers, Banda had 
additional leverage based on his economic power: he was by far the largest private commercial 
farmer and entrepreneur in Malawi. In 1971 Banda was appointed Life President, and strengthened 
the personality cult around his person, the “Ngwazi” (“great lion” or “conqueror” in Chichewa, the 
strongest local language in Malawi). (cf. Meinhardt 2010) 
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In economic and social terms, Malawi was characterized by rapid economic growth (over 5%) 
under Banda’s rule. This growth was based on agriculture since a significant private sector in 
manufacturing or mining was absent and the government kept to promoting an agricultural 
development strategy. As it favored estate and neglected smallholders, income distribution in 
Malawi was worsening, rural households were impoverished and in the late 1960s the top 10% of 
the population accounted for over 50% of national income. This agriculture-centered development 
policy has been consistently pursued by the government, but proved unsustainable in the long term 
as there had not been much structural transformation. A series of exogenous shocks (oil price peaks, 
disruptions in trade routes, influx of refugees due to the civil war in neighboring Mozambique and 
droughts) in 1979-81 exposed the weakness of Malawi’s economy. (cf. Booth et al. 2006: 4-5) 
 
During the Banda era political opposition was suppressed and critical political activists and 
individuals were prosecuted by the judiciary which was narrowly controlled by the president. It was 
forbidden to form or join any political organization other than the MCP. Human rights violations 
were common, and there was no organized, open or clandestine opposition movement in Malawi 
and due to the climate of mutual distrust and repression, there was no active civil society. The only 
non-state institution not deprived of the right of association was the church. In short, there was no 
meaningful participation in the political process due to these restrictions and this oppression. (cf. 
ibid.: 15-16) 
There were also no independent media, and the streamlined information system as well as the 
effective repression were important backbones of Banda’s autocratic power. Another was patronage: 
Banda allocated wealth and power to his supporters; however he maintained tight control of the 
extent of benefits granted and withdrew these privileges deliberately. There was a permanent 
rotation of portfolios and positions in his cabinets, and only a few top politicians remained in office 
for more than a few years. (cf. Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 3-7) 
Until the early 1990s, there was virtually no reaction, or any sanctions, to the repression and severe 
human rights violations from Western Europe and the U.S. On the contrary, the Banda regime 
received aid flows from Western donors who were supporting it generously due to its anti-
communist stance.67 Only after the end of the Cold War in 1991, criticism of the Banda regime was 
raised and donors did start to demand respect for human rights and to push for democratic reform. 
Donors were on the verge of cutting aid when Banda responded with an appeasement strategy, 
including the release of some political prisoners and an arbitrary discussion on the future of the 
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  It is noteworthy that Malawi’s neighboring countries were not having close relations to the Banda regime, and 
Malawi was the only southern African country to maintain diplomatic relations to South Africa during Apartheid. 
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single party system, and didn’t show any willingness for fundamental reforms. (cf. Meinhardt and 
Patel 2003: 4-6) 
 
4.1.1.2 The transition to a multiparty system 
Drawing on the experience from other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the political and economic 
conditions in Malawi were highly unfavorable for a successful democratic transition, as there was 
no opposition which would have had strong support and would be likely to take over power. The 
majority of the population was constituted by economically and politically marginalized rural 
farmers and the small and educated urban elite was either repressed or part of the government. Civil 
society was virtually nonexistent, in 1985 there were still only 25 local NGOs registered in Malawi. 
(cf. Booth et al. 2006: 16; Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 7) It was due to external pressure from donors 
that the government opened up the NGO sector. In addition the formation of the two emerging 
underground opposition groups in 1991 was initiated with the assistance of expatriates working in 
Malawi.68 (ibid.: 8) 
The strongest opposition group was composed of former MCP politicians who had been deposed by 
Banda, earned their living as businessmen and entrepreneurs, and mostly came from the Southern 
Region. This group, which later became the United Democratic Front (UDF), was led by Bakili 
Muzuli. The other opposition group which emerged in 1991 was dominated by professionals and 
intellectuals from the Northern Region, and was later known as the Alliance for Democracy 
(AFORD). AFORD distrusted the UDF movement as most of its members had served under 
Banda.69  
As the opposition had to remain underground and did not have the necessary capacity to voice its 
criticism, it reverted to the only institution which had an adequate nationwide platform to carry its 
message: Malawi’s two biggest churches, which so far had never been critical of the regime (cf. 
ibid.: 8-10). The Catholic clergy was approached and encouraged by the UDF to read a Pastoral 
Letter criticizing the regime for its human rights violations, corruption, inefficiency and the lack of 
democratic rights in all Catholic churches in Malawi on March 8 1992. This action had two effects: 
first, international support for the bishops ensured that they were not persecuted by the regime for 
their actions; second, the fact that the bishops had publicly criticized the regime without 
consequences broke a long-held taboo. Subsequently, for the first time since Banda had taken over 
                                                 
68
  Following Meinhardt and Patel (2003: 8) two Europeans used their important advantages – access to information 
about developments inside and outside Malawi through diplomatic channels, as well as not being suspected to be an 
agent of the regime – to get in touch with and support the initiation of opposition movements.  
69
  Another factor which fuelled distrust was regional differences: the North-South disparity had been deepened under 
Banda’s regime as it neglected and sidelined the northern regions. While UDF’s supporters mostly came from the 
Southern Region, AFORD’s supporters were from the north. (Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 9) 
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power in the 1960s mass-demonstrations and strikes took place in Malawi in 1992. (cf. Meinhardt 
and Patel 2003: 8-9) 
In response to the recent domestic developments in Malawi and due to external pressure from 
donors who had partly suspended aid flows in 1992, Banda agreed to the churches’ demand for a 
dialogue with the regime to liberalize the political system. The government wanted to restrict the 
participation in the discussion to churches only, but had to give in to other groups such as the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Law Society. Eventually, the two opposition movements UDF and 
AFORD officialized their existence and joined the discussion forum as pressure groups. 
Consequently, Banda called for a referendum on the question whether a multiparty system of 
government should be introduced. He was prepared to take this step as he was convinced that the 
rural population (about 85% at that time) would support him and back his government. However, 
two-thirds of the voters casting ballots were in favor of the introduction of a multiparty system, and 
Banda had to agree on elections to be held in 1994. This marked another step in the democratization 
process in Malawi. Since this transition, Malawi has a presidential system of government. The 
president, who is the chief of state, the head of government, and the supreme commander of the 
armed forces, is elected for five years. (cf. Booth et al. 2006: 8-13; Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 10) 
 
In economic terms, the era of transition was a period of economic liberalization under the influence 
of international donors. It was characterized by declining per capita incomes and further falls in per 
capita grain production. The latter was due to U-turns and inconsistencies in development 
strategies. (cf. Harrigan 2003) Most policies were guided by the BWIs’ stabilization and Structural 
Adjustment Programs, and the government of Malawi was fairly compliant with donor 
conditionalities. Between 1981 and 1994, Malawi implemented six Structural Adjustment Programs 
supported by the BWIs, while after 1995 three Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation Programs, 
another form of SAP supported by the BWIs, were implemented. (cf. World Bank 2008: 21-9) 
During the 1990s the government turned away from investing into economic infrastructure and 
shifted towards the social sectors, in accordance with the new development paradigm promoted by 
donors. But since the policies adopted did not address the underlying structural problems in Malawi 
(massive population growth, disadvantage of smallholders, and declining soil fertility), economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability were not restored. (cf. Booth et al. 2006: 5) 
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4.1.1.3 The era of democratization and reform 
The role of external influence in the transition to multiparty democracy in Malawi was significant: 
“[t]he democratization process was initiated and encouraged by Western donors who demanded 
democratic reforms in return for aid” (Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 11). Donor influence remained 
strong throughout the reform era which was to come (cf. Booth et al. 2006). After it was clear that 
elections were to be held in 1994, a new democratic constitution was drafted within a few months, 
with considerable inputs from donors and foreign consultants. This constitution, whose donor 
driven content and quick adoption is fully in line with Gill’s concept of new constitutionalism,70 
was passed by the one-party parliament only one day before the first multiparty parliamentary and 
presidential elections were held in May 1994. Muluzi’s UDF won the elections with 47% of the 
votes, Banda’s MCP became second receiving approximately about 30%, and AFORD won only 
19%. As the UDF did not win a majority in the National Assembly, it had to form a coalition, and as 
forming one with the MCP was not acceptable for donors who wanted to see a new constellation of 
power, AFORD became UDF’s alliance partner. Being aware of UDF’s limited possibilities in 
coalition building, AFORD demanded a large share of government offices and government coalition 
talks lasted until mid 1995. (cf. Fozzard and Simwaka 2002: 3; Meinhardt 2010)  
In 1995, a constitutional conference with broad societal participation took place but its results did 
not have much influence on the decision-making process. The review of the constitution which was 
passed in parliament by the UDF-AFORD majority did not reflect many inputs given outside 
parliament, nor any of those given in the participatory consultations which had been initiated. (cf. 
Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 13)  
 
In the 1999 general elections UDF was able to win a slight majority in parliament and Muluzi was 
appointed president for another 5 year term. The loosing parties challenged the results of the 
election pointing out electoral irregularities, and there were outbreaks of violence (cf. Jenkins and 
Tsoka 2003: 198). In 2000 the first local elections since democratization were held in Malawi with a 
participation rate of only 14% voters. UDF won most wards and ended up controlling 33 out of 39 
local assemblies. The slight ideological differences between the three major parties increased 
throughout the 1990s, and in the run-up to the elections.71 (cf. Fozzard and Simwaka 2002: 3)  
At the end of his second term, it was strongly debated if Muluzi should be allowed to run for a third 
term although the constitution does not provide for it. Eventually, he chose not to run for another 
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  Cf. Gill 1993 and chapter 3.1.3.1.  
71
  “UDF presented a liberal manifesto, balancing interests of government, people and private sector, while AFORD 
placed greater emphasis on workers’ rights and the MCP was more conservative, stressing the importance of clean 
and efficient administration, peace and stability” (Fozzard and Simwaka 2002: 3). 
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term and nominated another presidential candidate for the UDF, Bingu wa Mutharika, his Minister 
of Economic Planning and Development. With strong support from Muluzi, the almost unknown 
Mutharika won the elections in 2004. However, because of differences based on the government’s 
initiatives against corrupt party officials in high-ranking positions, Mutharika left the UDF and 
founded the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Consequently, the president did not hold the 
majority in parliament as UDF and MCP had formed an informal opposition alliance. This made 
decision making in parliament difficult and hampered the government’s work; it took months until 
important bills were passed and reforms were delayed. This situation did not change until elections 
were held in May 2009. Mutharika won the presidential elections, and his DPP got the two-thirds 
majority in parliament which allows for constitutional amendments. (cf. Meinhardt 2010) 
 
From 1999 on, during Muluzi’s second term as president, Malawi’s development performance was 
continuously worsening and there was frequent crisis. Until 2005 the economy was characterized by 
misappropriation of public resources, collapse of state services provision, fiscal indiscipline and 
consequent macroeconomic instability resulting in an inflation of 27% and interest rates of 44%. 
Moreover, inadequate and delayed government response to a crop failure in 2001/2002 caused an 
acute food crisis. (cf. Boot et al. 2006: 5-6) 
With the introduction of a new approach to lending practices by the BWIs in 1999, Malawi was also 
obliged to introduce a Poverty Reduction Strategy for continued lending. The first full PRSP was 
presented in 2002, and the PRSP-II was introduced in 2006.72 Since Malawi was granted debt relief 
in 2006, its macroeconomic situation was improved and GDP growth rates increased from 2 to 7%. 
This was also due to the introduction of economic development schemes and subsidies on fertilizer, 
which were introduced by newly elected president Mutharika although they violated BWIs’ 
requirements. Productivity in agriculture increased by 200%, but a long term strategy for economic 
development which goes beyond the agricultural sector is missing. (cf. Knaup 2010)  
 
4.1.2 The state, democracy and civil liberties 
The majority of the rural population in Malawi is politically and economically marginalized, lacks 
access to information and is not aware of its constitutional rights, or of how to enforce them. The 
level of political interest and activity is low, which is also due to historical reasons. (cf. Booth et al. 
2006: 16; Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 7)  Under the Banda regime NGOs were tightly controlled and 
their activities were strongly limited. With the democratization process and multiparty politics, Civil 
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  This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters.  
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Society Organizations (CSOs) have emerged and played a direct role in political issues. However, 
their role, significance and influence remain limited: while the church is still playing a leading role, 
academia and trade unions, which had been involved in the transition process to democracy lost 
significance. NGOs missed the opportunity to link up in networks, work together, and to establish a 
collective strength, and thus they do not have the capacities to oversee the government. For a long 
time, the relationship between CSOs and the government was characterized by mistrust and 
suspicion rather than by cooperation and mutual understanding. (cf. Meinhardt 2010; Meinhardt and 
Patel 2003: 34) 
Evidently, democracy in Malawi is not yet consolidated: it can be classified as a neo-patrimonial73 
democracy. Patrimonialism occurs “where the resources of the state are treated as the patrimony of 
the ruler, not as public wealth in the modern sense. Official servants and their retainers are rewarded 
by access to the spoils of office – by prebends, rather than salaries” (ODI 2001: 9). 
Neopatrimonialism prevails if such principles (still) operate within the context of a bureaucratic 
state structure. This can be the case within the framework of an authoritarian or democratic 
constitutional setting. One characteristic which also applies to Malawi is the “big man syndrome”, 
namely systematic clientelism and the use of state resources for the political legitimation of the 
leadership. (cf. ibid.: 9)  
In Malawi, the concept of government is still widely understood in its traditional sense, as 
Meinhardt and Patel (2003) explain.. Government is called “boma”, a Swahili word for an enclosure 
around the dwelling units of traditional chiefs, slave owners and influential people in pre-colonial 
society, a term also used to describe the colonial administrative centers. Boma refers to the 
administrative regime and is conceptualized as a powerful and feared institution protected by the 
police or guards. It operates independently and people do not see themselves as necessarily being 
part of the governance process. (cf. Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 50) Under Muluzi, the government 
was “preoccupied with its short-term political survival” and “employed authoritarian tactics against 
rivals, tried to bolster its position by satisfying the economic interests of supporters within the 
legislature and electoral constituencies, and resorted to populist policies” (Fozzard and Simwaka 
2004: 4).  
 
Although there is freedom of opinion and speech, there are serious shortcomings as regards freedom 
of the press and media. The two national dailies are owned by opposition politicians while 
television is owned and controlled by the state. There are several independent radio stations, though 
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  A discussion of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism in Africa can be found in Hyden (2006) or Medard (1987).  
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many of them broadcast at the regional level only. However, the influence of the media is limited by 
poverty: newspapers are relatively expensive and mostly published in English, as a result of which 
they are almost exclusively read in urban areas. (cf. Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 17; Meinhardt 2010)  
 
4.1.3 Malawi’s economy 
With a Gross National Income (GNI) of USD 4,2 billion and a per capita income of USD 280 (cf. 
World Bank 2009), Malawi is one of the world’s poorest countries in economic terms. In the past 
decade, economic growth has been positive, albeit fluctuating, and Malawi remains highly 
dependent on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Financial flows from multilateral and 
bilateral donors fluctuate between 20 and 25% of Gross Domestic Product.74  
Malawi’s economy is strongly dominated by agriculture. About 90% of the rural population live 
from agriculture characterized by a very labor intensive mode of production, and the majority are 
smallholders or self-sufficient farmers producing for their own needs. Agriculture also accounts for 
more than 90% of export earnings. Therefore, Malawi’s economy remains extremely vulnerable on 
several counts: it is dependent on a small basket of raw agricultural exports which renders it 
vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices, and its dependence on rain-fed agriculture 
means that it is also extremely vulnerable to changing climate conditions. Some unexpected climate 
changes and consequences, such as drought or floods, can cause food shortages with dramatic 
effects for the population. (cf. Tearfund 2007: 23-4) Agriculture accounts for 35,5% of GDP, 
industry for 17,5%. The industrial sector remains small, and having shrunk considerably since the 
1980s, it is limited to the four cities of Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu, and is not of any 
international significance. The service sector has grown and is now the main contributor to GDP, 
accounting for 47%. However, its contribution to employment remains small. Malawi’s trade 
balance is negative and its deficit has been rising in the past years. As a landlocked country with no 
sea ports it faces a natural barrier to trade. (cf. Meinhardt 2010; World Bank 2009) 
Most commodities produced in Malawi are agricultural products. The most important crops are 
maize, tobacco, tea and sugar. While the tea sector is still dominated by British entrepreneurs, the 
two existing sugar plantations are owned by a South African firm, and the tobacco plantations are 
owned by Malawian businessmen. Many politicians, like former presidents Muluzi and Banda, are 
successful and influential businessmen and virtually control certain business sectors (cf. Meinhardt 
2010: 10; Meinhardt and Patel 2003: 4, 60). As mentioned above, the processing industry is very 
                                                 
74
  The most important donors in terms of volume are the United Kingdom, Japan, U.S., Germany, Sweden, Norway, 
Canada and the People’s Republic of China. The most important multilateral donors are the European Union, the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank. Official Development Assistance to Malawi amounts around half a 
billion USD. (cf. www.aidflows.org [17.02.2011]; Bwalya et al. 2004: 7)  
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small and the main export crop, tobacco, which accounts for almost 75% of Malawi’s exports, is 
traded unprocessed as there is no industrial infrastructure for the production of cigarettes. 
Furthermore, while fertilizer is widely used, it is not produced in Malawi and must be imported.   
 
4.2 BWIs’ aid relationship with Malawi  
4.2.1 BWIs’ aid relationship with Malawi: Structural Adjustment Programs 
Malawi applied to the World Bank for its first International Development Association (IDA) credit 
in February 1965 and received the loan one year later. The volume of the “Highway Engineering 
Project” was USD 490.000 and the term of the credit was 10 years including a two-year period of 
grace (World Bank 1966). Since then, Malawi has received another 123 project loans (6 projects 
were dropped) amounting to about USD 3 billion at the time of writing. The first macro-economic 
stabilization programs based on the International Monetary Fund’s Stand-By Arrangement75 were 
introduced in late 1979, and the first World Bank Structural Adjustment Program in mid 1981. 
Between 1981 and 1994, Malawi implemented six Structural Adjustment Programs supported by 
the World Bank and after 1995 three Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation Programs, another form 
of structural adjustment supported by the BWIs, were implemented (cf. GoM 2002: 11). The 
International Monetary Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office uses the term “prolonged users” for 
countries engaged in IMF supported loan programs for at least seven years out of ten. For the period 
from 1971 to 2000 51 countries can be categorized as prolonged users. Malawi is one of the 16 
most prolonged users as it was under IMF arrangements for 17 years out of that 30 year period. (cf. 
Kubalasa 2004) This pattern must be seen in the light of aid dependency, and the IMF’s mandate to 
only provide temporary balance of payment support to countries (cf. ibid.: 3):  Malawi’s aid 
dependency expresses itself in financial and in institutional terms. “Institutional aid dependency is 
understood […] as a loss of capacity to make and implement planning decisions arising from the 
gross imbalance between domestically-generated revenues and the actual or potential availability of 
external finance” (ODI 2001: 12; cf. Booth at al. 2006: 33)  
 
In general, Structural Adjustment Programs are designed, negotiated and implemented in several 
stages. First, a Country Economic Memorandum, a situation analysis of the economy, is prepared by 
World Bank and IMF staff in consultation with the government. Second, sector-specific issues and 
                                                 
75
  The IMF’s Stand By Arrangement is a lending facility through which a member country can use IMF financing up to 
a specified amount to overcome short-term or cyclical balance of payments difficulties. Installments are normally 
phased on a quarterly basis, with their release conditional upon the member’s meeting performance criteria, such as 
monetary and budgetary targets (IMF 2003 quoted in OECD 2006) 
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constrains are identified in a Policy Framework Paper and concepts aimed at addressing the issues 
are developed. Third, based on the results of a mission, the World Bank prepares a white-cover 
Memorandum of the President and Staff Appraisal Report. The Memorandum outlines how funds 
provided by the BWIs are to be utilized. The draft Memorandum is given to the government to 
agree or disagree with its contents. Fourth, a yellow-cover Memorandum of the President is 
prepared by the World Bank and given to the government for review in consultation with various 
stakeholders in the country. This step is regarded as a critical stage in the design of the national 
SAP, as the yellow-cover document is the basis for negotiations. The government can reject some of 
the policies and conditionalities according to the views of the stakeholders involved. Fifth, after the 
yellow-cover Memorandum has been reviewed, the government can proceed with requesting 
funding for the SAP which was agreed upon. This is formally done in a Letter of Development 
Policy from the Minister of Finance to the President of the IDA. The submission of the letter leads 
to the preparation of the green-cover Report and Recommendation of the President of IDA to the 
Executive Directors. At the stage where the green-cover report is prepared, the World Bank and the 
government must effectively have agreed on all policies, conditionalities and the timing of 
disbursement of resources. (cf. Chilowa and Chirwa 1999: 245) 
 In Malawi “experience has shown that, prior to the agreement about adjustment programs where 
wider consultations with stakeholders are expected, things have tended to go wrong” (ibid.: 245). 
The problem was that the government negotiating team comprised officials from only three key 
departments, namely the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 
and the Reserve Bank of Malawi. It is noteworthy that line ministries, departments and the private 
sector which were directly involved in the implementation of the SAP were not involved in its 
design and negotiation. There was no effective forum for consultation with the private sector and 
trade unions. The Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry criticized the fact that consultations 
only took place after the programs had been implemented and their negative effects have become 
obvious. (cf. ibid.: 245) 
The review process of the Memorandum was influenced by institutional constraints and there was 
no effective discussion. Three constraints were observed by Chilowa and Chirwa (1999: 245). First, 
the document for discussion was not circulated internally for discussion within departments of the 
involved institutions. Second, there was no common understanding of the program among the three 
institutions in the government’s negotiating team. Finally, the negotiation team lacked the skills to 
develop alternative programs and to make a critical policy analysis of proposed the content. “As a 
result, the few government official involved in the negotiations panic when they receive the yellow 
document and agree to it without really appreciating the policies and conditionalities.” (Chilowa 
64 
and Chirwa 1999: 245) This also creates resistance in line ministries since the agreed policies often 
effectively conflict with their priorities. The World Bank criticized this lack of equivocal political 
commitment to the SAP which was agreed by the three key departments.  
 
The Structural Adjustment Programs implemented in Malawi between 1981 and 1995 focused on 
the liberalization of the agricultural sector, parastatal sector reform, finance sector reform, and 
rationalization of the budget. In the agricultural sector, the reforms centered on price controls and 
on lifting restrictions on smallholder production of tobacco.76 Financial sector reforms included the 
liberalization of the exchange rate, relaxation of exchange controls, and the liberalization of interest 
rates. These reforms also brought a shift in monetary policy from direct to indirect instruments. 
Major industry and trade reforms, including strong reductions in tariffs, were implemented. 
Furthermore, public enterprises were privatized, leaving redistributive issues, such as popular 
ownership and employment, unresolved. In general, the Government of Malawi assesses that “the 
adjustment programs have had limited impact on economic growth and poverty reduction”, two of 
their primary goals. As outlined above, as growth rates fluctuated and were even negative in the 
early 1990s, sustainable growth has proved to be “elusive” (GoM 2002: 12). The set of structural 
reform programs did not translate into poverty reduction, and macroeconomic instability actually 
aggravated the poverty situation. In order to address this situation, in 1994 the Government of 
Malawi introduced the Poverty Alleviation Program, whose impact remained limited. The 
Government admits that the main constraint of the Program was the absence of a well-articulated 
action plan, and disjointed initiatives which lacked coordination proved to be ineffective. (cf. ibid.: 
11-17) 
 
4.2.2 BWIs’ aid relationship with Malawi: debt relief      
Malawi was a highly indebted country and was granted debt relief within the framework of the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The HIPC Initiative was launched in 1996 and 
is a multi-creditor initiative which grants conditional debt relief to poor countries. Participating 
creditors comprised all multilateral, official bilateral and commercial creditors. External public and 
publically guaranteed debt was reduced – but not totally cancelled – in the HIPC Initiative. Debt 
                                                 
76
  The BWIs were heavily criticized for their agricultural sector advice to the Government of Malawi. The initial 
impact of the SAP reforms led to a substantial increase in the production and increased revenues for the rural sector. 
However, these effects were offset by input prices – especially prices for widely used fertilizer – increasing faster 
than producer prices. The BWIs enforced the lifting of price controls and the elimination of fertilizer subsidies left 
the Government of Malawi with no possible policy response in order to intervene against the rapidly increasing 
producer prices. Consequently, farmers and the rural population suffered greatly and famines were aggravated. (cf. 
Harrigan 2003).  
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relief under the HIPC Initiative is a two-stage process. Eligible countries77, including Malawi, first 
need to reach “decision point” which means that they have a track record of macroeconomic 
stability and have prepared a Poverty Reduction Strategy. PRSPs were seen as mean for creating 
national commitment to poverty reduction and to ensure that HIPC funds are used appropriately, 
this means for poverty reduction. In an endeavor to loosen the HIPC-PRSP link and to give 
beneficiary countries more time to draw up a full PRSP, the concept of an Interim PRSP was 
introduced by the BWIs. This Interim PRSP is a document which enables a country to access partial 
debt relief while preparing the full PRSP. When reaching decision point, the amount of debt relief 
necessary to bring countries’ debt indicators to HIPC thresholds is calculated, and countries begin 
receiving interim debt relief on a provisional basis. Countries reach the second stage, completion 
point, if they maintain macroeconomic stability, carry out key structural and social reforms, and 
satisfactorily implement a Poverty Reduction Strategy for a minimum of one year. At completion 
point the remaining amount to be written off is released. (cf. World Bank 2010) After reaching 
decision point in December 2000 Malawi was granted partial debt relief. In August 2006 it reached 
completion point as 20th country in a row. In sum, Malawi’s total external debt stock, which was at 
USD 3 billion in nominal terms, was reduced to USD 400 million. (cf. World Bank 2008) By 
reaching the completion point of the HIPC initiative, Malawi also became eligible for further 
multilateral debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Due to its debt structure Malawi 
greatly benefited from the HIPC Initiative.78 However, scholars and NGOs advocate that the amount 
of debt relief granted to Malawi is not sufficient and the HIPC initiative is regarded as inadequate 
compared to the preferred total debt forgiveness (cf. Chimango 2002: 1).  
 
4.2.3 BWIs’ aid relationship with Malawi: Poverty Reduction Strategy  
In 1999 the BWIs introduced the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the new 
development approach replacing the SAPs. The most prominent tool for implementing the CDF are 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which form the basis for lending programs with the IMF 
and the World Bank. PRSPs lay out a country’s macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and 
programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. The 
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  Eligible countries must have debt burden indicators above the HIPC initiative thresholds using the most recent data 
for the year immediately prior to the decision point. A debt level is regarded as sustainable if it is below 15% of 
GDP, Malawi had a debt service ratio of 19%. The net present value of debt to exports ratio stood at 267% against 
the sustainable threshold of 150% and the net present value of debt to domestic revenue at 472% compared to the 
threshold of 250%. (Bwalya et al. 2004: 7) 
78
  Malawi’s debt structure is as follows: the World Bank is the largest creditor, accounting for around ¾ of multilateral 
debt; Japan is the largest bilateral creditor, holding about 85% of the country’s debt to the Paris Club; commercial 
debt is at a low level of about 2%. (cf. www.aidflows.org [17.02.2011]) 
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core principles underlying the PRSP (cf. chapter 2.3.1) approach suggest that PRSPs would be 
expected to include (cf. Klugman 2002; World Bank 2010):  
(i) A description of the participatory process used (including the format, frequency, 
location and contents of consultations); 
(ii) Comprehensive poverty diagnostics; 
(iii) Clearly presented and costed priorities for macroeconomic, structural, and social 
policies (which should not become a “wish list”); 
(iv) Appropriate targets, indicators, and systems for monitoring and evaluating progress. 
 
The PRSP cycle79 comprises the following successive steps (cf. Bretton Woods Project 2003): 
(i) Understanding the nature of poverty in the lending country;  
(ii) Choosing poverty reduction objectives (based on the Millennium Development 
Goals); 
(iii) Defining the strategy for poverty reduction and growth (prioritization of focus areas 
and development challenges); 
(iv) Implementation of programs and policies; 
(v) Monitoring outcomes and evaluating impact.  
 
As mentioned earlier, a PRSP should be developed in a participatory way and thus nationally 
owned. The level of participation is decisive for whether or not the given country’s PRSP will be 
approved. In each country, the government is responsible for writing the PRSP and for organizing 
technical and donor inputs.80 The PRSP must be presented to the Bank and the Fund before a 
country receives funding, hence after step (iii) and before step (iv) as above. The boards of both the 
World Bank and the IMF need to approve a country’s PRSP before a lending program is agreed. The 
contents of the PRSP are appraised by officers from both BWIs in so called Joint Staff Assessments. 
The PRSP also provides the framework for developing the BWIs’ national Country Assistance 
Strategy. (cf. ibid.) 
 
When the PRSP approach was introduced, researchers warned that “there will inevitably be tensions 
between the PRSP drafting efforts and commitments that governments have already entered into 
with the IFIs” (ODI 2001: viii; cf. ibid: 21). Theoretically, the PRSP should also be based on 
                                                 
79
  An illustrated description of the PRSP cycle can be found in Annex C.  
80
  For more details on ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers see chapter 2.3.2 and for a detailed analysis of 
ownership of the national PRSP in Malawi see chapter 4.3  
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existing national development strategies and this can also turn out to be problematic. The PRSP was 
not Malawi’s first poverty-reduction policy, but previous approaches had been centered on safety 
nets to ameliorate the situation for the poorest and these measures failed to address the root causes 
of poverty. The Poverty Alleviation Program introduced after democratization also failed to deliver 
the expected results as it suffered from the absence of an action plan, poor prioritization and 
inadequate linkages to the budget. (cf. Bwalya et al. 2004: 7-8) Furthermore, there was the Malawi 
Vision 2020, which has been drawn up in with inputs from public consultations, but was a “wish 
list” with no framework for implementation (cf. Jenkins and Tsoka 2003: 199-202.) Based on these 
existing national programs in theory, and with a weak link to them in practice, the Government of 
Malawi developed an Interim Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) which it 
presented it in May 2000 (cf. Peretz 2007: 19). The revised final document was then agreed by the 
boards of the Bank and Fund in December 2000 and consequently partial debt relief was granted to 
Malawi. The I-PRSP submitted was supposed to lay out a road map for the full PRSP and was not 
comprehensive (Fozzard and Simwaka 2004:8).  
The Government of Malawi wanted to proceed swiftly and started the preparations for the full PRSP 
in January 2001. They should have been finished already 4 months later, in April 2001. However, 
due to pressure from various stakeholders, and especially Civil Society Organizations, the 
Government changed its initial schedule and extended the PRSP preparation process to ensure that 
the paper is based on broad national ownership. As the first full PRSP has not been operational at 
the time initially scheduled by the GoM, a PRSP Findings to Date document was drawn up and 
designated to provide inputs for the 2000/2001 budget. After an extended consultation process, the 
final full PRSP was presented in April 2002. The first progress report was presented one year later, 
in 2003, and two others followed in 2005 and 2006.81 In addition to the PRSP the Government of 
Malawi developed the Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (MEGS) in 2003. The MEGS 
highlighted the importance of economic development and in particular the significance of the 
private sector for poverty reduction and Malawi’s prosperity as this was missing in the full PRSP 
document. (cf. VENRO 2008) Although the full PRSP was approved in 2002, and it informed the 
budget for the years 2002/2003, its effective implementation did not start until several years later 
(cf. Peretz 2007:1). This was due to previous failures in macroeconomic policy and subsequent 
shortfalls in donor support. In the fiscal year 2001/2002 Malawi’ economic management 
commitments got “off track”, and consequently the IMF withheld parts of its funds, with other 
donors following suit. As the implementation of the PRSP built on the commitment of donors (to 
                                                 
81
  A detailed chronology indicating most relevant milestones of the PRSP process in Malawi can be found in Annex D.  
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provide 60% of the resources) a loss of funds hampered the swift and successful implementation of 
the first PRSP (cf. MEJN 2002). In 2003 Malawi got back “on track” and financial flows resumed, 
however this rebound was not long-lasting and the government’s performance was again poor soon 
afterwards (cf. Bamusi 2006: 7). After three years, the second PRSP was introduced in 2006; it is 
entitled Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, and also draws on the MEGS. (cf. VENRO 
2008) 
The content of Malawi’s first PRSP was built around four policy areas: sustainable pro-poor 
economic growth and structural transformation; human capital development; quality of life for the 
vulnerable; and good governance. These four areas constituted the main strategic elements around 
which interventions and policies were grouped into a framework for poverty reduction. (Bwalya et 
al. 2004: 10) 
 
4.3 Ownership in Malawi’s PRSP process: Argumentative Discourse Analysis based on Hajer  
The PRSP process is based on the assumption that participation will increase national ownership 
which in turn will ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the reforms. Scholars highlight that 
ownership of the PRSP depends on who participates, whether participation actually affects the 
design of policies or merely provides endorsement to externally designed programs, as well as the 
scope and coverage of the PRSP process (cf. Steward and Wang 2003). Country ownership is 
therefore a rather flexible concept. In order to analyze the aid relationship between the BWIs and 
Malawian stakeholders in the PRSP process and how it was changing over time, and in order to 
address the question who “owned” the PRSP – how far it was nationally owned, and how far it was 
perceived as imposed from outside – I will examine the dynamics in various steps of the PRSP 
cycle outlined in the previous chapter, the negotiations with the BWIs, and the endorsement 
process. 
In order to find answers to my research question “What was the aid relationship between the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, the Government of Malawi, Parliament and Civil Society in the first 
PRSP process and how did it change over time?” I will conduct an Argumentative Discourse 
Analysis82 and for this purpose I split it up in two operationalized questions:   
(i) Who was involved in the PRSP process and what interaction was there between the 
stakeholders? Which stakeholders directed the formulation of the PRSP? 
(ii) How was ownership perceived by different stakeholders? 
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  My research method, which formed the basis for collecting the findings that are presented in this chapter,  is 
described in more detail in chapter 3.2.  
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I will base my analysis on research papers and official documents of the Government of Malawi 
such as the interim PRSP, the full PRSP, the PRSP progress reports,83 as well on documents of the 
BWIs such as Joint Staff Advisory Notes and the Country Assistance Strategy, and on documents 
published by other stakeholders such as NGOs and parliamentarians. 
 
4.3.1 The process of PRSP formulation: stakeholders and interaction 
In this chapter, I will give an overview on the stakeholders which participated in the PRSP process, 
the timing, quality and coverage of participation, as well as on the content of the participative action 
in order to get an idea whether participation actually affected the design of the PRSP.   
 
Who participated in the PRSP process?  
The World Bank and the IMF demand that PRSPs are drawn up based on a participatory process 
involving national civil society and the private sector, as well as bilateral, multilateral, and non-
governmental development partners (cf. World Bank 1999). Yet, the design and negotiations of the 
Malawian PRSP were dominated by the Government of Malawi. The I-PRSP was drafted by the 
Government of Malawi with assistance from the BWIs, and it was produced speedily in a non-
inclusive process with virtually no consultation of any further national stakeholders (cf. Jenkins and 
Tsoka 2003: 201). Civil society was almost completely excluded; also bilateral donors did not get 
included and complained about the heavy BWI interventions in the drafting process. (cf. MEJN 
2001: 9) 
According to a study by the NGO VENRO (2008), which conducted broad research into 
participation in PRSP processes in more than 60 countries, insiders observed that in Malawi the 
Government dominated the PRSP process extensively and that it might have accepted the PRSP 
process, including participation, only in order to fulfill the requirements to be granted debt relief 
through the HIPC initiative. Other studies (Bwalya et al. 2004; Jenskins and Tsoka 2003) also arrive 
at the conclusion that the political elite was not favorable to the process and that its support was 
limited.  
 
Institutionally, the PRSP process was organized in a four-tiered committee structure (cf. Bwalya et 
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  The BWIs expect a PRSP to include a description of the participatory process which was used and to comprise a 
description of “the format, frequency, and location of consultations; a summary of the main issues raised and the 
views of participants; an account of the impact of the consultations on the design of the strategy; and a discussion of 
the role of civil society in future monitoring and implementation.” (World Bank 2010) This should give a full picture 
of aspects of ownership and participation of the Malawi PRSP, however as final versions of official documents often 
reveal little about the politics of negotiations and (in)formal channels of influence that shape decision, documents 
from other stakeholder will be consulted as well in this analysis.  
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al. 2004: 9; GoM 2000):  
(i)  The Ministerial Committee consisted of representatives of six ministries and was chaired 
by the Minister of Agriculture, yet the Minister of Finance played a dominant role. The 
Reserve Bank of Malawi was also represented.  
(ii)  One tier lower was the National Steering Committee. It comprised the principal 
secretaries of all ministries, the manager of the Central Bank, representatives of the 
Treasury and the National Economic Council. The National Steering Committee was 
chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury. It also included the National Coordinator, a 
World Bank officer of Malawian descendent, who was in charge of the overall 
coordination of all activities at all four tiers.  
(iii) The Technical Committee was the third tier. It was chaired by the National Economic 
Council and played a pivotal role in the actual management and oversight of the PRSP 
formulation process.  
(iv) At the fourth tier were all Thematic Working Groups, 21 in total. The working groups 
included representatives from the Government of Malawi, civil society, the private 
sector and donors. Not all stakeholders were equally represented in each working group. 
The Thematic Working Groups (TWGs) constituted the main arenas for participation. 
The results of the substantive discussions of each working group were fed into the work 
of the Technical Committee (one tier up) and the drafting team.  
 
The parliament was also involved in the PRSP process. However, the parliament is not a very 
strong political institution in Malawi, and its role in the PRSP process remained rather limited. No 
measures to strengthen its role in the design of the PRSP were taken. Some parliamentarians were 
involved in working groups focusing on specific topics, though it is noteworthy that government 
officials considered the parliament to belong to the Civil Society Organization category when the 
Thematic Working Groups were composed. (cf. Bwalya et al 2004: 14) Many Members of 
Parliament (MPs) lacked the technical expertise and time required for their activities in the working 
parties.84 Eventually, the full PRSP was passed by parliament, after having been designed by the 
Government with very little contributions from MPs. The World Bank and IMF criticized the 
limited participation of parliamentarians.  (cf. IMF and World Bank 2003: 4; 2006: 2; VENRO 
2008).  
                                                 
84
  Parliamentarians were supported in their work by civil society which provided parliamentarians with research 
outcomes and commented and simplified versions of the PRSP. In return, the parliament was supposed to ally with 
civil society and  voice its concerns, such as for instance about budget priorities, in parliamentary debates and 
influence contents of acts and annual budgets. (cf. VENRO 2008) 
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The government has been very hesitant to involve civil society in policy-making and at the 
beginning only four Civil Society Organizations were directly involved in the design of the PRSP, 
one of them being the Council for NGOS in Malawi (CONGOMA). One representative of 
CONGOMA – which was founded in 1985 and due to its parastatal structure it is not an 
independent NGO – was eventually invited by the Government to join the team drafting the PRSP 
(Bwalya et al. 2004: 12). In general, civil society in Malawi has long been weak and disorganized, 
NGOs had little influence on politics and missed the opportunity to work together on certain issues. 
The PRSP process in Malawi initiated stronger cooperation between NGOs: civil society identified 
opportunities to be heard within the framework of the PRSP process, consequently improved their 
organization in order to seize them, and to provide constructive inputs. In this respect the 
foundation of the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), a network or umbrella organization 
of around 100 NGOs active in Malawi, in 2001 is particularly noteworthy85. (cf. VENRO 2008)  
MEJN has played a part in the PRSP process from its very beginning. It successfully lobbied for the 
stronger involvement of CSOs in the PRSP process, and although a few NGOs had originally been 
formally invited to the PRSP process by the government in the beginning, around 100 civil society 
representatives were later taking part in Thematic Working Groups later. MEJN also developed a 
project devoted to monitoring the PRSP, especially budgetary policies. In general, it can be said that 
the PRSP process strengthened the position and role of Malawian civil society. (cf. Bwalya et al. 
2004 12-3) 
 
The private sector was also involved in the PRSP process, as several of its representatives were 
active in the Thematic Working Groups (on Industry, Credit and Macroeconomic Stability) working 
on the draft PRSP (cf. ibid.: 13). Though, the private sector was not involved in the review process 
and the BWIs recommended getting the private sector more involved in future (cf. IMF and World 
Bank 2003: 4; 2006: 2). The Malawi Economic Growth Strategy, which was developed in 2003 in 
addition to the PRSP, aiming at highlighting the importance of economic development and in 
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  MEJN was almost exclusively financed by Northern donors, especially by the UK-based NGO OXFAM. MEJN 
representatives say that their dependency on external donor funding has not comprised their activities but studies 
point out that “the low educational level at the grassroots and limited analytical skills among NGO staff compound 
the situation and hamper the development of a forceful stance on policy issues. Combined with a servile attitude, the 
result might be a tendency to dance to the tune of donors or other external agents” (Bwalya et al. 2004: 13; 25). 
Another scholar agrees that foreign involvement in local NGOs brings the risk that the organizations can feel more 
accountable to the North, rather than to the local poor, and adds that such cooperation bears another risk: “While 
expats may have the eloquence and writing skills in dealing with policy-makers, their prominence can fuel 
government suspicious that CSO are the pawns of ‘troublesome white men from Oxfam’”. (Rick 2002: s.p.) 
However, since more than 100 NGOs have been involved in the PRS process, it can be concluded that grassroots 
interests have also been advocated and heard. (cf. Bwalya et al. 2004: 12)  
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particular the significance of the private sector for poverty reduction was drawn up with significant 
contributions from the private sector (cf. VENRO 2008).  
 
Trade Unions were not much involved in the PRSP formulation process at all. Their involvement 
was limited to general consultations which were targeted at CSO. (cf. Bretton Woods Project 2002) 
 
Another important stakeholder in the PRSP process were donors, (i.e. the World Bank and IMF, the 
British Department for International Development and the European Union (EU)), who were 
involved in the Thematic Working Groups and the National Steering Committee. (cf. Jenkins and 
Tsoka 2004: 201, 203; VENRO 2008) All donors in Malawi were organized into an aid coordination 
group, chaired alternatively by the World Bank and UNDP.  Through this donor coordination group, 
donor representatives were deployed to Thematic Working Groups. Donor behavior was 
ambivalent: on the one hand they refrained from deep involvement in the drafting process 
highlighting the principle of ownership, while on the other hand they emphasized that the content of 
the PRSP must meet the expectations of the Word Bank and the IMF. For instance, after the first 
draft PRSP was circulated to all stakeholders, the BWIs submitted “substantial written comments” 
(Bwalya et al. 2004: 15) on the draft and did not hide that they were particularly concerned about 
the sections on the macroeconomic framework. (cf. ibid.: 15-6, 25) 
 
Timing and quality of participation in the PRSP process 
The initial timeframe scheduled by the GoM needed to be amended. As outlined in chapter 4.2.2, 
the GoM developed the I-PRSP through a non-participative process with the BWIs virtually being 
the only stakeholder consulted and presented it in May 2000. The revised final document was then 
agreed by the boards of the Bank and Fund in December 2000 and consequently partial debt relief 
was granted to Malawi. The Government of Malawi wanted to proceed swiftly and started the 
preparations for the full PRSP in January 2001. They were to be supposed to be finished already 4 
months later, in April 2001. Due to pressure from various stakeholders, the Government changed its 
initial schedule and extended the PRSP preparation process to ensure that there is sufficient time for 
consultations and that the paper would be based on broad national ownership. It has been the MEJN 
that was leading the lobbying campaign for the extension of the timeframe together with the support 
of donors (cf. MEJN 2001a: 4; VENRO 2008). After an extended consultation process, the final full 
PRSP was presented in April 2002. The first progress report was presented one year later, in 2003 
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and two further followed in 2005 and 2006.86 
 
The quality of participation varied during the PRSP formulation process.87 When the PRSP 
approach was introduced by the BWIs, knowledge about it was very limited in beneficiary 
countries. Since then, it has spread and deepened, but at the beginning of the PRSP process in 
Malawi, it did not extend across the whole of government or into local government. (cf. Jenkins and 
Tsoka 2003: 200; ODI 2001: viii) A survey of sub-Saharan African countries formulating PRSPs 
finds that “there is a tendency for the facts of the PRSP initiative to be fully grasped only by a small 
core of government personnel who have been directly responsible for carrying it forward. In some 
cases, a similar level of understanding is shared by a small number of academics or civil-society 
representatives.” (ibid.: 20) And it highlights that “the availability of even quite elementary 
information on the subject declines quite steeply as one moves away from these central points” 
(ibid.: 20). 
In Malawi, participation in the three first stages of the PRSP process – poverty analysis, setting 
poverty reduction objectives, and defining the strategy for poverty reduction and growth – was very 
limited at the beginning, and the Government of Malawi tended to dominate the process. Civil 
society was not represented in the Technical Committee responsible for the overall process, but only 
in sectoral working groups, and took part in ad-hoc workshops at the national level. At the district 
level, representatives of CSOs were sometimes invited to join consultations, though the 
consultations focused on members of district parliaments, administration (police, district health 
officers), traditional authorities and “other influential people within the districts” (PRSP Technical 
Committee quoted in Jenkins and Tskoa 2003: 202). The Technical Committee organized 
consultative meetings in all of Malawi’s 27 districts, most of which lasted half a day or a full day at 
most. Since many of the meetings were organized at short notice, attendance was far below what 
had been anticipated. Especially in the first design stages of the PRSP the consultations were 
organized ad-hoc and were not supposed to become permanent mechanisms. (cf. Bwalya et al. 
2004: 15; VENRO 2008)  
The results of the Thematic Working Groups’ work were discussed in a workshop, which formed 
the basis for the drafting of the final PRSP. The composition of the drafting team was strongly 
debated, as the Government had not arranged for a strong participation of civil society and the 
drafting team originally consisted predominantly of government representatives and a BWI 
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  A detailed chronology indicating most relevant milestones of the PRSP process in Malawi can be found in Annex D.  
87
  It needs to be pointed out that public participation in policy formulation has not been established in Malawi before 
the PRS process started and there was virtually no legal basis for participative processes at that time. (cf. VENRO 
2008) 
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consultant. It refused independent CSO representatives joining the team pointing out that two 
representatives of the parastatal Council for NGOs in Malawi were already part of it. The newly 
founded MEJN which focused its work on the PRSP process exercised pressure on the GoM to 
allow joining the drafting team and eventually two MEJN representatives were allowed to 
participate. MEJN seems to have enjoyed donor support in this regard. (cf. MEJN 2001b: 4; 
VENRO 2008. The draft paper was circulated to all stakeholders and civil society, along with 
donors, for submission of written comments. Due to the constraints outlined above, civil society did 
not succeed in advocating the adoption of policies favored by it in the final PRSP. Issues brought up 
by CSOs, such as corruption or the promotion of agricultural cooperatives, were not considered. (cf. 
ibid.) 
 
Participation in the implementation88 of the PRSP was also limited. In the first progress report on 
the implementation of the PRSP, which was submitted in 2003, activities of civil society are not 
mentioned, despite their relative significance. This is partly due to the fact that the report was 
written by the Government of Malawi, and not in a participative process. The World Bank and IMF 
criticized this behavior and called upon the GoM to get all stakeholders – civil society, the private 
sector, religious groups and donors – more involved. (cf. IMF and World Bank 2003: 2; 2006: 4) 
The GoM, which had changed after elections had been held in 2004, took this criticism into account 
and put more emphasis on NGOs’ role in the implementation of the PRSP in the second and third 
progress reports. It mentions the activities of several NGOs in specific sectors, such as agriculture 
(GoM 2005a: 57). 
According to VENRO, MEJN has been actively involved in the implementation of the PRSP, 
including beyond its limited mandate in official PRSP structures. It analyzed and commented the 
poverty reduction strategies put forward by the GoM, leading to conflicts with the Government 
about budgeting priorities89. The second PRSP progress report also described the participative 
process in which it was drafted: a team of government officials and a few civil society 
representatives worked on a first draft of the second progress report, which was then discussed in 
meetings with high-ranking government officials, donors and NGOs. It was then presented to the 
members of the working party on budgeting, monitoring and evaluation who initially delivered 
inputs for the PRSP (cf. ibid.: 1). Donors seemed comfortable with the content of the second 
                                                 
88
  As outlined above, the study does not focus on the implementation of the PRSP, and I tackle issue only very briefly 
at this point with respect to participation.  
89
  For example, MEJN criticized the Government’s spending policy in the education and health sectors. MEJN 
acknowledged that the Government has increased education and health spending, but criticized that it has used funds 
which had become available through partial debt relief from the HIPC initiative, and not funds from the core budget, 
especially in the light of strong increases the President’s international travel expenses. (cf. VENRO 2008) 
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progress report, and the World Bank and IMF certify that civil society was relatively well involved 
in the implementation of the PRSP (cf. IMF and World Bank 2006: 2).  
 
Participation in monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the PRSP was also rather limited. 
Participative monitoring had not been very common in Malawi before and no fully functional 
monitoring system has been established during PRSP implementation. Monitoring and evaluation 
co-ordination points were established by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, and 
overall monitoring and evaluation of the process were supposed to take place at the local, district 
and national levels. However, involvement of all stakeholders was not arranged for. In response to 
this deficiency MEJN introduced an independent tool for monitoring the implementation of the 
PRSP. Besides MEJN, the Civil Society Coalition of Quality Basic Education, a network with 
around 80 member organizations, conducted a budget analysis in the education sector and referred 
explicitly to the PRSP in their results. The growth in relevance of civil society’s PRSP work led the 
government to commit itself to accept “external” monitoring systems by NGOs. (cf. Kubalasa 2004: 
6-8) The BWIs also criticized the lack of a proper monitoring and evaluation system explicitly and 
in doing so, they also highlighted that monitoring and evaluation need to be conducted in a 
participatory manner (cf. IMF and World Bank 2003; 2006). 
 
Lacking capacities and funding also limited the scope of participation. Information flows from the 
Government to other stakeholders has not always been smooth and many NGO activists, as well as 
parliamentarians lacked the expertise to give meaningful inputs into highly technical debates. Both 
problems were particularly significant in the rural areas of Malawi. Hence the PRSP process 
remained virtually focused on the capital city, Lilongwe. (cf. MEJN 2001a, 2001b) 
 
What was discussed? 
The contents of the PRSP - and thus also that of any consultation - had been pre-set by two factors: 
first, the content was considerably limited by some of the HIPC and PGRF conditionalities. HIPC 
Competition Point triggers (conditionalities) were included into the I-PRSP which was “Bank-
orchestrated” (Jenkins and Tsoka 2003: 201) and publicly justified by the Bank as Malawian-
owned. As the PRSP was developed on the basis of the I-PRSP, the road map outlined in the latter 
directly limited the content of the full PRSP. Three specific triggers were the subject of considerable 
consternation.90 (cf. ibid.: 209) Another factor influencing the content of the PRSP and the 
                                                 
90
  The first trigger was progress in the implementation of the National Safety Net Strategy. The strategy had been set 
up under strong World Bank influence and its inclusion into the PRSP appeared to pre-determine the outcome of the 
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consultations was the fact that the GoM showed “an absence of high-level political commitment to 
serious reform and the lack of a thoroughgoing overhaul of conditionalities” (Jenkins and Tsoka 
2003: 197). This was also reflected in its acceptance of strong BWI involvement in the formulation 
of the PRSP chapters on macro-economic policy. MEJN underlined that much of the prioritization 
of measures proposed in the PRSP was based on donor pressure (cf. MEJN 2001: 17).  
In addition to these restrictions, during the drafting process of the final PRSP there was high 
uncertainty concerning the level of support from bilateral donors due to some shortfalls of the GoM 
in fulfilling macroeconomic policy commitments. As it seemed probable that that donors (especially 
DANIDA, the EU and USAID) would withhold aid flows, the drafting team was forced to cut some 
previously prioritized activities in the PRSP and scale down others (cf. Jenkins and Tsoka 2003: 
204).  
Nevertheless, participation by civil society in the formulation also affected the design of the PRSP. 
For instance, HIV/AIDS organizations have been influential in shaping the policies of their TWGs 
(cf. Steward and Wang 2003: 17). However, most NGOs reported to MEJN that the 
recommendations made during consultations have largely not been incorporated in the documents 
that were passed on to the Technical Committee which was in charge of drafting the final PRSP (cf. 
MEJN 2001a; 2001b). When it came to structural reform and structural policy issues, “NGOs and 
their coalition in Malawi have been totally unable to influence macro-economic policy or even 
engage government in dialogue about it” (Steward and Wang 2003: 18). In its review of the draft 
PRSP, MEJN also criticized that the final paper needed to be more coherent and more poverty-
focused (cf. MEJN 2001a: 19).91 
 
4.3.2 Discussing ownership: discourse coalitions 
In this chapter, I will focus on how different stakeholders perceived the concept of ownership, their 
roles in the PRSP process and how the topic issue was discussed. In analyzing statements by 
different actors, particular attention is paid to the employment of story lines, narratives and 
metaphors by each actor in order to identify their discourse(s) – a set of concepts that structured 
their contributions – when they were discussing ownership in the PRSP process. The aim of this 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Thematic Working Group on safety nets. The second trigger causing controversy was achieving performance 
indicators in HIV/AIDS and education, as it appeared “a bit random” to government officials and seemed to pre-
empt the PRSP process. The third trigger was the submission of the draft Land Law to Parliament. Again, it was 
regarded as pre-empting and changing the content of the PRSP as it was already “prefabricated”. (cf. Jenkins and 
Tsoka 2003: 211) 
91
  Steward and Wang (2003) strongly criticize the missing link between macroeconomic policy and poverty in 
Malawi’s PRSP and the BWIs action in this respect. Two tables in Annex E, which are based on Steward’s and 
Wang’s findings, give an overview on reforms contained in PRSP, and on poverty and macroeconomic reform 
linkages.  
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chapter is to investigate whether different actors formed discourse coalitions, i.e. specific coalitions 
around specific story lines. As discourse coalitions are not primarily connected to a particular 
person, but are related to practices in the context of which actors employ story lines, it becomes 
possible that some actors utter contradictory statements, or even reproduce different discourse-
coalitions. (cf. Hajer 1995, 2006; see also chapter 3.2.) 
 
Ownership 
The term “ownership” was hardly used in the discussion of the PRSP process in Malawi. Many 
other terms that are related to the concept – participation, consultation, consensus and political will 
– were used much more frequently and were discussed in more detail. When the expression 
ownership was used by local stakeholders in Malawi, in general no explanation of its meaning was 
given; it was also not listed in the glossary which the GoM attached to the full PRSP in order to 
explain some key terms used in the document. Scholars point out that “ownership” is sometimes 
used as misnomer for participation and/or consultation in PRSP processes, and that this was the case 
in Malawi (cf. Jenkins and Tsoka 2003: 213).  
 
Without explaining the causality in detail in their PRSP documents, the government and the NGO 
coalition MEJN both advance the view that ownership of the PRSP will enhance its effectiveness 
(cf. GoM 2000: 18; MEJN 2001: 17). This argument had been put forward by the World Bank and 
IFM when the Comprehensive Development Framework was introduced, and they argued that 
national ownership of policies would enhance the likelihood of policy adoption, implementation 
and sustainability. This hypothesis was not questioned by the GoM and MEJN in official 
documents, communiqués or position papers and they promoted the idea of national ownership. 
However, government officials proved to be skeptical of the viability of this hypothesis when 
speaking off the record in unofficial interviews (cf. Jason and Tsoka 2001: 55).  
Government, civil society and the BWIs also agreed that stakeholders’ will to support the 
implementation of the PRSP can enhance its effectiveness (cf. GoM 2002: xiv; MEJN 2001a: 17; 
Cavassini and Entwistle 2005b). The same stakeholders also underlined that the PRSP should be 
based on „broad” national ownership and agreed on the range of stakeholders which are expected to 
take part in the PRSP process: civil society, the private sector, the poor, parliament and local 
authorities were named. While the government and the BWIs tend to speak of “broad” ownership, 
civil society also demands that it should be “meaningful” and adds a qualitative dimension to the 
discussion of ownership. However, in their Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies the BWIs 
also acknowledge that the quality of participation and consultation has an impact on the ownership 
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of the content of PRSPs (cf. GoM 2000: 18; 2002: 57; MEJN 2001a: 2; Klugman 2002: 238-243). 
These two actors, MEJN and the BWIs, also form a coalition in highlighting that transparency is 
important for ownership (cf. IMF and World Bank 2006: 2; MEJN 2001a: 15; Klugman 2002: 238, 
240). MEJN did so in light of the poor information flows from the Government to civil society 
which it regarded as unsatisfactory, and in light of the lack of transparency of negotiations between 
BWI officials and the GoM. This shows that apparently the World Bank and the Fund did not live 
up to their principles in practice, or at least their performance was perceived as weak by MEJN. (cf. 
ODI 2001: 28; Steward and Wang 2003: 10) 
 
Participation 
As outlined above, all stakeholders involved tended not to discuss the guiding principle of 
ownership. However, they discussed “participation” as a means to achieving ownership. The term 
was used very often, although the meaning of participation and how participation could be achieved 
was perceived quite differently by all stakeholders. Nevertheless, there was a common 
understanding of some aspects of participation and actors formed discourse coalitions around it.  
 
The World Bank, which again had introduced the concept of participation as an element of the 
PRSP process, outlined in its Sourcebook that “participation is the process by which stakeholders 
influence and share control over priority setting, policymaking, resource allocation and/or program 
implementation” (Klugman 2002: 237) in the PRSP process. From this statement it appeared that 
public participation comprises initiation and control of the PRSP, and should take place at various 
stages of the process, including monitoring and evaluation which should be carried out in a 
participative manner. In their Joint Staff Advisory Notes, the World Bank and the IMF attested that 
the Malawi PRSP’s main strengths were “a highly participatory process involving government, civil 
society, the private sector and donors” and “an adequate institutional structure for monitoring the 
PRSP” (IMF and World Bank 2002: 1). They concluded that the participatory process “has helped 
develop a relatively high degree of national ownership over the strategy” (ibid.: 2).  
Participation in the PRSP formulation was perceived somewhat differently by the GoM. In the first 
draft it said that the process of developing the PRSP would require the broad participation of civil 
society and other stakeholders, including parliament and the poor. It also devoted an entire section 
of the full PRSP to participation and showed commitment to getting other stakeholders actively 
involved in the PRSP process. However, in other sections of the same document the GoM showed 
that it also regards information dissemination as a mean of participative action, and this idea differs 
substantially from the World Bank’s definition of a participative process. The GoM also highlighted 
79 
that in terms of policy content the PRSP “will not duplicate existing work or ‘reinvent the wheel’” 
(GoM 2000: 26-27) and by doing so it confined the scope of the participatory process a priori.   
Since civil society has not been involved in the formulation of the I-PRSP, MEJN expressed its 
reservations about the GoM’s approach to participation from the beginning of the PRSP process by 
underlining that participation had a limited impact on the content of the PRSP and that people were 
merely brought together to discuss items on an agenda pre-set by others. (cf. Bwalya at al. 2004: 9; 
MEJN 2001a, 2001b; Rick 2002; Steward and Wang 2003: 17) It also raised the issue of 
representation by pointing out that the number of participants as well as logistics – time and place 
of meetings – limited the possibilities for meaningful participation in the PRSP process. As outlined 
in the previous chapter, the timing of the PRSP formulation process was a hotly debated issue. Both 
MEJN and donors lobbied the government to extend the time frame envisaged for the consultations 
in order to ensure that a truly participative process would be possible. Another issue strongly 
criticized by MEJN was the composition of the Thematic Working Groups and the Technical 
Committee, which was in charge of writing the final draft: MEJN highlighted that “representation is 
critical as it is directly linked to ownership” (MEJN 2001a: 21). The organization solicited help 
from donors in this regard (cf. ibid.: 4) and they seem to have enjoyed the Bank’s support in that 
cause (cf. VENRO 2008). 
 
It is noteworthy that the general tenor on the range and quality of participation in the process 
became more critical towards the end of the PRSP cycle. While MEJN stuck to its position and 
continued to highlight the deficiencies in the government and donors’ actions, the World Bank 
which had been speaking of “a highly participative process” (IMF and World Bank 2002: 1). in the 
first Joint Staff Advisory Note which approved the Malawi PRSP, raised some criticism about 
missing participation in the preparation of the first progress report (cf. IMF and World Bank 2003: 
4). The Bank and Fund were very clear about the lack of participation by the private sector and 
parliamentarians in the JSAN of the second progress report (cf. IMF and World Bank 2006: 2) This 
shift is based on the fact that the World Bank observed that the government had only paid lip 
service to comprehensive consultation processes and its actions proved to be the opposite (cf. 
Jenkins and Tsoka 2003: 201). This is particularly true for participation in monitoring and 
evaluation. In the full PRSP, the GoM presented a participative approach to monitoring and 
evaluation, but a proper system was not set up until the end of the first PRSP cycle three years later. 
Eventually, civil society and the BWIs formed a coalition around criticizing limited participation.  
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Consultation 
Participation and consultation were often used interchangeably, or in a pair, when stakeholders were 
discussing the PRSP process in Malawi and for all actors consultations seemed to be as important as 
participation for implementing the principle of ownership. As was the case with participation, the 
term consultation was used rather often, although its meaning was quite differently perceived and 
defined by all stakeholders involved. However, there is a common understanding of some aspects of 
consultation and actors form discourse coalitions around it.  
First of all, all stakeholders, including parliament, agree on the fact that capacities for consultations 
are missing and that Civil Society Organizations, Members of Parliament, officials from district 
administrations and the like are not able to make significant contributions to the PRSP due to this 
lack of capacities. Although no clear capacity building efforts had been made during the 
formulation process, both the World Bank and the government praised the “extensive ‘bottom-up’ 
consultations” (IMF and World Bank 2002: 2) and highlighted that the PRSP is “the product of a 
highly consultative process involving a broad range of stakeholders and represents a consensus 
about how Malawi can develop and achieve its core objective of poverty reduction” (GoM 2002: 
xi). However, in other documents the government underlined that consultation does not necessarily 
involve participation in decision making, and admitted that building ownership and consensus is not 
as simple as holding consultations (cf. GoM 2000: 19). Its ambivalent attitude towards consultations 
as means for participation in order to ensure ownership became clear in the I-PRSP, which had been 
developed in a non-participative process: the GoM imprudently announced that it had resisted “the 
temptation to consult for consultation’s sake to pacify the donor community” (ibid.: 19). It also 
warned that ineffective consultations which have no impact on policies might lead to consultation 
fatigue, and admitted that this was the case in previous public consultations it had held. From these 
statements it became clear that the GoM was not truly committed to the idea of consultations. 
Consequently, MEJN responded that consultations, which it perceived as a “top-down process” at 
that time, must not be stopped, rather the process should be improved so it could inform the content 
and improve the ownership of the strategy (cf. MEJN 2001a: 4; 15). The government’s skepticism 
towards the participative elements of the PRSP was also known to parliament which confirmed that 
the GoM regarded participation and consultations merely as a donor-imposed precondition for debt 
relief (cf. Chimango 2002: 1). 
 
Donor involvement 
The starting point of the PRSP approach is the assumption that donor driven development strategies 
are less effective and that countries should be in the driver’s seat in the PRSP process. There was a 
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general consensus on that fact and when national ownership of the PRSP was discussed, donor 
involvement was also mentioned, both implicitly and explicitly. Donors were most reluctant to 
speak about their role in the formulation process, the government hardly ever referred to it and was 
rarely critical about it, while Civil Society Organizations both welcomed and rejected donor 
involvement, depending on the context.  
 
There was no doubt about the fact that the process of PRSP formulation was clearly pre-set by the 
BWIs. All stakeholders, including donors, reveal that there was donor pressure or that the process 
was BWI driven (cf. Banda 2005; Bwalya 2004: 16; GoM 2002: 74; World Bank 2003: 18). 
However, in Malawi the World Bank and the Fund did not only pre-set the process, they also got 
involved in the formulation as such and provided inputs for the PRSP’s content. As outlined above, 
this was especially the case in macro-economic policy. While the government only touched on BWI 
involvement very briefly in its PRSP documents, the World Bank said in its Country Assistance 
Strategy document that the Malawian government “welcomed the Bank’s participation in the PRSP 
theme groups” (World Bank 2003: 15). MEJN openly criticized the negative impact such 
involvement has on country ownership and expressed concern whether the PRSP could differ 
significantly from previous BWI initiatives (MEJN 2001a: 12-3). However it is noteworthy that 
MEJN welcomed the Bank’s and Fund’s involvement when it came to making the process more 
participatory by getting more civil society representatives to join the Thematic Working Groups and 
the drafting team (cf. MEJN 2001a: 4; VENRO 2008).  
 
Consensus 
A story line which was repeatedly voiced by all stakeholders involved is that the PRSP needs to 
reflect a broad consensus in order to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of policy 
implementation. The term consensus seems to have replaced the term ownership which was hardly 
ever used, possibly due its difficult operational definition which strongly depends on the role each 
stakeholder envisages for him/herself.  
In the full PRSP, which has an extensive chapter on participation, the GoM highlighted repeatedly 
that the preparation process was designed to ensure that there was consensus on the strategy across 
Malawian society and that all stakeholders were engaged in the process (cf. GoM 2002: 106). It also 
pointed out that one of the overall objectives of the process is to “build consensus on Malawi’s 
Poverty reduction strategy in order to enhance likelihood of policy adoption, implementation and 
sustainability” (GoM 2000: 18). For the World Bank “participation and consensus building in 
government decisionmaking processes for macroeconomic policy formulation and implementation” 
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(Klugman 2002: 239) are a key output of a PRSP participatory process. In a handbook on strategic 
communication in the PRSP process, which is part of the Sourcebook, the World Bank explains that 
strategic communication is more than disseminating information to people, it is a means “to build  
consensus among stakeholders about the development agenda” (Mozammel and Zatlokal 2002: 3). 
Like the GoM and the World Bank, MEJN also repeatedly mentioned the need for consensus on 
policies in its PRSP documents repeatedly. It was eager to show that by participating in the PRSP 
process it did not aim at sabotaging, but at improving its contents, and at reaching agreement on 
them (cf. MEJN 2001b: 4).  
 
4.3.3 Findings of the Argumentative Discourse Analysis 
As outlined in chapter 3.2.2, discourse analysis is “the examination of argumentative structure in 
documents and other written or spoken statements as well as the practices through which these 
utterances are made” (Hajer 2006a: 66). Practices are the sites where language is used. In this 
analysis the PRSP process itself and its various elements, for instance the Thematic Working Group 
meetings, workshops and consultations which were held, as well as reports and position papers 
which were written, are practices.92 According to Hajer  (ibid.: 66), the aim of any Argumentative 
Discourse Analysis is to examine how the definition of a political problem relates to the particular 
narrative in which it is discussed, and the aim of my analysis was to examine how the formulation 
and the ownership of development policies in Malawi is related to the World Bank’s ownership 
discourse. 
 
In the previous chapter I examined how different stakeholders perceived the concept of ownership, 
their roles in the PRSP process and how the topic issue was discussed. Particular attention was paid 
to the employment of story lines, narratives and metaphors by each actor in order to identify 
discourses and discourse coalitions, namely coalitions around specific story lines.93 Since discourse 
coalitions are not primarily connected to a particular person, but are related to practices in the 
context of which actors employ story lines, it is possible that some actors utter contradictory 
statements, or even reproduce different discourse-coalitions, as was the case in Malawi.  
It can be observed that in discussing the concept of ownership, and its proxy participation and 
consultation, as well as donor involvement as some sort of counterpart to ownership, different 
                                                 
92
  A more detailed discussion of Hajer’s definition of practices can be found in chapter 3.2.2.  
93
  An overview of different story lines applied by the BWIs, the GoM, civil society and the parliament can be found in 
Annex F. This overview is strongly condensed and presents some preliminary results of steps 1 to 7 of Hajer’s 
proposed approach for conducting discourse analysis (cf. chapter 3.2). Their employment was discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
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stakeholders employed various story lines and formed diverse discourse-coalitions in Malawi. It is 
noteworthy that during PRSP implementation unusual coalitions around specific political interests 
were formed, as the World Bank and IMF supported civil society for instance.  
 
Throughout the PRSP process the Government of Malawi uttered contradictive statements and 
reproduced different discourse-coalitions at the same time. In general, it can be said that 
government statements which were made in official documents such as the I-PRSP, the full PRSP or 
the Progress Reports were uncritical of the PRSP approach and supportive of the BWIs. In these 
statements the GoM tended to let aside controversies which emerged during the PRSP process. 
However, in statements made “off the record”, such as for instance in interviews for studies, and in 
statements which were expected to be off the record, such as comments to MEJN, the GoM 
employed different story lines. Here it tended to be more skeptical of the PRSP process as such, the 
scope and range of participation, as well as of donor involvement. After the end of the first PRSP 
cycle and after general elections had been held, the GoM raised criticism of the BWIs more openly.  
The BWIs tended to be very reluctant to make comments on the PRSP formulation process. In the 
Joint Staff Advisory Notes and the Country Assistance Strategy they emphasized the high quality of 
the formulation process, and praised the GoM for arranging broad participation in the beginning of 
the PRSP cycle. Towards the end of the process, after the GoM had also been under crossfire from 
several donors due to weak performance, the BWIs criticized the GoM for some deficiencies and 
the lack of participation in the review of the PRSP.  
MEJN, representing the voice of most Malawian Civil Society Organizations, was uttering 
consistent statements throughout the formulation process, but formed discourse coalitions with 
varying actors based on who else was supporting its concerns. While it joined a discourse coalition 
with the BWIs arguing for stronger involvement of CSOs in the PRSP process in order to make 
participation more meaningful, it formed a (informal) discourse coalition with the GoM when 
criticizing the BWIs for their strong involvement in the formulation process and deploring that the 
process was donor driven. Taking the prevailing skepticism of the Malawian civil society towards 
international donors into account, it is somewhat surprising that donor involvement increased the 
possibilities for broader and more serious involvement by CSOs in the PRSP formulation process in 
Malawi.  
 
The most prominent discourse coalition formed by all stakeholders which can be identified in my 
analysis is the one around ownership of PRSPs, namely the hypothesis that ownership will enhance 
the effectiveness of reform and development policies. Although doubts about how ownership can be 
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ensured and how donor involvement can diminish national ownership were raised by MEJN (and 
the GoM when talking off the record), no one questioned the Comprehensive Development 
Framework, the PRSP approach, and the new emphasis on ownership as such. Achieving ownership 
of the PRSP in order to enhance policy implementation was a goal for all stakeholders involved.  
The other strong discourse coalition was the one formed by MEJN and the World Bank who jointly 
advocated for stronger and more meaningful participation of civil society, parliamentarians and the 
private sector. Their definition of participation was wider than that of the government, especially 
when it came to participation in monitoring and evaluation.  
Another important discourse coalition voiced by civil society representatives, the GoM, and 
cautiously also by donors, was criticism of the existence of various forms of conditionality and BWI 
involvement. The PRSP process was perceived as donor imposed or donor driven, especially after 
the Bank and the Fund became involved in the Thematic Working Group on macro-economy and 
dominated the content of the PRSP in this sector.  
Last, a further particularly noteworthy discourse coalition was formed around the idea that the 
PRSP needs to reflect a broad consensus on the strategy. All stakeholders agreed that consensus 
needs to be formed around the PRSP policies by means of participation, and consensus-building 
was regarded as particularly important by the GoM and World Bank, which defined it as an overall 
objective or a key output of the PRSP process. Nevertheless, most stakeholders seem to have had a 
different idea of how such a consensus could and should emerge given their different 
understandings of participation.  
 
In order to measure the influence of discourse Hajer (2006a; 2006b) proposes a two-step procedure 
which assesses whether a discourse coalition is dominant in a given political realm. First, central 
actors should be forced to accept the rhetorical power of a new discourse. The situation here a 
discourse is widely used for conceptualizing the world is called “discourse structuration”. This is 
clearly the case in Malawi: the World Bank introduced the ownership discourse together with its 
new development paradigm and persuaded other central actors to accept it. As the findings of the 
analysis show, both national stakeholders, the GoM and civil society, use the concept of ownership 
and the hypothesis that ownership of policies will enhance implementation and sustainability of 
reforms. This was the case, even though the national stakeholders did not seem to have a clear 
understanding of its meaning and operationalization in the PRSP framework. All stakeholders are 
speaking about ownership and the proxy participation and/or consultation. 
Second, if the discourse solidifies into institutions and organizational practices of that given 
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political domain, and the actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given 
discourse, one can speak of “discourse institutionalization”. If both criteria are fulfilled, the 
particular discourse is deemed dominant, according to Hajer (2006a, 2006b). The second criterion is 
also fulfilled in Malawi: as the Bank and the Fund introduced the ownership discourse together with 
a policy tool, the PRSP, it provided the basis for allowing its discourse to become institutionalized 
from the outset. The ownership discourse solidifies into institutions and organizational practices 
through the participatory process and holding of consultations. Thus, as both criteria are fulfilled 
and the World Bank’s and the International Monetary Fund’s ownership discourse is dominant in 
development policy.  
 
4.4 Ownership in Malawi’s PRSP process: assessment based on the World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Department’s approach 
As outlined in chapter 3.2.2, I complete my findings by applying the criteria the World Bank has put 
forward to assess ownership in order to answer my third research question “Did Malawi ‘own’ its 
PRSP?” 
In the World Bank’s handbook “An Operational Approach for Assessing Country Ownership of 
Poverty Reduction Strategies”, the authors discuss the possibilities and difficulties of defining and 
measuring country ownership. They admit that “it is difficult to arrive at a definition of country 
ownership that is operational and empirically verifiable” (Cavassini and Entwistle 2005a: 2) and 
present four criteria to assess ownership proposed by the World Bank’s Operations and Evaluation 
Department (cf. ibid.: 2-7)94:  
(i) The locus of initiative for the policy must be in the government; 
(ii) The key policymakers responsible for implementation must be intellectually 
convinced that the goals to be pursued are the right ones; 
(iii) There must be evidence of public support from the top political and civic leadership; 
and 
(iv)  There must be evidence that the government is building support among the affected 
stakeholders and can rely on their cooperation. 
 
First of all, it is noteworthy that in these criteria the role of donors and the Bank and Fund are not 
mentioned explicitly although they play a significant role, especially for the first point. In the case 
of Malawi, as in all other countries which were producing a PRSP, the locus of program initiation 
                                                 
94
  The following is based on Cavassini and Entwistle 2005: 2-7 who draw on World Bank OED 1995: 64 and on 
Johnson and Wasty 1993, as well as on ODI 2001: 54-5. 
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was clearly not in the government, but in external donor agency. Development of a PRSP was 
mandatory for both debt relief and for lending from the Bank and the Fund. Although in theory 
governments were free to reject funds from both sources, in practice their choice was quite limited 
due to the lack of alternatives. Thus it can be said that the locus of initiative for the policy was 
external, not in the government. (cf. ODI 2001: 54-5)  
Second, when looking into the principle of ownership, key policymakers responsible for 
implementation did not seem to have been intellectually convinced that the goal to be pursued was 
the right one. As outlined in the previous chapter there was a lack of understanding of and 
skepticism towards the principle of country ownership and/or participation. In their early study 
which was completed while the full PRSP was still being developed, Jenkins and Tsoka (2001: 55) 
observed that government officials were extremely skeptical about the viability of the ownership–
effectiveness function. As for the contents of the PRSP, the GoM needed a long time to incorporate 
the PRSP policies into the budget and to start with implementation, which indicates that the goals to 
be pursued might not have been perceived as “the right ones” by key policy-makers.   
As regards support of the top leadership – the political dimension of a PRSP process – there was 
again no clear commitment from politicians. “It was apparently not until the end of the process that 
the President Muluzi himself fully grasped that the PRSP was more than a method for deciding how 
to spend resources freed up through HIPC debt relief” (Jenkins and Tsoka 2003: 201). Confusion 
and lack of information among the top political leaders prevented them from supporting the PRSP 
process pro-actively. As for the civic leadership, it can be said that NGOs and the Catholic church 
were in favor of the PRSP in general, but they remained critical about many aspects of the 
formulation process and its contents. In most of their comments they shed light on the shortcomings 
of the PRSP and thus do not appear to have been very supportive.  
The relationship between the government and other affected stakeholders was problematic as was 
shown in the previous chapters. The government did initiate a participative process and hold 
consultations, but when doing so it made an effort to limit the scope of these activities as much as 
possible. In short, the government solicited inputs it did not deem valuable. Therefore it failed to 
build support among affected stakeholders who initially had been willing to cooperate.  
Evidently, the four criteria for assessing ownership of poverty reduction strategies put forward by 
the World Bank and the IMF have not been fulfilled in Malawi. Thus it is obvious that Malawi did 
not “own” its PRSP.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examined the World Bank's and the International Monetary Fund's roles in development 
by analyzing their practices in the first PRSP process in Malawi. In the examination of the process, I 
was particularly concerned with how and why the idea of “ownership” was promoted by the World 
Bank, as well as with the tensions and contradictions that resulted from applying it in development 
policy.95 My analysis was guided by three research questions: 
(a) To which extent has the BWIs' development paradigm changed since the introduction of 
the PRSP approach with respect to ownership and participation?  
(b) What was the aid relationship between the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Government 
of Malawi, Parliament and Civil Society in the first PRSP process and how did it change 
over time?  
(c) Did Malawi “own” its PRSP? 
 
At the beginning of the paper an overview of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
their conceptualization of development and their activities was given. The BWIs’ shift to the PRSP 
approach and the principle of ownership were analyzed from a neo-Gramscian perspective. Then, I 
examined the process of introducing the PRSP approach in Malawi and the way in which the 
document itself was formulated, in order to answer whether the PRSP process effected a 
transformation in the relationship between donors, i.e. the Bank and the Fund, the Government of 
Malawi and civil society. This aid relationship was analyzed by means of an Argumentative 
Discourse Analysis based on Hajer (1995; 2006a; 2006b).96 This also gave insights into how the 
PRSP initiative was received by national stakeholders, and how far the behavior of the Bank and the 
Fund has altered in their views. Furthermore, it illustrated the scale of commitment shown and the 
types of action taken by all stakeholders involved. To answer how far the PRSP was nationally 
owned and how far it was imposed from outside, I completed the findings from the discourse 
analysis with results from an approach to assess ownership of PRSPs proposed by the World Bank.  
 
In what follows, I will first go back and discuss how and why the BWIs development paradigm 
changed since the introduction of the PRSP approach and examine the meaning of ownership from a 
                                                 
95
  The detailed research design can be found in chapter 1. 
96
  My research method is outlined in more detail in chapter 3.2. 
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neo-Gramscian perspective in order to answer my first research question. Drawing on that and the 
findings of my analysis from chapter 4, the remaining two research questions will be answered.97 
  
5.1 Ideologies of development or practices of power?  
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have played an increasingly important role as 
financers of development over the past 50 years. Their areas of activity have been widening over 
time and since the 1980s they have played a lead role in development policy and are have 
influenced North-South relations heavily. In order to get access to development finance from the 
Bank and the Fund, any borrowing country from the South had to agree to comply with a set of 
macroeconomic policy recommendations and fulfill certain conditionalities. By linking 
concessional lending to a set of macroeconomic policies the BWIs had a direct and profound 
influence over the ways in which Southern Countries organized their economies and integrated into 
the world economy. (cf. Woods 2006)  
The debt crisis in the 1980s helped the Bank and the Fund to increase their leverage towards 
Southern Countries and the developing world had virtually no alternative to following the BWIs’ 
policy prescriptions. From 1980 until the mid-1990s the BWIs promoted a set of policies which 
became known as the Washington Consensus, while the Structural Adjustment Programs were its 
most prominent policy tool. Key elements of the Washington Consensus, which aimed at 
macroeconomic stabilization in light of the debt crisis, were: macroeconomic prudence, economic 
outward orientation, domestic liberalization, liberalization of trade and finance, fiscal and monetary 
austerity, privatization, and minimal government intervention.98 Soon, all Southern Countries 
seeking funding from the Bank and the Fund were obliged to implement a SAP. (cf. Goldman 2005; 
Raffer and Singer 2001) 
As the SAP development approach proved not to be effective and not to bring about effects in 
macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth, the BWIs in the late 1990s announced to move 
away from the Washington Consensus towards a new development paradigm. It was widely 
believed that a lack of local enthusiasm for what appeared to be standard policy sets was due to 
limited “country ownership” of these programs and that this was leading to delays or failures in 
implementation. Consequently, the Bank and Fund began to argue the case for greater national 
ownership of development policies.  In the late 1990s a new development agenda, termed the Post 
                                                 
97
  At this point, I would like to repeat that I am aware of the limits of general findings which can be generated from a 
single-country study and refer to the limited scope of a Masters dissertation.  
98
  For a more detailed discussion of the Washington Consensus see chapter 2.2.2 or Raffer and Singer (2001) who give 
a very clear and detailed overview of economic development policy of the past 60 years.  
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Washington Consensus, was introduced and a new policy tool, the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper replaced its widely criticized predecessors, the SAPs. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers now 
form the basis of virtually all multilateral lending to the poorest Southern Countries. They are 
policy documents produced by borrower countries outlining the economic, social and structural 
programs envisaged to reduce poverty. The PRSP approach is regarded as the most concrete and 
widespread manifestation of the BWIs’ efforts to increase country ownership of development 
programs as it ostensibly prioritizes civil society participation in the formulation of the national 
poverty reduction strategy. (cf. Steward and Wang 2003: 2)  
Although PRSPs are ostensibly drawn up in a participative process and meant to be “owned” 
nationally, they must receive endorsement from the boards of both the Bank and the Fund before 
becoming effective. This limits the actual scope of national ownership of PRSPs as the BWIs have 
identified specific policy criteria for approval, namely: a sound macroeconomic framework and 
structural reform policies including trade and financial liberalization, fiscal prudence and low 
inflation, privatization, deregulation of labor markets and civil service reform, appropriate sectoral 
policies and programs, good governance and realistic costing and appropriate funding (cf. Klugman 
2002). Herein lies a fundamental contradiction: adopted PRSP policies must fit within a strategic 
framework imposed by the BWIs, and should simultaneously be freely chosen and “owned” 
nationally. (cf. Cammack 2004) The Bank’s and the Fund’s expectations of PRSP policies are very 
clear, especially when it comes to macroeconomics, where a neoliberal set of policies is required 
which hardly differs from that recommended in SAPs. True ownership of policies in terms of 
national self-determination is hardly possible and thus the BWIs’ development paradigm seems to 
have not changed since the introduction of the PRSP approach.  
 
A neo-Gramscian perspective can help make to make sense of the BWIs’ shift towards the PRSP 
approach, and of the reasons why the Bank and Fund introduced the ideas of ownership, civil 
society participation and poverty reduction while adhering to neoliberal economic policy.  
 
As outlined in chapter 2, the disputed question which neo-Gramscians aim to answer in their work 
is whether, and in what ways, a current world order can be described as hegemonic, in the sense of a 
particular model of state, economy, and society being diffused on a global scale and imposed by 
regulatory institutions (cf. Cox 1983; Schwarzmantel 2009a: 7). Cox’ complex three sphere model99 
                                                 
99
  See chapter 3.1.2.2. According to Cox (1983), hegemony is constituted by the interplay of three separate spheres of 
social activity, namely : (i) the social relations of production, consisting of the totality of social relations that 
engender particular social forces through material and ideational forms of social interaction; (ii) different forms of 
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which explains how hegemony is constituted proofs to be useful to examine global power 
structures: since the 1970s a restructuring of production has been taking place in the world economy 
which is often termed “globalization”, or “transnationalization of production” by neo-Gramscians 
This process has promoted the emergence of a transnational capitalist class and resulted in a change 
of forms of state with a shift from Keynesian welfare states to neoliberal competition states. As a 
consequence this has also changed the world order and the role of international institutions, which 
are now acting as regulatory bodies propagating the ideology of globalization, viz. promoting the 
interests of the transnational capitalist class and economically strong states. (cf. Rückert 2007; 
Taylor 2004: 126) In this context, Cox’ himself was speaking of a “nascent global historic bloc” 
(Cox 1999:12).  
 
According to Gill (1993, 1995) and Rückert (2006, 2007), the neoliberal world order is not yet 
hegemonic – or still “nascent” in Cox’ terms – due to the increasing coercion and domination which 
are needed and applied in the (re)production of neoliberal norms and practices.100 In Southern 
Countries for instance, highly contested neoliberal policies such as the SAPs and the PRSPs have 
faced increasing resistance from civil society as well as governments.  
 
In neo-Gramscian thinking the IMF and the World Bank are perceived as leading actors in the 
attempt to create hegemony around the current neoliberal world order, including in Southern 
Countries. In doing so, they work through ideology by building consensus rather than by using 
force. (cf. Robinson 2004; Rückert 2007) In his seminal work, Cox (1983) explained how 
hegemony can be (re)produced through international institutions, such as the BWIs, on an 
international level. Out of the six avenues of intervention he and Rückert (2007) propose, three can 
be identified as particularly relevant101 for explaining how the World Bank and the Fund work to 
restore hegemony and build consensus around the neoliberal world order in Southern Countries, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
state, encompassing historically contingent and amendable state- society complexes, and (iii) world orders, 
describing how relations in the international system can be organized . 
100
  Gill argues that a historic bloc can be established without necessarily enjoying hegemonic rule and points out that 
the transnational historic bloc is exercising supremacy, not hegemony (Gill 1993; 1995). For Gramsci, “supremacy 
prevails, when a situation of hegemony is not apparent and when dominance is exercised through an historical bloc 
over fragmented opposition” (Bieler and Morton 2004: 96-7, emphasis in original, see also chapter 3.1.3.1). 
Although the world order is yet not hegemonic, economic neoliberalism is hegemonic ideologically and in terms of 
policy (cf. chapter 3.1.3).  
101
  Cox presents five elements which are important to understand how hegemony operates through international 
institutions: (i) they embody rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders, (ii) they are themselves 
the product of the hegemonic world order, (iii) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order, (iv) they 
co-opt elites from peripheral states, and (v) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas. Rückert (2007) adds another 
element to Cox’ lists: the provision of material incentives to subaltern social forces. For a more detailed discussion 
of Cox’ model see chapter 3.1.2.3.   
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including Malawi, and how the introduction of the PRSP is helping them in this attempt:  
First, the BWIs work to coopt elites from Southern Countries to give an appearance of broad 
representation in order to legitimize their own policies.  
 
In the PRSP process, incorporating CSOs into the policymaking process could be seen as an attempt to 
coopt civil society actors in the developing world into the development framework [of the BWIs] and 
to legitimize the contested neoliberal policy reforms in developing countries. (Rückert 2007: 97).  
 
Second, the BWIs absorb, assimilate, and domesticate potentially dangerous ideas and adjust them 
to the dominant coalition (Cox 1983: 166-7). This is made “to make it seem as though the concerns 
of critics are being heard and taken seriously. In the process, however, the meaning of these ideas 
and concepts is usually transformed to fit the interests of the hegemonic forces” (Rückert 2007: 97). 
In the PRSP process, through participation and consultations the ideas and language of those who 
mobilize public support for change are absorbed, and then written into official documents and 
policies of the PRSP.  
 
As a consequence, the language and rhetoric of the [BWIs] changes, but the principles that determine 
the substance of the policies and procedures of the institution do not change. […] In doing so it 
appears to the public that the leaders of the campaign for popular participation and systemic change 
are now engaged in the policy process. (Paterson 2008: 9) 
 
This gives the impression that the issues they have been advocating have been incorporated into the 
PRSP. However, this is not the case, as the contents of the PRSP are widely pre-determined and the 
scope of participation is limited to consultation and information sharing, and does not involve the 
possibility to influence decision-making processes, as was the case in Malawi.  
Third, the BWIs provide material incentives to Southern Countries so as to coopt the “beneficiaries” 
into a hegemonic world view. These material incentives for instance can be debt relief under the 
HIPC initiative or increases in poverty-related spending for subsidizing the extremely poor who are 
usually most adversely affected by neoliberal policies. (cf. Rückert 2007)  
In Gramscian terms, this mechanism of assimilation can be called passive revolution or 
transformismo. It is a way to attain power through a process of compromise and amalgamation, 
without breaking the existent social fabric. Counter-hegemonic ideas and antagonistic groups 
became disorganized and some of their elements of them are integrated into the broader consensus 
(cf. Taylor 2004: 126).  
 
Civil society plays an important role in transformismo, as it does in the Malawian PRSP process. As 
discussed in chapter 2, civil society participation has become a crucial element of BWI practice 
with the introduction of the PRSP approach. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, this must be 
92 
understood in the context of the BWIs’ attempt to hegemony around the neoliberal world order: 
civil society is the ideological sphere where social struggles are fought, consensus is created and 
hegemony maintained,102 hence the BWIs’ turn towards civil society and formerly excluded groups 
– such as the poor, marginalized and rural communities – is no surprise (cf. Rückert 2007: 102). The 
policies proposed and accepted in the PRSP framework are focused on integrating the formerly 
excluded people in the formal economic system. Incentive structures which shape behavior in ways 
conductive to the promotion of competition and capitalist accumulation, such as for instance 
subsidization of health care and water, were created in an effort to control subaltern forces and 
coopt them into the neoliberal system as an example. (cf. Rückert 2006: 59) 
Thus, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, public participation can be seen as an attempt to facilitate 
hegemony-building by creating a broad-based consensus around development policies. The BWIs 
have acknowledged this function in the hypothesis which underlies the Malawian PRSP approach: 
participation in policy formulation will generate consensus and a sense of ownership, and will lead 
to domestic political support for reforms, making program implementation consequently more 
sustainable and effective. In this context and in view of Gramsci’s theory it is noteworthy that the 
need for creating consensus is explicitly highlighted by the BWIs, as well as the national 
stakeholders, in the PRSP documents in Malawi. As it becomes evident in the discourse analysis in 
chapter 4, the demand for consensus sometimes even replaces the demand for ownership. The 
World Bank also underlines the role strategic communication can play in consensus building, and 
reveals that much of participation in the PRSP process is not about real ownership of policies (cf. 
Mozammel and Zatlokal 2002: 3). As it appears from the Malawian PRSP experience, the main goal 
of participation in the PRSP process is not the incorporation of alternative ideas by civil society into 
the strategy, but rather the creation of a consensus around the content of the PRSP, whose neoliberal 
parameters have already been largely defined before the participatory process started (cf. Rückert 
2006). Therefore, from a neo-Gramscian perspective the World Bank’s policy shift towards the 
PRSP approach and the emphasis on country ownership are fully in line with the ambition to push 
the neoliberal economic paradigm and to establish a hegemonic world order because  
 
the commitment to poverty reduction and even the commitment to economic growth is a consistent 
commitment to the systematic transformation of social relations and institutions in the developing 
world, in order to generalize and facilitate capitalist accumulation on a global scale, and build 
specifically capitalist hegemony through the promotion of participation and ownership.  (Cammack 
2004) 
                                                 
102
  According to Gramsci „the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling 
class not only justifies and maintains dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” 
(Hoare and Nowel-Smith 1971: 178 quoted in Rückert 2007). This means the state and civil society are not separate 
spheres, as dominant social forces always use civil society in order to maintain hegemony.  
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Thus, to summarize, the fundamentals of the BWIs’ development paradigm have not changed 
significantly since the introduction of the PRSP approach. Ownership and participation are tools 
supposed to build consensus around these BWI policies.  
 
5.2 The aid relationship between stakeholders 
In Malawi, the power relationship between both multilateral and bilateral donors and the 
government had been asymmetrical, conflict-ridden and was characterized by the use of 
conditionalities to promote reforms which generated nominal compliance followed by non-
implementation (cf. ODI: 2006). The introduction of the Comprehensive Development Framework 
and its policy tool, the PRSP, offered, at least potentially and to some extent, an opportunity for 
changing the aid relationship between the BWIs and Malawi. This potential could only be used to a 
certain extent, primarily because of the maintenance of conditionalities, which were a source of 
much contention. (cf. Bwalya 2004: 6; Jenkins and Tsoka 2003: 209) 
 
When analyzing the configuration of power within and the relationship between the three groups of 
stakeholders involved in the PRSP process in Malawi – the BWIs and bilateral donors, the 
Government of Malawi, and civil society – based on the findings from chapter 4, the following 
picture emerges.  
Although there were some differences in the level of knowledge about and commitment to the 
PRSP between single ministries, with the Ministry of Finance taking the lead in the formulation 
process, the government acted as one. The parliament, which in general has a weak role in Malawi, 
was not strongly involved in the formulation process, although the final PRSP had to be approved 
by parliament. In sum, there were no internal power shifts at the state level. The same applies to the 
BWIs and other donors. The BWIs remained gatekeepers for development finance and although 
some donors slightly criticized the BWIs for getting too much involved into the PRSP formulation 
process, their criticism had no impact on the BWIs’ behavior. (cf. Booth et al. 2006; Bwalya 2004: 
27-8; Jenkins and Tsoka 2003) Quite the contrary applies to the Malawian civil society which was 
fragmented and weak before the PRSP process and underwent strong changes. During the initiation 
phase more than 20 CSOs organized themselves and founded a network, MEJN, in order to be able 
to better advocate their perspectives and interests in the PRSP policy making process. MEJN 
underwent strong growth in terms of membership during the first PRSP cycle,103 but its legitimacy 
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  It seems that MEJN has suffered from internal problems which have had a negative impact on its work after the end 
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in terms of representativeness is debatable (cf. VENRO 2008). For instance, critics argued that 
interests of the rural population and the poor have not been taken into consideration by civil society.  
As for the relationship between the three groups of stakeholders, it can be observed that civil 
society strengthened its position vis-à-vis the state and formed a coalition with the BWIs and 
donors. This was apparent when the civil society felt excluded from participating in the formulation 
process of the I-PRSP and with support from donors lobbied the government to ensure that civil 
society representatives would be more involved in the remaining PRSP process. Taking the 
prevailing skepticism of Malawian CSOs towards international donors into account, it seems 
somewhat paradoxical, that the latter’s interventions facilitated broader formal involvement of 
NGOs in the process. It should be kept in mind that forming this coalition had its price and that a 
“trade off is discernable between assertion and strengthening via-à-vis the state at the cost of greater 
dependence of donor funding” (Bwalya et al 2004: 27). However, despite the strengthened position 
of civil society the government tended to dominate the process at the national level and CSOs had 
no decisive say. In Malawi, civil society participation has been wide but shallow, as it was limited to 
consultation, rather than including joint decision making (cf. Steward and Wang 2003: 27). As for 
the relationship between the BWIs and the government, no significant shift or change occurred and 
the aid relationship remained virtually the same. As the PRSP came with many strings attached and 
given the government’s high aid dependency, it had virtually no possibility to resist against the 
BWIs. The latter were able to influence the content of the PRSP through conditionality and thus 
dominated the process. (cf. Bwalya et al. 2004)  
 
Thus, the aid relationship between the stakeholders is still problematic and the BWIs tend to 
dominate it. Through the PRSP process civil society gained influence in Malawi and strengthened 
its position, particularly vis-à-vis the government.  
 
5.3 Ownership of development strategies 
As became evident in chapter 4, the PRSP approach did not bring about the alleged change in the 
nature of conditionality in Malawi, and the process was perceived as donor driven, rather than 
“owned” nationally by Malawian stakeholders, despite broad participation and consultation. The 
initiative for developing the PRSP did not come from national stakeholders. The persistence of a set 
of BWI conditionalities already known from the Washington Consensus era and its Structural 
Adjustment Programs posed an obstacle for generating a dynamic of national ownership of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of the first PRSP cycle. (Walter Eberlei, personal communication [05.11.09]) 
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Malawi PRSP. This would not have been such a great problem if the BWI conditionalities coincided 
to a large extent with the views of the government. (cf. Rückert 2007, Steward and Wang 2003) As 
this was not the case in Malawi, it came to direct donor involvement in sectoral policies, especially 
macro-economic policy, when the government wanted to part from standard BWI policies. (cf. ODI 
2001) The other major constraint to national ownership was the absence of high-level political 
commitment to serious reform, as is shown in chapter 4.4. 
 
Thus, since the PRSP process was not initiated by national stakeholders and there was only weak 
support for it, it is obvious that Malawi did not “own” its PRSP. However, it needs to be 
acknowledged that the participatory nature of the PRSP process has underpinned the legitimacy of 
the policy documents and consensus has been built around them. (cf. Bwalya et al 2004: 26) 
 
5.4 Ownership or empowerment? 
PRSPs were intended to increase national “ownership” of programs and reforms through extensive 
public participation. The findings show that – as I assumed in my hypothesis – Malawian civil 
society was strongly involved in the PRSP formulation process, but it could not make meaningful 
contributions to strategy design as the degree of participation stopped far short of joint decision 
making and control. The policy shift towards increased ownership was meant to increase local 
support for BWI policies through creating consensus by means of participation. The government, 
which was formally leading the process on the national level, was also constrained in influencing 
the design of policies, especially macroeconomic policy. The fact that the PRSP had to comprise 
certain reform policies, which were very similar to previous BWI recommendations made in SAPs, 
suggests that the BWIs’ development paradigm has not changed substantially since the introduction 
of the PRSP approach. Thus PRSPs may give a sense of greater national influence and ownership, 
but since there is no significant underlying change, the BWIs’ turn to ownership is basically rhetoric 
and does not have empowerment of Southern Countries as a goal. The Bank and the Fund were 
successful in changing perceptions: they managed to present PRSPs as nationally owned through 
emphasizing public participation in the process, and thereby increased enthusiasm for their policies 
in Southern Countries. In neo-Gramscian terms, their passive revolution was successful.  
 
5.5 Ideas for further research 
This study only analyzed “ownership” in the formulation process of the first PRSP in Malawi, and 
looked into implementation only very briefly. Thus further research could examine implementation, 
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and the time frame of such an analysis could also be extended to the second PRSP cycle. A 
comparative examination of the countries’ experience with their first and their second PRSPs could 
be carried in order to analyze how developments changed over time.  
As was mentioned above, there are limits to general findings which can be generated from a single-
country study, and thus further research would need to look into the PRSP experience of other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other continents in order to be able to make more general 
conclusions.  
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ANNEX  
 
 
ANNEX A 
Figure 1 
Hegemony: Relation between spheres of activity 
 
Hegemony within a historical structure is constituted on three spheres of activity which are in 
relation to each other. Social forces operate within and across all spheres o activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bieler, Andreas; Morton, David (2004): A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: 
neo-Gramscian perspective in International Relations. In: Capital & Class; Spring 2004, No 82, p. 88.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Hegemony: Relation between elements of spheres of activity 
 
Within each of the spheres three elements reciprocally combine to constitute a historical structure.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bieler, Andreas; Morton, David (2004): A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: 
neo-Gramscian perspective in International Relations. In: Capital & Class; Spring 2004, No 82, p. 88.  
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ANNEX B 
Figure 3 
Map of the Republic of Malawi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations (2004): Map No. 3858 Rev. 3 
ANNEX C 
Figure 4 
The PRSP cycle: successive steps and actors involved 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bretton Woods Project (2003): Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs): A Rough Guide. p.9  
ANNEX D 
Table 1 
Chronology of the PRSP Process in Malawi (revised schedule) 
 
October 2000 Issuance of Issues Paper by the Technical Committee 
December 2000 Malawi reaches the decision point under the enhanced HIPC Initiative 
January 2001 Official launch of PRSP process 
January 2001 Launch of Thematic Working Groups at the Malawi Institute of Management. 
Clarification of roles and discussion of terms of reference 
February 2001 District consultations in all 27 districts, facilitated by the TC and some TWG members 
April 2001 Circulation of first PRSP draft 
May 2001 Workshops for comments on first draft by TC, experts, civi society and TWGs, and 
charting of the way forward 
May 2001 Stakeholders’ meeting on draft PRSP document 
July 2001 Sharing of TWG costing experience and addressing problems 
August 2001 Status reports by TWGs and charting the way forward 
September 2001 Media campaign 
October 2001 Workshop for comments on first draft by private sector, traditional authorities, 
councilors, donors, and civil society 
October 2001 Comments on first draft by Members of Parliament 
November- 
December 2001 Finalization of third draft by drafting team 
December 2001 Discussion of third draft by Principal Secretaries 
January 2002 Discussion of comments by donors, based on written submissions 
March 2002 Cabinet discussion of PRSP document 
March 2002 Submission of final civil society comments, coordinated by MEJN 
April 2002 Final draft completed, printed and circulated 
April 2002 National launch of PRSP document 
 
Source: Bwalya, Edgar et al. (2004): Poverty reduction strategy processes in Malawi and Zambia. CMI Report. 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/2004%5Crep%5Cr2004-8.pdf [22.02.2011] 
ANNEX E 
Table 2 
Reforms contained in Malawi PRSP 
 
Economic Management  
Reliance on macroeconomic stability for poverty reduction  
Trade Policy (tariff reduction/export promotion)  
Monetary Restraint X 
Exchange Rate Policy  
Fiscal Restraint X 
Tax & Customs Reforms X 
Price Control/Wage Policies  
User Fees  
Sectoral Policies X 
 
 
Public Sector Governance and Management  
Budget Management X 
MTEF X 
Decentralization X 
Public Administration Reform X 
Anti-corruption X 
 
 
Financial Sector Reform  
Financial Institutions  
Financial Intermediation Policies  
Private Sector Development  
Privatization  
Price Liberalisation  
Legal and Judicial Reform X 
Land Tenure Laws X 
 
 
Social Sector Reforms  
Education X 
Health X 
Social Protection/Employment Promotion X 
Rural Livelihoods  
Food security X 
Environmental Protection X 
Ethnic Minority Protection  
Gender Equity X 
Children/Disabled X 
Vulnerable Groups X 
Macro and Poverty sections separate? Yes 
Ex ante assessment of impact? Yes 
 
Source: Stewart, Frances; Wang, Michael (2003):  Do PRSPs empower poor countries and disempower the 
World Bank, or is it the other way round?  QEH Working Paper Series – Working Paper Number 108, p. 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Poverty and macro-reform linkages in Malawi policy 
 
Links between growth and poverty reduction  
Links between Poverty and Trade Policy  
Links between Poverty and Monetary Policy  
Links between Poverty and Tax Policies/Fiscal Reform  
Links between Poverty and Privatization  
Links between Poverty and Legal/Judicial Reforms  
Links between Poverty and Civil Service Reforms  
Links between Poverty and Financial Sector Reforms  
Assessment of Past Policies X  
Discussion of policy trade-offs  
Poverty Impact Evaluation  
 
Source: Stewart, Frances; Wang, Michael (2003):  Do PRSPs empower poor countries and disempower the 
World Bank, or is it the other way round?  QEH Working Paper Series – Working Paper Number 108, p. 24 
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ANNEX G 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the Bretton Woods Institutions’ roles in development by analyzing their 
practices with respect to “ownership” in Malawi and focuses on the formulation process of 
Malawi’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). It is concerned with why and how 
the idea of “ownership” has been actively promoted by the World Bank, as well as with the 
contradictions that resulted from applying it in development policy. Applying a neo-
Gramscian perspective, the paper examines to which extent the development paradigm of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund changed since the introduction of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy approach with respect to “ownership” and participation. The aid 
relationship between the Bretton Woods Institutions and national stakeholders in Malawi and 
its change over time are examined by means of Argumentative Discourse Analysis, and the 
paper asks whether Malawi “owned” its PRSP. It comes to the conclusion that Bretton Woods 
Institutions’ development paradigm has not changed substantially. The policy shift towards 
increased “ownership” was meant to increase local support for Bank and Fund policies 
through creating the sense of greater influence by means of participation. 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Rollen der Bretton Woods Institutionen im Entwicklungsbereich 
anhand ihrer Praktiken hinsichtlich „ownership“ in Malawi. Der Schwerpunkt der 
Untersuchung liegt auf dem Prozess der Entwicklung des ersten Strategiepapiers zur 
Armutsminderung (PRSP). Sie befasst sich damit, warum und wie das „ownership“-Konzept 
durch die Weltbank vorangetrieben wurde, sowie mit den aus seiner Umsetzung 
resultierenden Widersprüchen für Entwicklungspolitik(en). Von einem neo-Gramscianischen 
Ansatz ausgehend untersucht die Arbeit, inwieweit sich das Entwicklungsparadigma der 
Weltbank und des Internationalen Währungsfonds seit der Einführung des 
Armutsminderungsstrategie-Ansatzes hinsichtlich „ownership“ und Partizipation verändert 
hat. Der Wandel der Beziehung zwischen den Bretton Woods Institutionen und der nationalen 
Beteiligten in Malawi wird mittels argumentativer Diskursanalyse untersucht und die Frage 
gestellt, ob Malawis Strategiepapier zur Armutsminderung tatsächlich im nationalen 
Eigentum lag. Die Arbeit kommt zum Schluss, dass das Entwicklungsparadigma der Bretton 
Woods Institutionen sich in der Praxis nicht grundlegend verändert hat. Der Kurswechsel hin 
zu „ownership“ zielte lediglich darauf ab, lokale Unterstützung für Politiken der Bank und des 
Fonds zu sichern und dies geschah anhand der Vermittlung des Gefühls erhöhter 
Einflussmöglichkeiten durch Partizipation.  
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